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Preface 
The following essays are not systematically 
linked with one another. What they have in 
common is that they all deal with Wittgenstein's 
philosophy, and that they are throughout criti- 
cal with regard to positions which are proposed 
in the literature on Wittgenstein. The first 
five essays try to give interpretations of 
particular sections of the Philosophical Inves- 
tigations The sixth is a critique of one 
writer's interpretation of Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy. In the last essay the author tries 
to make Wittgenstein's later philosophy fruitful 
for one field of modern non-classical logic. 
Another point of contact is that all the essays 
in this volume are connected with the Wittgen- 
stein Archives at the University of Bergen. The 
essays of Peter Philipp go back to two lectures 
which he delivered in Bergen in spring 1992, as 
a guest of the Archives and the Institute of 
Philosophy. The other essays were written in 
Bergen, during the author's stay at the Archives 
between October 1991 and December 1992. This 
stay was supported by the Alexander von 
Humboldt-Foundation (Germany) and the Norwegian 
Research Council. I wish to express my thanks 
for the opportunity to work at the Archives. But 
above all I must acknowledge my gratitude to the 
colleagues from the Archives, Claus Huitfeldt, 
Ole Letnes, Alois Pichler, and Astrid Castell, 
for their generous help. I should also thank 
Peter Cripps for his help with the English 
proof-reading. Last but far from least I am in- 
debted to Prof. Tore Nordenstam (Bergen) and 
Prof. Eike von ~avigny (Bielefeld), who agreed 
to act as my advisers in this work. 
Richard Raatzsch 
Bergen, December 1992 
Abbreviations for works by Wittgenstein 
TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. 
D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1961. 
BIB and BrB The Blue and the Brown Book, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958. 
OC On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe 
and G.H. von wright, tr. D. Paul and 
G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1969. 
PI 
RoF 
philosophical ~nvestigations, ed. 
G.E.M. Anscornbe and R. Rhees, tr. 
G.E.M. Anscornbe, 2nd. edition, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. 
Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough', 
tr. A.C. Miles and R. Rhees, The 
Human World no. 3(May 1971), pp. 28- 
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Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscornbe and G.H. 
von Wright, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1967. 
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Nyman, tr. P. Winch, Oxford: 
Blackwell 1980. 
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stein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) pp. 35ff.) are 
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Philosophical Investigations 2 : 
Wittgenstein's Remarks on a Complete Language 
In this paper I shall primarily try to give an 
extensive interpretation of some remarks from 
the beginning of the PI which gave rise to 
several objections. Some of them were pointed 
out several decades ago, others are more cur- 
rent.' In my eyes some of the objections express 
uncertainty about content and role of the re- 
marks in question, whereas others express a 
philosophical position which is different from 
Wittgenstein's. Whereas the first group can be 
answered by giving a consistent interpretation, 
the second needs another kind of answer. I will 
try to give one in form of a critique of a 
critique, based on Wittgenstein's philosophy. My 
main subject will be two essays of Audun 0 f ~ t i . ~  
I will start with the interpretation (section 
I); hereafter the critique will be reconstructed 
(section 11). In the last section (111) an 
answer, consisting mainly of a diagnosis con- 
cerning the reasons for the critique, will be 
given. 
' Cf.: Rhees 119781, Manser 119731. Mosedale [I9781 
0fsti (1985, 19901. 
"mfsti 11985, 13901. In the following I will refer 
to both articles with name, date and page-number in the 
text. 
Wittgenstein's remarks which are in question 
here belong to the first sections of the PI. The 
word "complete" occurs first in PI 2. I take it 
to be appropriate first to consider the context 
of this occurence. 
In PI 1 Wittgenstein quotes a passage from 
Augustine on his learning (and use of3) lan- 
guage. In these remarks we get, in Wittgen- 
stein's view, "a particular picture of the 
essence of human language", according to which 
"the individual words in language name objects - 
sentences are combinations of such names. " In 
this particular picture we find, according to 
Wittgenstein, "the roots of the following idea: 
Every word has a meaning. This meaning is corre- 
lated with the word. It is the object for which 
the word stands." For the sake of exegetical 
clarity we have to register that Wittgenstein is 
concerned with three different things: 
(i) Augustine's description of (his) learnins 
- - - 
etc., 
(ii) a picture of the essence of human lan- 
guage, and 
(iii) an idea of the meaning of a word. 
The phrase "these remarks, . . . , give us'' indi- 
cates that (i) presupposes (ii)' and the phrase 
' Augustine's remarks on his use of language in the 
quotation are restricted to one - the last - sentence 
(see below1 . 
' The German text has: "In diesen Worten erhalten 
wir . . . "  (my italics - R . R . ) .  This is different from: 
"Mit diesen Worten erhalten wir . . . O m .  In German one can 
say: "Er beschrieb den Berg mit den Worten . . ." ("He 
described the mountain with the words . . . " ) . One cannot 
say: "Er beschrieb den Berg in den Worten . . . " ,  but "In 
der Beschreibung seiner Wanderung steckte auch eine 
Beschreibung des bestiegenen Berges.". Similarly, 
someone who utters "Peter beats his wife." does not say 
(in one sense of saying), that Peter has a wife, or 
that his wife exists. But what he says presupposes - to 
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"in this picture . . . we find the roots.. . "  
indicates that (iii) also presupposes (ii). (ii) 
is then, one could say, at the heart of the 
whole section. Nevertheless, the presuppostion 
(ii) does not exhaust its respective antecedents 
( i )  and (iii). 
The next three steps taken by Wittgenstein are: 
- to register that Augustine "does not speak of 
there being any difference between kinds of 
word", 
- to give a diagnosis according to which some- 
body describing the learning of language in 
Augustine's manner is "thinking primarily of 
nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'bread', and of 
people's names, and only secondarily of the 
names of certain actions and properties; and of 
the remaining kinds of word as something that 
will take care of itself" ( ) ,  and 
- to describe a special use of language - the 
well-known shopkeeper-example. 
The first two comments are given from the point 
of view of our language. In our language there 
are different kinds of words like nouns, proper 
names, names of actions, of properties, etc. The 
first two steps are furthermore, as I would put 
it, taken from an internal point of view with 
respect to Augustine's remarks, that is, in 
these points Wittgenstein restricts his own 
comments to Augustinels description. These 
comments are also restricted to the topics which 
be true or false - these propositions. If this is 
accepted, then it is no problem to say, that someone 
who says (in the sense above) "Peter beats his wife.", 
also says (in another sense of saying, e.g. in the 
sense of "saying implicitly") that Peter has a wife, or 
that Peter's wife exists. Therefore I use the word 
'presupposition". With regard to the relation between 
(iii) and (ii) the case is similar. (Note the definite 
article in "die Wurzeln"!l 
are circumscribed by (ii) and (iii) . The func- 
tions of these comments are: 
(a) to make explicit what - with regard to (ii) 
and (iii) - gives Augustine's description (i.e. 
(i)) a prima facie plausibility, and 
(b) to remind the reader that there are more 
kinds of words in our language than Augustine in 
writing and the reader in reading may have been 
thinking of. 
With (a) Wittgenstein implicitly accepts that a 
description of the learning of language must be 
brought into accordance with, or must correspond 
to, a picture of the essense of human language - 
that is: with a picture of what it is that has 
been learned - and with an idea of the meaning 
of a word. To see why Wittgenstein says that 
somebody describing the learning of language in 
Augustine's manner is thinking primarily of 
nouns like "table" and of proper names one must 
register a characteristic of Augustine's de- 
scription. He speaks not only about objects but 
furthermore about the elders moving towards 
something, the play of their eyes, their "seek- 
ing, having, rejecting, or avoiding something", 
about their meaning to point out, the expression 
of their faces, their state of mind, his "seeing 
what they tried to name by the sound they ut- 
tered". Augustine's description is full of 
mental predicates5, especially those which are 
connected with visual experience of things and 
with attitudes towards material objects. Tables, 
chairs, the Chinese Wall and Marilyn Monroe are 
- contrary to red and five - paradigmatic exam- 
ples for entities one can move towards, see, 
Cf.: Savigny [ 1 9 8 8 1 ,  comment on PI 1. In the 
following I will refer to the commentaries by Bak- 
er/Hacker, Hallett and Savigny with name(s1 only, if 
the comment(s) of the section which is in the text in 
question is/are meant. Otherwise I will give the date 
and the number of the page. Translations from Savigny's 
commentary are mine, if not otherwise indicated. 
reject, avoid, seek, etc. 
The third step is taken from an external point 
of view, that is, Augustine's description of his 
learning (and use of) language is contrasted 
with a description of a simple example of lan- 
guage in use - the well-known shopkeeper-exam- 
ple. The connection between the first two steps 
on the one hand and the third step on the other 
is at least twofold: 
- whatever the learning of language may consist 
of, it should enable the child to use the lan- 
guage, that is to "operate with words" [PI 116, 
- our operation with words includes operating 
with words like "apple", "red", and "five" as 
described in the shopkeeper-example in PI 1. 
Whereas Augustine's description of the learning 
of language seems to fit to the use of, or 
operation with, the word "apple" the following 
questions arise with regard to the other two 
words: "'But how does he (i.e. the shopkeeper - 
R . R . )  know where and how he is to look up the 
word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 
'five'?'" [PI 11 These questions arise because 
it is not prima facie plausible that the uses of 
the words "red" and especially "five" could be 
This is also accepted, in some sense, by Augus- 
tine: "Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their 
proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt 
to understand what objects they signified; and aEter I 
had trained my mouth to form these signs,I used them to 
express my own desires." (PI 1, my italics -R.R.) One 
could imagine that the shopkeeper-example starts with 
the sentence "I have the desire to get five red ap- 
ples.", and then continues with the written text. 
Notice also that in the German original the passage 
" .  . . die ( that is: "die Worter", "the words" -R.R. ) 
ich wieder und wieder, an ihren bestimmten Stellen in 
verschiedenen Satzen, aussprechen horte." has no 
grammatical subject. Correct would be e.g. : ". . . die 
ich sie (that is: "die Erwachsenen", "the adults" - 
R.R.) wieder und wieder, ..., aussprechen hbrte." 
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learned in the way indicated by Augustine's 
description.' 
Instead of giving an answer, Wittgenstein repu- 
diates the question: "Well, I assume that he 
acts as I have described." [PI 11 What gives 
Wittgenstein the right to do this? He says: 
"Explanations come to an end somewhere." [PI 11 
At first sight this doesn't seem to be a good 
reason for the repudiation, for this phrase, one 
could object, is true despite our understandable 
need for explanations in various situations. For 
this remark to be a reason for repudiating the 
question one should imagine what an answer - in 
the context of the discussion of PI 1 - could 
consist of. In the style of Augustine the answer 
could be a refined description of the learning 
of language. But this would nevertheless have 
been provoked by the description of the use of, 
or the operation with, the words given by Witt- 
genstein, for the question quoted above arises 
just because it is not prima facie plausible how 
Augustine's report could fit the use of the 
words "red" and especially "five". We see, the 
refined description of the learning of language 
would be dependent on the description of the use 
of language.' But nevertheless, the repudiation 
of the question is something like. a break in the 
argumentation. The effect and the point of this 
move is that it turns one's thoughts to the 
description of the use of, or the operation 
' With "not a priori plausible that" is not meant 
"impossible that". Cf. Wittgenstein's remarks in PI 
28ff. which lead to the first summary of the discussion 
of Augustine's description in PI 32. 
' This observation supports my claim that (ii) lies 
at the heart of (i) and (iii). I suppose here that (ii) 
has primarily to do with the use of language, i.e. that 
the essence of language is the essence of the spoken or 
written language as it is used. 
with, words as the most important subject of a 
search for the essence of human language in a 
Wittgensteinian manner. An effect of this redi- 
recting of interest consists in the concentra- 
tion on what people are doing when speeking, not 
on what they may think, feel or wish.9 
We saw that Augustinels description of his 
learning of language runs into trouble if con- 
trasted with even a simple example of an opera- 
tion with words, at least it loses its prima 
facie plausibility and therefore part of its 
attractiveness. It seems that the general idea 
of meaning brings about similar problems. At 
least Wittgenstein's response to the question 
Cf. also PI 689. Here Wittgenstein writes: 
"'I am thinking of N.' 'I am speaking of N.' 
How do I speak of him? I say, for instance, 'I must 
go and see N today'-but surely that is not enough! 
After all, when I say 'N' I might mean various people 
of this name.-'Then there must surely be a further, 
different connexion between my talk and N, for other- 
wise I should still not have meant HIM. 
Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you 
imagine it: namely by means of a mental mechanism. 
(One compares 'meaning him' with 'aiming at him'.)" 
The point in which this section resembles the repudia- 
tion of the question in PI 1 is that it seems that 
according to Augustine's description, the problem is 
how the shopkeeper could have got a mental picture of 
the ojects named "five" and "red", the objects the 
"someone" spoke of. If this were obvious as it seems to 
be with the word "apple", then the question would not 
arise. The shopkeeper could know then what he is to aim 
at, for he has a mental image he can compare with what 
he sees. The mechanism between the mental image he 
acquired by learning and the visual experience he has 
could exist. Wittgenstein's answer in PI 689 resembles 
then the repudiation of the question in PI 1 in its 
implicit demand to look and see what the connection 
consists in, instead of supposing a mental mechanism, 
that is, in the demand to look at the use, or the 
language-game. Here one can see what the connection 
consists of. ICf. also: Savigny.) 
"But what is the meaning of the word 'five'?" 
[PI 11 seems to be similar to his response to 
the question above: "No such thing was in ques- 
tion here, only how the word 'five' is used." 
[PI 11 Notice that the question is only con- 
cerned with the meaning of the word "five" and 
not with the meaning of the word "red" . Wit tgen- 
stein chooses the most obvious case to show that 
there is something unclear with the general idea 
of meaning due to Augustine - even in such a 
simple case like that of the shopkeeper-example. 
If the general idea of the meaning of a word 
surrounds the working of language with a haze, 
then we should expect that the picture of the 
essence of language, in which the roots of this 
general notion lie, could also be criticized. 
"That philosophical concept of meaning has its 
place in a primitive idea of the way language 
functions." [PI 23 If, as we said above, (iii) , 
presupposes (ii), and if (iii) runs into trouble 
when applicated on an operation with words like 
"five", then one could expect first to have to 
change (ii) in order to solve the puzzles. This 
is surely true, and it is exactly what Wittgen- 
stein tries to do with his invention of primi- 
tive language-games like that of the shopkeeper. 
~ u t :  "I£ we look at the example in 51, we may 
perhaps get an inkling how much this general 
notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the 
working of language with a haze which makes 
clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to 
study the phenomena of language in primitive 
kinds of application in which one can command a 
clear view of the aim and functioning of the 
words." [PI 51" 
l o  In the German text Wittgenstein writes "der 
allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte" and not 
"dieser (that is: Augustine's - R . R . 1  allgemeine 
Begriff . . . " .  If Wittgenstein meant with "der allgemei- 
ne Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte" Augustine's general 
notion, then an alternative could be to propose anoth- 
Therefore, even if (iii), to be true or false, 
depends on the truth of (ii), in philosophizing 
(iii) plays a crucial role. It is a prejudice 
which gives rise to the assumption that the 
language must function in accordance with it. 
Where this seems not to be obvious, a search for 
explanations and hidden entities is produced. 
What produced the haze and the fog (that is: the 
false picture) in the case of Augustine's de- 
scription and its respective idea was the fact 
that it is not clear how they could be brought 
into accord with the variety of different kinds 
of words and the variety of different kinds of 
use of words in our language. As long as we try 
to follow the idea we are not able to get a 
clear view and a correct picture. 
The questions posed in PI 1 were, as we saw. 
concerned with the explanation of the use and 
meaning of some of the three words, not all of 
them. Augustine's description of the learning of 
language and the respective picture of the 
essence of language and the general idea about 
the meaning of words are not useless in all 
respects. Therefore Wittgenstein says that the 
philosophical notion of meaning due to Augustine 
stems from a primitive idea of the way in which 
language functions, from a primitive picture of 
the essence of human language. But, one could 
also say that this idea is an "idea of a lan- 
guage more primitive than ours." [PI 21 These 
two things are not the same. The primitive idea 
of the way in which language functions is primi- 
tive with regard to the way our language func- 
tions. The philosophical notion of meaning 
brings about problems - for instance it produces 
a need and a search for refined explanations - 
when it becomes applicated to fragments of our 
language which had not been part of what its 
er, distinct general notion. 
13 
proponents have been thinking of. In the case of 
a language more primitive than ours there is no 
need for explanations, there are no puzzles. 
Insofar as one can characterize such a language 
as a language consisting only of the examples 
the proponents have been thinking of. Therefore 
Wittgenstein's remarks on a language more primi- 
tive than ours are not the expression of a new 
observation or something similar, but a method- 
ological reformulation of the first remarks. Its 
methodological point is the following: if a 
general notion of the meaning of a word and its 
respective picture of the essence of human 
language produce - when they are compared with 
the whole or with particular fragments of our 
language - the need for explanations and further 
refinements like for instance the postulation of 
hidden entities etc., and if they have therefore 
to be taken to be inadequate, and if finally 
this need is not brought about if they are 
compared with (fictitious) primitive languages, 
then is seems possible to get an adequate con- 
ception, an appropriate picture by looking at 
our language as a system, a whole of such (real) 
primitive languages, which is itself - as a 
whole or a system - not primitive. If this is 
true, then this sheds light on the repudiation 
of the question in PI 1 and the remark that 
explanations come to an end somewhere: every- 
thing that is necessary in philosophy is avail- 
able without explanations, without theories, 
without postulates, etc. 
Such a "language more primitive than ours" is 
the language described in PI 2 - the language of 
the builders. Wittgenstein writes: 
"Let us imagine a language for which the de- 
scription given by Augustine is right. The 
language is meant to serve for communication 
between a builder A and an assistant B. A is 
building with building-stones: there are blocks, 
pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the 
stones, and that in the order in which A needs 
them. For this purpose they use a language 
consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 
'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; - B brings the 
stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and- 
such a call. - Conceive this as a complete 
primitive language." 
For this  language the picture of the essence of 
human language which is implicit in Augustine's 
description is r i g h t .  But it is not right for 
the whole of our language. Insofar as a correct 
response to Augustine's description is: "'Yes, 
it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly 
circumscribed region, not for the whole of what 
you were claiming to describe.*" [PI 31" 
In PI 8 and PI 15 Wittgenstein describes expan- 
sions of the language of PI 2. In PI 8 the 
expansion consists of "a series of words used as 
the shopkeeper in (1) used the numerals (it can 
be the series of letters of the alphabet); 
further, let there be two words, which may as 
l1 Wittgenstein writes that Augustine "does de- 
scribe a system of communicationu. (PI 3 )  If we suppose 
that young Augustine was not able to speak aloud, that 
means: not able to communicate, then there is a differ- 
ence between Augustine's description of the learning of 
the language and his description of a system of commu- 
nication. I take the "system of communication" to 
belong to what I called above (ii) . (Also the phrase 
"the description given by Augustine" i n  PI 2 has to be 
interpreted in this way.) If we make this distinction, 
then it is possible to say that his description of a 
system of communication is appropriate, whereas his 
description of the learning of the language might not 
be - like it is indicated by Wittgenstein in PI 6 (see 
below). (Remember that someone who says "Peter beats 
his wife." presupposes that Peter has a wife as does 
someone who says "Peter does not beat his wife.". But 
normally only one can be right.) 
15 
well be 'there' and 'this' (because this roughly 
indicates their purpose), that are used in 
connexion with a pointing gesture; and finally a 
number of colour samples." In PI 15 Wittgenstein 
assumes that A uses tools, and he introduces 
marks which are borne by the tools which A uses 
in building. "When A shews his assistant such a 
mark, he brings the tool that has the mark on 
it." 
In PI 18 Wittgenstein responds to a possible 
objection to his comment in PI 2: that this 
language cannot be complete because it consists 
only of orders. Wittgenstein's argumentation 
goes as follows: if one wants to object that the 
language of PI 2 (and also, we could add, the 
expanded languages) is incomplete because it 
consists only of orders, then one should ask 
further whether our language is complete, wheth- 
er it was complete before the symbolism of 
chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal 
calculus were incorporated. The point of this 
response is, that, in making the objection 
above, one presupposes at least that a language 
could only be complete if it consists of more 
than just orders. But what could function here 
as a criterion of a language's completeness? Is 
the inclusion of the symbolism of chemistry such 
a criterion? And was our language then incom- 
plete before this symbolism was incorporated? It 
is clear, I think, that the question serves as a 
reductio ad absurdum. The point of Wittgen- 
stein's response is that the concept of a langu- 
age's completeness is - at least - not related 
to the abstract degree of structural elements 
included in the language. Therefore, the use of 
"complete" in the objection is not a correct 
use. 
But the remarks in PI 18 bring about a problem. 
What is meant by "language" in PI 2? If the 
objection in PI 18 should be an objection at 
all, then one must accept that only orders 
belong to the language. But in PI 2, as well as 
in PI 8 and PI 15, Wittgenstein does not speak 
explicitly about the language's consisting of 
orders, but only about its consisting of words 
and how they are used. Is there not a category- 
mistake in Wittgenstein's remarks? Someone who 
says that a book consists of a cover, pages, 
cardboard and paper makes a category-mistake, 
for the proposition that a book consists of a 
cover and pages and the proposition that a book 
consists of cardboard and paper are not proposi- 
tions on the same category-level. From one point 
of view - say a structural one - a book consists 
of a cover and of pages. From another point of 
view - say a material one - a book consists of 
cardboard and paper, namely the cover consists 
of cardboard and the pages consist of paper. 
Whereas it is questionable whether something is 
a book which does not consist at least of a 
cover and pages, something can surely be a book 
even if, rather than cardboard and paper, it 
consists of, say, plastic or leather. To consist 
of a cover and pages seems then to be a neces- 
sary condition for being a book12, but to con- 
sist of cardboard and paper is not. If what is 
true for books, is also true for languages, then 
the question must be answered: What takes the 
place of the cover and the pages on the one 
hand, and the cardboard, paper, plastic, or 
leather on the other? What seems to support the 
analogy, and what seems to give the answer, is 
that we can imagine that instead of the words 
"block", "pillar", etc., A and B use other 
signs, for instance different pieces of paper, 
" This is an idealization. But that 'booku is in 
ordinary discourse not always used in accordance with 
this necessary condition is not important for the 
problem which is in question here. 
or - as Wittgenstein himself introduces - marks 
which are used by A and B and which are borne by 
the tools A uses in building [PI 151, or colour 
samples [PI 8, see above]. And instead of order- 
ing by uttering "Block!", A could also order by 
showing a piece of paper. So it seems as if the 
words, pieces of paper, marks, and colour sam- 
ples play for language the role which cardboard, 
paper, plastic, and leather play for books. 
But there is a difference between words, colour 
samples, etc. on the one hand and cardboard, 
paper, etc. on the other hand. Whether something 
is cardboard, or paper, etc. can be decided 
independently of the identification of its being 
a cover, a page or part of a book. The criteria 
of identity of cardboard, paper, etc. are inde- 
pendent from the criteria of identity of covers, 
pages, and books. But whether something is a 
word, or a colour sample, etc. cannot be decided 
independently of the identification of its being 
used in language." The criteria for the identi- 
ty of a word are not independent of the criteria 
for the identity of a language14. The proposi- 
tion that this or that is paper entails nothing 
about pages. But the proposition that that or 
that is a word entails that it is in some way 
used in language, for instance in the way of 
giving, obeying, etc. orders .I5 But one problem 
'I This remark is also a bit dogmatic, for there 
are cases like the well known beetle which crawls 
through the sand and produces a track identical to the 
inscription of "Churchill". But this is a borderline- 
case which bases on our paradigmatic examples for words 
and signs in general. (See also below.) 
'"his problem is most explicit in PI 200 - here 
with the help of the game-analogy. 
l 5  Instead of the way above ("entails"1 the point 
could also be expressed in a "behaviouristic" language. 
Someone who says, that this or that is paper and denies 
remains then: does the process of building 
belong to the way the words are used, or not? 
And if it belongs to this, then we could ask 
whether Wittgenstein's "Conceive this as a 
complete primitive language." in fact means 
"Conceive this as a complete primitive activi- 
ty." 
This question seems to be answered in PI 7. Here 
Wittgenstein writes that "the whole process of 
using words in ( 2 )  (can be thought of - R.R.) as 
one of those games by means of which children 
learn their native language. I will call these 
games 'language-games' and will sometimes speak 
of a primitive language as a language-game." But 
in the last sentence of PI 7 Wittgenstein 
writes: "I shall also call the whole, consisting 
of language and the actions into which it is 
woven, the 'language-game'." Here it is clear 
that "language" cannot mean "language-game", for 
if it did so, the whole sentence would become 
obscure. What one has to register here is that 
Wittgenstein does not use "language" and "lan- 
guage-game" as termini technici with a clearly 
defined meaning, that is according to explicitly 
given rules, but in the way the word "language" 
is used in ordinary discourse. But this does not 
mean that it is used without any rules. Normally 
the context makes clear how a word has to be 
understood. When Wittgenstein speaks in PI 2 
about a language for which the description given 
by Augustine is right, he uses "language" in the 
sense of "the whole process of using words". 
When he speaks about a language consisting of 
the words ... (or consisting only of orders), he 
that this is also a page need not be criticized. 
Whether he will be criticized depends - among other 
things - on the matters of fact. Someone who says that 
this or that is a word, but denies that it is/was used 
in language can be criticized, no matter what the facts 
may be. 
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uses "language" like he does in "language and 
the actions into which it is woven". But how are 
"this" and "language" used in "Conceive this as 
a complete primitive language. " ?  I think both 
senses just mentioned are possible, but both 
give rise to special problems.16 
If we take "language" and "thisM in "Conceive 
this as a complete primitive language." in the 
sense of "the whole process of using words" 
(including the activities), then the "Conceive 
this . . ."- demand has to be understood in the 
sense of "Conceive this as a complete primitive 
activity." What could "complete" mean in this 
case? To answer this it is fruitful to ask what 
it could mean to say a given language-game (in 
the sense discussed here) is incomplete. Remem- 
ber Wittgenstein's answer on the incompleteness- 
objection in PI 18. The point there was that to 
call our language (in)complete presupposes a 
criterion according to which it could be (in)co- 
mplete. The objection was rejected because there 
is no such thing that could function as a crite- 
rion." The only way I see to give this proposi- 
tion a sense despite this rejection would be to 
understand it in the sense that the language 
does not function, work, or the like. That is: 
it has some aspects which make it resemble a 
Wittgenstein's invention of primitive languages 
has two aspects he himself described in PI 492: 
"To invent a language could mean to invent an 
instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the 
laws of nature (or consistent with them); but it also 
has the other sense, analogous to that in which we 
speak of the invention of a game. 
Here I am stating something about the grammar of the 
word 'language', by connecting it with the grammar of 
the word 'invent'." 
For Wittgenstein's use of "purpose", "tool", "instru- 
ment", etc., cf.: Hunter (119901, p. Iff). 
" We can, of course, stipulate one. See below. 
language-game, but it is not really one. It is 
incomplete in itself. The demand "Conceive this 
as a complete primitive language." would mean 
then: "Do not look at this as if it could not 
function, work, or the like. Look at this as if 
it does."18 For the whole second part of PI 2 
stands under a let-us-imagine clause, the demand 
would say: this is an imaginable, functioning 
language-game. 
"Completeness of a language", if "language" is 
understood in the second sense above, means: a 
language consisting of this and that is complete 
if this and that are s~fficient'~ tools for the 
activities which this and that are used for. 
This means for the situation described in PI 2, 
that A is able to build with his calls of the 
words, that B is able to pass the stones A 
called for, and if they are sometimes not suc- 
cessful then not because there are not enough 
words or because there are no descriptions and 
'' This is implicitly supported by the argumenta- 
tion in P I  18, for there it is clear that whatever the 
proponent could propose as a criterion, it would not be 
of any importance with regard to the question whether 
our language works. 
" They need not be necessary tools! There may be 
functional equivalents, and some tools may even be 
superfluous. Therefore, the fact that Wittgenstein 
gives in P I  8 and P I  15 expansions of the language of 
PI 2 is no argument against the completeness of the 
language of P I  2. Whether the expansions of P I  8 for 
instance are not necessary, depends on the purpose. If 
the purpose changed, for instance into a purpose of 
building differently colored houses, then at least the 
colour samples - or a functional equivalent - would be 
necessary, if the way of using the signs were un- 
changed. 
only orders.20 That A is able to build with his 
calls, and that B is able to pass the stones A 
called for, means then - with regard to com- 
pleteness - that there are enough words (and 
perhaps also that they are different enough from 
one another, not too long, etc.) and/or that 
orders are sufficient. The situation may change, 
and that may bring about a need for further 
words, or language-forms. But now the language 
is complete. We see that to say a language is 
complete means to say that it is complete rela- 
tive to a practice, not in itself, or absolute- 
ly. 'h pactice W c r ~  as the aiterim of cmpletexss." 
'' In this spirit one could say - against 0fsti 
([19851, p. 587) - that Wittgenstein accepts something 
like a minimal repertory, but one related to the game 
in question, not an abstract one. 
" In this essay I try to relate only to the PI. 
But a few remarks on other sources should be allowed at 
this place. In the ''Blue Book'' Wittgenstein writes: 'A 
treatise on pomology may be called incomplete if there 
exist kinds of apples which it doesn't mention. Here we 
have a standard of completeness in nature. Supposing on 
the other hand that there was a game resembling that of 
chess but simpler, no pawns being used in it. Should we 
call this game incomplete? Or should we call a game 
more complete than chess if it in some way contained 
chess but added new elements? " [BIB, p. 191 And in 
the "Brown Book" he writes: "Suppose a man described a 
game of chess, without mentioning the existence and 
operations of the pawns. His description of the game as 
a natural phenomenon will be incomplete. On the other 
hand we may say that he has completely described a 
simpler game. " [BrB, p. 771 ; and: "We are not, however, 
regarding the language-games which we describe as 
incomplete parts of a language, but as languages 
complete in themselves, as complete systems of human 
communication. To keep this point of view in mind, it 
very often is useful to imagine such a simple language 
to be the entire system of communication of a tribe in 
a primitive state of society." [BrB, p. 011 The quoted 
passages from the "Brown Book" are in accordance with 
the first of my interpretations. The remarks from the 
On the basis of this interpretation we can say 
that somebody making the incompleteness-objec- 
tion above, uses the predicate "incomplete 
relative to our language", without registering 
the hidden part "relative to our language" in 
this predicate. "Complete" is as well a predi- 
cate with one place more than obvious, as is 
"appropriate". Augustine's description is nei- 
ther appropriate, nor inappropriate; it is 
appropriate relative to x, and not appropriate 
relative to y, where "xu  and "y" stand for 
different entities. The language of PI 2 is 
neither complete, nor incomplete; it is complete 
relative to the language-game of PI 2, and 
incomplete relative to our variety of language- 
games. So one cannot object to Wittgenstein's 
remark that the language is incomplete. It is 
incomplete relative to our language-games, but 
this is not the question of PI 2. It is complete 
relative to the game of PI 2. These are not 
surprising insights; the game of PI 2 was de- 
signed for this purpose. Notice that the lan- 
guage of PI 2 is complete relative to the lan- 
guage-game of PI 2, not relative to Augustine's 
description. 22 
Wittgenstein compares Augustine's description of 
the essence of language with a description of 
the essence of games according to which a game 
consists in "moving objects on a surface accord- 
"Blue Book" indicate, as well as the phrase "complete 
in themselves'' in the "Brown Book", that it is in some 
sense confusing to call a (language-)game complete or 
incomplete, for "(in)complete" seems to need a criteri- 
on. " (1n)complete in itself" seems to be a borderline- 
case. This supports in my view the search for a further 
interpretation. 
2 2  Contrast this with: Mosedale [19781 and 
Savigny . 
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ing to certain rulesl'.[PI 31 This definition is 
incorrect with regard to the variety of games we 
play; it can be made correct "by expressly 
restricting it to those games (i.e. board-games 
R.R. ) . " ( 1  The point of introducing the game- 
analogy is in our context - it is 
much easier to see the relatedness of defini- 
tions, descriptions, or the like, of games to 
specific games than it is in the case of lan- 
guage, 
- if, for example, one were to describe two 
players, A and B, playing a game with four kinds 
of card, one would hardly object that the set of 
kinds of card is incomplete. It is simply only 
another game of cards than bridge, poker, or 
skat. And this is obvious, not least because 
games of cards are in many respects played 
according to explicit rules, some of them often 
prescribing with which and how many different 
kinds of cards the game has to be played. A set 
of cards of the game skat would be incomplete if 
it consisted only of 31 kinds of cards, instead 
of 32. Similarly, the language of PI 2 would 
become incomplete if, for example, A and/or B 
forgot the word "pillar" (or, in the cases of 
the extended versions of PI 2, if they lost a 
colour sample or a mark) but still had to build 
with pillars which were still available. The 
language would be incomplete with regard to the 
purpose of the language of PI - to build with 
four kinds of stones.24 An objection that a 
given set of cards of skat is incomplete, would 
be true or false. But an objection that the set 
of kinds of cards of an unspecified game is 
incomplete (that is in the sense of the possible 
objection in PI 18) is senseless. Nevertheless 
it shows that one, making this objection, is 
" Cf. also the quoted passages from the "Blue 
Book" and the "Brown Book" above. 
=' Cf.: PI 57. 
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familiar with other cardgames, like Augustine 
was familiar with - cum grano salis - our vari- 
ety of language-games . 
With the help of the game-analogy Wittgenstein 
is able to illuminate his use of primitive 
languages/language-games. It serves to disperse 
"the haze" which "surrounds the working of 
language" [PI 51, and which arises when we look 
at it through the general notion of the meaning 
of a word as found in Augustine. Instead of 
primitive, fictitious kinds of word application 
one can also take the primitive forms of lan- 
guage which "a child uses . . .  when it learns to 
talk. Here the teaching of language is not 
explanation, but training ("Abrichten" in German 
-R.R. ) . "  bid. 1 2 =  SO we must register another 
important distinction Wittgenstein makes, a 
distinction between: 
- "the practice of the use of language", and 
- the "instruction in the languaget' [PI 71 .*' 
That distinction has furthermore the aspect of 
bringing into account the fact that people have 
to be instructed in their language. Wittgenstein 
writes in PI 6 that an "important part of the 
training will consist in the teacher's pointing 
to the objects, directing the child's attention 
to them, and at the same time uttering a word; 
for instance, the word 'slab' as he points to 
25 The language in question here is our language. 
" This distinction is not the same as the distinc- 
tion from PI 5 between explanation and training. 
Explanation as well as training can be a component of 
learning. Whether explanation can in a special case, 
with regard to a special language-fragment, be a form 
oE teaching depends on the faculties the child has 
sofar learned. Explanation cannot be at the beginning 
of learning language at all, for the child cannot ask 
questions. 
that shape." Wittgenstein calls this "ostensive 
teaching of words" and contrasts it with "osten- 
sive definition" (I2'. Whatever ostensive teach- 
ing of words consists of, it can surely not be 
identified with giving orders. Wittgenstein 
himself emphasizes the contrast between the 
orders of PI 2 and the instruction in the lan- 
guage of PI 2: "In the practice of the use of 
language (2) one party calls out the words, the 
other acts on them. In instruction in the lan- 
guage the following process will occur: the 
learner names the objects, that is, he utters 
the word when the teacher points to the stone." 
[PI 7IZ6 
The importance of the distinction between the 
practice of the use of language and the instruc- 
tion in the language - in our context - lies in 
its capacity to solve an implicit tension in the 
remarks above. For, if people have to be in- 
structed in their language and the instruction 
entails ostensive teaching, then the language of 
PI 2 would not consist only of orders, unless we 
were to make a categorical distinction like the 
one above, but still - which would be in accor- 
dance with Wittgenstein's position and which is, 
Wittgenstein aside, true - accepted that people 
have to be instructed in their language. There- 
fore, the objection of PI 18 would be based on a 
false presupposition - that the language con- 
sists only of orders - and would have to be 
answered otherwise. 
' Here I follow the English translation. The 
German original uses the words "hinweisende Erklarung" 
and "Definition'. 
'' In the German original Wittgenstein writes: ". . . 
im Unterricht der Sprache aber wird sich dieservorgang 
finden: ...' The "aber" stresses the difference. It is 
not translated in the English version. Cf.: Hallett, 
Savigny . 
But what gives Wittgenstein the right to make 
such a categorical distinction? The first thing 
one should notice is that Wittgenstein speaks 
about "instruction in the language", not about 
"instruction in the use of language" . 2 9  The 
point of this difference is that Wittgenstein 
agrees with his interlocutor that the effect of 
the ostensive teaching of the words can consist 
in establishing "an association between the word 
and the thing." [PI 61" This can mean various 
things, for instance evoking images; but one 
thing is clear: "... in the language of 6 2  it is 
not the purpose of the words to evoke images. 
(It may, of course, be discovered that that 
helps to attain the actual purpose.)" [Ibid.] To 
be a learning of the use of that language osten- 
sive teaching is not sufficient. What a child 
learns in this way, one could say, is naming an 
object. But, in parenthesis of PI 49, we can 
say: ". . . naming and calling in the game of PI 2 
do not stand on the same level: naming is a 
preparation for calling the words in the game of 
PI 2. Naming is so far not a move in the lan- 
guage-game any more than putting a piece in its 
l 3  Cf.: Hallett. To say that something can be 
instruction in the language without being at the same 
time an instruction in the use of language reflects the 
analysis of "language" above. This is not the only 
possible interpretation. The German Text has. "...;in! 
Unterricht der Sprache . . . ' (my italics) . This and also 
the passage in PI 9 "When a child learns this language, 
it has to learn a series of 'numerals' a, b, c, ... by 
heart. And it has to learn their use. . . . "  indicate 
that with "instruction in the language" could also be 
meant "instruction in the use of language", if we 
understand "language" in the sense of "language-game". 
But still these things are different, as is indicated 
by the "And" in PI 9 and by the possibility that the 
same process of naming objects, etc. can be part of 
quite different instructions in the use of language. 
'O This is a partial agreement with Augustine. 
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place on the board is a move in chess. We may 
say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing 
has been named. It has not even got a name 
except in the language-game." [PI 491" That 
naming and calling (in the game of PI 2) do not 
stand on the same level means that instruction 
in the language is not something specified 
enough to be an instruction in the use of that 
language. And if it is not connected in this or 
that way with this or that language-game, then 
it is perhaps no instruction at all. But given 
the context of, for instance, the game of PI 2 
its components are "processes resembling lan- 
guage. " [PI 7 I 
To become an instruction in the use of a lan- 
guage, the training must be specified. Associa- 
tions, mental images, and the like are not 
sufficient . Necessary and sufficient for the 
training in the use of a language(-game) is that 
the child can "act upon it in such-and-such a 
way ... Doubtless the ostensive teaching helped 
to bring this about; but only together with a 
particular training. With different training the 
same ostensive teaching of the words would have 
effected a quite different understanding." [PI 
61  For something, we see, to be an instruction, 
or a training, in the use of a language, the 
relatedness to the language(-game) in question 
is essential. So we can say that such a training 
is not self-sufficient, nor self-defining; it is 
defined by the language-game. Whatever the 
training in the use of a language may consist 
of, it does not change the essence of the lan- 
guage(-game) in que~tion'~; moreover, "it may be 
" Cf. also: PI 26, 28, 30, et. al. 
" This does not mean that a change in the training 
could not bring about (causally) any change in our 
language-games. But the point - in our context - is 
that the games are then other games. 
all one to us whether someone else has learned 
the language, or was perhaps from birth consti- 
tuted to react . . .  like a normal person who has 
learned . . ." [PI 495, my italics.] And even if 
the person has learned, it could be that he has 
learned only by watching [cf.: PI 311. 
That the language of PI 2 has to be regarded as 
complete (in both of the senses above), does not 
mean that is has to be regarded as the whole 
language of A and B." Otherwise the following 
passage from PI 6 would make no sense: "We could 
imagine that the language of 5 2 was the whole 
language of A and B; even the whole language of 
a tribe."3' If we could imagine this, then we 
" This is also said in the quoted remark from p. 
81 of the "Brown Book". In the following "language" is 
always taken to mean "language-game" or "the whole 
process of using words". But the remarks are also valid 
for the other sense, for without the whole process of 
using words there are no words. 
" Wittgenstein's German phrases for "complete 
language" and "whole language" are "vollstandige 
Sprache" and "ganze Sprache". In German "vollstandig" 
and "ganz" are in some occurrences interchangeable, in 
some occurrences not. For the passage of PI 6 to make 
sense besides the demand of PI 2 Wittgenstein should 
use one of the word-uses of "ganze" which is not 
interchangeable with "vollstandige'. Here is one 
example where the occurrences are not interchangeable: 
(1) Dies ist meine ganze Briefmarkensamlung; sie ist 
aber nicht vollstandig. 
Instead of vqanze" in the first part of (1) we could 
- 
also say 
1 . 1 '  Dies ist meine vollstandige Briefmarkensamlung; 
but it would be bad German to continue with 
(1.21 sie ist aber nicht vollstandig. 
To say 11.1) or (1.1') means that it is all I have; to 
say (1.21 means that these are not all the different 
items one can have. (1.1') and (1.21 together would be 
bad German because one would use the same word for 
different concepts in one sentence, which because of 
the "nicht" sounds like a contradiction. Instead of 
should also be able to imagine that the language 
of PI 2 is not the whole language of A and B, or 
of a tribe.I5 This point can also be illuminated 
with the help of the game-analogy. We can imag- 
ine both: 
-two players, or even a tribe, playing only one 
'ganze" in (1) one could also use "gesamte", but we 
cannot use "gesamte" instead of "vollst8ndigeV in (1) 
or (1.2). Wittgenstein uses "ganze" in the sense of 
(i.e. interchangeable with) "gesamte". That is also the 
case in PI 7, where he speaks about "the whole process 
of using words in (2)" ("der ganze Vorgang des Ge- 
brauchs der worte in (2) " 1 .  
To imagine that the language of PI 2 is the 
whole language of A and B need not be the same as to 
imagine that the language of PI 2 is the whole language 
of a tribe. The "even" in the quotation indicates that 
we should also be able to imagine that the language of 
PI 2 is the whole language of A and B, but not the 
whole language of a tribe. But a problem would be 
whether we could imagine that the language of PI 2 is 
not the whole language of A and B, but the whole 
language of a tribe, if the tribe is the tribe A and B 
belong to (which is not said by Wittgenstein). 
All these differences give rise, it seems, to a prob- 
lem: In virtue of what does somebody belong to a 
community (tribe)? (Cf.: Pothast [19911, p. 138f.) For, 
one could say, to a given community belong all and only 
those people who share (at least some of) the practices 
of that community. If we accept this as a definition we 
cannot continue saying that an individual is doing this 
or that if "the pattern of the individual's behavior is 
embedded in a particular way in patterns of social 
behavior within the relevant community (i.e the commu- 
nity the individual belongs to -R.R.)" lv. Savigny 
[1988), p. 7; translation from Glock [19921, p. 119). 
That would be a circular definition. I think that the 
problem of individuating communities is similar to the 
problem of individuating persons (cf.: Teichman [19761- 
) .  There are different criteria; we have geographical, 
ethnographical, cultural, historical, religious and 
other ones. And which we use depends on our purposes 
and the wider context in which the question arises. So 
there need not be a circular set of explanations. 
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game, and 
-two players, or even a tribe, playing the same 
game, but also other games. 
And in both cases we could as well say that this 
and that are the complete elements of the game, 
or of one of the games respectively, as we could 
say that the game/each game is complete in 
itself . I 6  
But there is still a problem here. The problem 
is that Wittgenstein does not simply assert that 
the language of PI 2 is complete, but demands of 
the reader to conceive it as a complete lan- 
guage. So one should expect that Wittgenstein 
connects a certain purpose with this demand. 
What purpose? The question is the same as: What 
role does the demand of PI 2 play in the course 
of the argumentation in the PI? If we accept 
that ( 2 ) ,  that is the essence of human language, 
lies at the bottom of the whole discussion at 
the beginning of the PI - which doesn't imply 
that other topics are not to be found among the 
PI, for instance the nature of mind - then it is 
not hard to see that the essential role of the 
demand is to serve as a preparation for the 
discussion connected with the concept of family 
resemblance. For, if we conceive the language of 
PI 2 as complete, then we immediately see that 
this language is very different from our lan- 
guage, that it is much more primitive. But we 
also see that the language of PI 2 is different 
from the language of PI 8, and from many other 
36 So it is simply not true, as 0fsti writes, that 
Wittgenstein neglects to emphasize "a difference 
between (whole ('ganzen' in the German text - R.R.) ) 
languages and (only as a 'part' of such possible) very 
simple, or primitive, language-games." (l19851, p.587) 
This is also not true, if we translate "ganzen" with 
"complete", which is not very appropriate because of 
the "'parts'" ("Teile'" in the German Text -R.R.), but 
perhaps not excluded because of the quotation-marks. 
languages too, which Wittgenstein describes in 
the PI. What becomes a problem then is the 
assumption that there is (or must be) something 
common to all language-games. For, even if we 
call the words of both PI 2 and PI 8 "names", we 
see that the uses of the names are "absolutely 
unliken [PI 101. The same is true for language- 
forms such as orders, questions, and the like. 
[Cf.: PI 19ff.I" Therefore, if we accept that 
languages such as those of PI 2, 8, 15, etc. may 
be taken to be complete languages, then we are 
also prepared to see that there is nothing 
common to them all in virtue of which we call 
them all language. 
Also this can be illuminated with the help of 
the game-analogy. "Consider for example the 
proceedings that we call 'games'. I mean board- 
games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, 
and so on. What is common to them all? Don't 
say: 'There must be something common, or they 
would not be called 'games'" --but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all. - For 
if you look at them you will not see something 
that is common to all, but similarities, rela- 
tionships, and a whole series of them at that. 
"[PI 661 ~ittgenstein calls these similarities 
"family-resemblances" [PI 671. Therefore, the 
demand of PI 2 to conceive the language of A and 
B as complete, is the demand to put aside the 
prejudice that there must be something common to 
all (language-) games, and it is the demand not 
to theorize, but to look and see. To conceive 
the language of PI 2, and others too, as com- 
plete is a condition for seeing the family- 
resemblances, or - if seen - to give them their 
right weight. 
Now we can see the importance of the point of PI 
18 more clearly. To ask whether our whole lan- 
" Cf.: Mosedale [I9781 and the following essay. 
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guage is complete is either itself an incomplete 
question, or is the question whether it is 
complete relative to the language-games we play. 
In the first case it is an incomplete question 
because it is not clear with regard to what our 
whole language should be (inlcomplete. That 
means that we have to decide according to which 
criteria we want to know whether our whole 
language is complete or not. If we want on the 
one hand to know whether our whole language is 
complete with regard to the variety of language- 
games we play - that is: whether our terminolo- 
gy, syntax, etc. are complete - or with regard 
to their respective "purposes" - then we want at 
best to know something that can only be answered 
by an empirical investigation. Such an empirical 
investigation could for example provide us with 
the insight that there are some language-frag- 
ments in our whole language which are incom- 
~lete.~' The practical result could be then a 
proposal of a reform. "Such a reform for practi- 
cal purposes, an improvement in our terminology 
designed to prevent misunderstandings in prac- 
tice, is perfectly possible. But these are not 
the cases we have to do with (in philosophy - 
R . R . ) .  The confusions which occupy us arise when 
language is like an engine idling, not when it 
is doing work." [PI 1321 
'' It can make a difference for a special part of 
language with regard to completeness what happens 
around it. It can happen for instance that the vocabu- 
laries of two language-games are not different enough 
from one another, so that it is too often unclear for 
the users whether a special utterance belongs to this 
or that game. In this case the functioning of the 
language-fragments as tools for the respective games 
(see above) could be disturbed. (The variety of our 
language-games need not be based on atomistic language- 
games, its structure need not be simple addition.) But 
notice that in this case the games are disturbed 
themselves. 
3 3 
But, there is a point in Wittgenstein's remarks 
in PI 2 that seems to bring about problems and 
to give reason for Rhees' and 0fsti's criti- 
cisms. To see this point better, we must go back 
to PI 2 and look at it more closely. 
Who is speaking here? It is only A, who is 
speaking. What is B doing? He only has to pass 
the stones A called for. There is no difference 
in principle here between what A and B are doing 
and what a hunter and his dog are doing. Indeed, 
many dogs, which are trained for hunting, are 
able to understand - "understand" just in the 
sense of PI 6 - much more words than only four, 
and are able to do much more than only to pass 
things the master calls for. But nevertheless, 
dogs do not - for instance - philosophize, even 
if some dogs look very skeptic. Dogs, and ani- 
mals in general, just do not talk. " . . .  animals 
do not talk because they lack the mental capaci- 
ty. And this means: 'they do not think, and that 
is why they do not talk."' [PI 2513' To think, 
one could say, is to be reasonable (or ratio- 
nal), or - weaker - only thinking beings are 
reasonable (rational) beings. Therefore, whatev- 
er PI 2 may show us, it is not sufficient with 
regard to thinking/reasonable (rational) beings, 
that is with respect to (most of) us. The game 
of PI 2 lacks an essential aspect: that human 
beings think. Therefore, the language of PI 2 
'' 0fsti writes with regard to the game PI 2: "I 
would say it is still too early to ascribe thinking to 
our persons." ((19901. p. 145) 0fsti does not mention 
the question whether animals think or not, but we will 
see, I hope, that his problem can be compared with this 
one. 
can be neither cdmplete nor the whole lang~age'~ 
- in a not trivial sense of these concepts - of 
(a tribe of) human beings. We couldn't even 
imagine this, if our imagination were in accord 
with our fundamental intuition about what it is 
to be a human being. 
In this point Augustine was much nearer to the 
truth than Wittgenstein, for he uses mental 
predicates in his description of the learning of 
language. Whatever may be wrong with Augustine's 
conception in detail, it simply bases - contrary 
to Wittgenstein's - on a fundamental intuition 
we cannot miss. This is the point which Bfsti 
also wants to stress: "On a special level one 
can say, that the language-subjects are reason- 
able beings and that 'the extent' of their 
language (notwithstanding which 'suburbs' this 
language now entails or not) is unimportant." 
[1985, p. 58914' A language can only be complete 
- in a not trivial sense - if it allows the 
users to be reasonable (rational). Similarly 
Ape1 writes: " Wittgenstein once said: 'If a 
lion could talk, we could not understand him.' 
This seems to me not very plausible since it is 
precisely linguistic competence and not . . .  the 
conditions of life (birth, death, sexuality) 
conceived of as independent of linguistic compe- . 
'O Rhees clearly sees, contrary to mfsti, that the 
stronger problem with regard to the question discussed 
now is that Wittgenstein says we could imagine that the 
language of PI 2 is the whole language of A and B, or 
even a tribe. Cf:: Rhees 119781. 
" The remark on the extent of the language is not 
meant literally. On p. 588 0fsti lists five theses, 
each - as it seems - standing for a necessary condition 
of a complete language in the sense of 0fsti. The first 
is: "The complete language must entail a plurality of 
language-games . . . "  (See also below.) 
tence - that separate us from lions."42 
But not only are the "conditions of life (birth, 
death, sexuality)" not enough, neither are the 
particular activities which Wittgenstein consid- 
ers with his language-games. As Aristotle wrote: 
"Just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any 
artist, and, in general, for all things that 
have a function or activity, the good and the 
'well' is thought to reside in the function, so 
would it seem to be for man, if he has a func- 
tion. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner 
certain functions or activities, and man has 
none? is he naturally functionless? or as eye, 
hand, foot, and in general each of the parts 
evidently has a function, may one lay it down 
that man similarly has a function apart from all 
these? What can this be?" His answer is: "the 
activity of soul in accordance with, or not 
without, rational prin~iple".~' Therefore, it is 
not enough to presuppose a certain "transcenden- 
tal language-game" or the like, but one has to 
make a clear distinction between language-games 
(in the sense of PI 2 and other sections) on the 
one hand, and the language on the ~ther.~"ven 
if Wittgenstein's concept of completeness is 
correct, it is valid only for language-games 
'' Apel (119731, 11, 257, 1671, quoted from 0fsti 
([19901, p. 135). What seems not very plausible to Apel 
is not that we could not understand a talking lion, but 
that a lion could talk. A similar point is made by 
Baker/Hacker (1985) with respect to PI 206. See also my 
interpretation of PI 206 in this volume. 
'I Aristotle ([19841, 1097 b25 and 1098 a81, quoted 
from 0fsti ([19901, p. 1671. "Linguistic competence" 
seems to be - for Apel at least - a modern expression 
for "soul". 
" Cf. 0fsti ([19901, p. 1291, where he marks this 
as a central difference between his approach and that 
of Apel. 
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like that of PI 2, not for the language. But the 
language-game of PI 2, as we saw, is a language- 
game which neglects the differentia specifica of 
human beings. It is not only comparable with a 
hunter's and his dog's interaction, but also 
with interaction among animals alone, for in- 
stance with a cocks calling his hens by crowing. 
Therefore it is by no means clear, "when . . . the 
different language-game competences of a person 
(are) sufficient to constitute linguistic compe- 
tence . . ." [1990, p. 1381. This is the question 
of "formal completeness", which is "rather 
avoided by Wittgenstein." [1990, p. 1391 
This question is not one of complexity, like 
Wittgenstein seems to suggest (e.g. in the Blue 
Book), but rather a question of different lev- 
els. However complex the plurality of language- 
games which a child has to learn may be, "sooner 
or later we will have to reach a level where the 
subject becomes a subject in the full sense, a 
level which must have to do with its recognition 
of itself and others as autonomous, 'equivalent' 
subjects." [1990, p. 1441 Even if we conceded 
that the builders in PI 2 think, it is "too 
meagre to capture the full sense of 'thinking'. 
And this would still be so however much we 
extended the repertoire of common language-games 
in the person's home country . . . "  [190, p. 1451 
For the language this means that it must be 
constructed in a way which allows us 
(i) to reflect on language, 
(ii) to move in and out of certain language- 
games, 
(iii) to imagine and describe language-games 
other than those we ourselves play, 
(iv) to give an "'overview"' on the games we 
play, and not only to play them, 4 5  and 
4 5  I have condensed here the remarks in l I 1 9 9 0 1 ,  
pp. 1 9 9 - 1 5 5 1 .  C f .  also: ( [ 1 9 8 5 1 ,  p .  5 8 8 f l .  
(v )  to reach and express a "complete communi- 
cative competence" [1985, p. 589. 
This level cannot itself be a "special, more or 
less separable language-game (as for instance 
Apel means - R . R . ) ,  but rather part, or an as- 
pect, of a structural trait which runs through 
the whole of a complete language, i.e. through 
each of its language-games." [1990, p. 14614' 
The reason for the necessity of a complementary 
structure of language is that "any intentional 
act (in the full 'human' sense) must reach two 
'' The German words are: "vollstandigen kommunika- 
tiven Kompetenz". 
" 0fsti calls this the "'description' level"', 
which is complementary to the "perfonnative level" 
[ibid. I .  
My question in this paper is not whether 0fsti's 
approach is consistent or not. Therefore only some 
remarks at this point to this question. If the "struc- 
tural trait runs through ... each of ... (a whole 
language's - R.R.) language-games", then it runs also 
through the game of PI 2, or whichever one wants. But 
then there is no "sooner or later" at which we will 
"reach a level where the subject becomes a subject in 
the full sense" (see above). With learning one game, 
the child becomes "a subject in the full sense". Or, 
the child has already been "a subject in the full 
sense", and then the child does not become one. (This 
is, as we will see, Augustine's implicit position.) 
Furthermore, if the conditions i - v ,  mentioned 
above, are realized in each game, then there is some- 
thing common to all games, and not only family-resem- 
blance, and the language of PI 2 is not really com- 
plete, or not complete in the full sense. Perhaps 
family-resemblance and completeness are all we can see. 
What 0fsti could say at this point is that it is not 
enough, or perhaps trivial, only to see, one must also 
think. The alternative - to take, like Apel, the "level 
of description", characterized by conditions (il-(iv), 
as a special language-game - brings about similar 
problems. For instance, it should then be possible, to 
learn only this game, without the other ones. 
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levels" : 
(i! "the 'game' level"', and 
(ii) the level where "the agent masters the 
concept of what is done." (1 
The second level is the one on which descrip- 
tions of the game played are possible." This is 
the level, which guarantees that responsible 
actions are possible, the level where "the drama 
of human interaction takes place." [Ibid.] 
These are 0fsti's remarks on what is trivial 
with Wittgenstein's concept of completeness, and 
on what a non-trivial concept must include. Now 
we can look at what Wittgenstein could answer. 
Section 25 of the PI goes in its entirety as 
follows : 
"It is sometimes said that animals do not talk 
because they lack the mental capacity. And this 
means: 'they do not think, and that is why they 
do not talk.' But - they simply do not talk. Or 
to put it better: they do not use language - if 
we except the most primitive forms of language.- 
Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, 
are as much a part of our natural history as 
walking, eating, drinking, playing." 
Why does Wittgenstein writes "But - ..." ? Isn't 
it accepted in the first two sentences that 
animals do not talk? The difference between 
"they do not think, and that is why they do not 
talk" and "they simply do not talk" consists in 
'' In  some sense t h i s  i s  a point  a l s o  demanded by 
Baker and Hacker. 
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the first phrase's being an explanation, and the 
second phrase's not being an e~planation.~' "Our 
mistake is to look for an explanation, where we 
ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-pheno- 
menon'. That is, where we ought to have said: 
this language-game is played." [PI 6541  To say 
that animals do not talk means then to say that 
they do not play language-games. That is why it 
is better to say that animals do not use lan- 
guage, than to say that they do not talk. And 
the exception is that they play the most primi- 
tive language-games. Whether a creature's utter- 
ing of sounds is talking or, say, crowing de- 
pends on the circumstances of the utterances. 
Not even each verbal utterance of a human being 
is talking, just like a cockatoo's talking is 
only talking in a very special sense, which is 
secondary with regard to our normal use of 
"talking". "We say 'The cock calls the hens by 
crowing' - but doesn't a comparison with our 
language lie at the bottom of this?" [PI 4931 
To say that animals do not play language-games, 
if we except the most primitive ones, means that 
they do not play the variety of language-games 
we play, if we except the most primitive ones. 
This is a difference of multiplicity, complexi- 
ty, structure, richness, content, and purpose in 
the sense above. It is a difference of social 
forms of life.50 Therefore, even if a lion could 
talk, we could not understand him because his 
form of life would be too different from ours. 
But this is not something special for lions. "We 
also say of some people that they are transpar- 
ent to us. It is, however, important as regards 
this observation that one human being can be a 
complete enigma to another. We learn this when 
'' C f .  : H a l l e t t .  
Cf . : Savigny. 
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we come into a strange country with entirely 
strange traditions; and, what is more, even 
given a mastery of the country's language. We do 
not understand the people. (And not because of 
not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) 
We cannot find our feet with them." [PI, p. 
2231 
But to repeat: it is a difference, and one could 
add here, as in the case of the difference 
between living and not living beings: "this is a 
case of the transition #from quantity to quali- 
ty'." [PI 2 8 4 1  So, the first thing we must 
register, is that Wittgenstein very well accepts 
in his philosophy something like a fundamental 
(perhaps better: qualitative) difference between 
animals and human beings. However many "levels" 
there may be, in learning the multiplicity of 
our language-games a child becomes a being that 
is qualitatively distinct from animals. We see 
that the intuition of there being a fundamental 
difference between human beings and animals (and 
all other things in the universe we know about) 
is no argument against Wittgenstein's philoso- 
phy. On the contrary, in his PI Wittgenstein 
tries to give us a clear picture of that differ- 
ence. 
But, one could ask, what about thinking? Do the 
remarks above mean that Wittgenstein wants to 
deny that people think, and only accepts a 
difference in the complexity of verbal beha- 
There is a problem in this passage: the use of 
"mastery of the country's language'. It has, for the 
principle of charity, to be understood in the sense of 
"being able to understand the content of what the 
people say", or in the sense of "being able to under- 
stand when they give orders", or something similar. The 
point is, that we do not understand them in the sense 
that we cannot see the point in their (verbal) actions. 
Cf.: Schulte l[19901, pp. 159ff.). 
viour? Here, I think, one should see that 0f- 
sti's argument bases on the primitiveness of the 
game of PI 2. Otherwise he would have to say 
that also the games of 
"Forming and testing a hypothesis- 
Presenting the results of an experiment in 
tables and diagrams- 
Making up a story; and reading it- 
Play-acting- 
Singing catches- 
. . . " [PI 2 3 1  
are played by beings which are not reasonable, 
or have no "linguistic competence". This would 
be, I think, obviously nonsense. On the con- 
trary, to be able to do things like these above 
means to be able to think. To think (or to have 
"linguistic competence" ) is not something that 
lies behind, or at the bottom, of playing lan- 
guage-games, but is expressed in playing them. 
Understood in this sense the phrase "animals do 
not think, and that is why they do not talk" 
becomes at best a The exception, 
that animals use the most primitive forms of 
language - that is, that they play the most 
primitive language-games - means then that they 
think only in the most primitive sense of the 
word, are only primitive reasonable beings, or 
that they do not think in "the full sense of 
'thinking"' (Ofsti). "We say a dog is afraid his 
master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his 
master will beat him to-morrow. " [PI 6501 Here 
both parts of the sentence are important: 
- that we say a dog is afraid, that is: that we 
attribute mental capacities to animals, but 
- that we do not say a dog is afraid he will be 
beaten tomorrow, that is: that we do not attrib- 
ute to animals the mental capacities we attrib- 
ute to people, but only primitive, simpler ones. 
Cf . : Hallett, Savigny . 
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That people have to learn their language means 
then that they have to become reasonable beings. 
This point is Wittgenstein's main argument 
against Augustine: "And now, I think, we can 
say: Augustine describes the learning of human 
language as if the child came into a strange 
country and did not understand the language of 
the country; that is, as if it already had a 
language, only not this one. Or again: as if the 
child could already think (or were already 
reasonable - R.R.). And 'think' would here mean 
something like 'talk to itself'." [PI 3 2 I s 3  
What Wittgenstein attacks is neither the idea 
that people think, nor the idea that the differ- 
ence between human beings and animals may be 
seen to consist in the human being's having 
mental capacities and the animal's not having 
mental capacities (with the exception of the 
most primitive ones), but the idea that we have 
a clear picture of what it means to think, or to 
have mental capacities, according to which 
thinking or having mental capacities is some- 
thing which is in principle independent from 
using language; and that this picture serves as 
an explanation for the human being's ability to 
talk and the animal's lack of such an ability. 
But if Wittgenstein does not deny that there is 
a (fundamental) difference between human beings 
and animals, does this not indicate that there 
is something wrong with his demand in PI 2 and 
especially with his remark in PI 6? That there 
is a conceptual contradiction between the demand 
and the remark on the one hand and our concept 
of a human being on the other would only be true 
if to play the variety of language-games we play 
- and, accordingly, to have the mental capaci- 
ties we have - were our only criterion for being 
Cf . also: Savigny . 
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humans. But since it is already indicated by the 
fact that people have to learn their language, 
and accordingly have to become thinking or 
reasonable beings it is clear that this is not 
the only criterion. If little children are human 
beings, then also A and B can be. That animals 
are also able to play a game like that of PI 2 
does not mean that A and B, or children, are not 
distinct from animals, for we have furthermore 
lots of criteria for being  heref fore, 
neither the demand of PI 2 nor the remark in PI 
6 stand in contradiction to our basic intuitions 
about what it means to be human. 
But now one could ask: What is the difference on 
principle between Wittgenstein on the one hand, 
and 0fsti (Apel, and others) on the other, if 
Wittgenstein neither denies that there is a 
fundamental difference between human beings and 
animals, nor denies that this difference can be 
seen to consist - understood in the right way - 
in the human's thinking and the animal's not 
thinking? The deep difference, I think, is one 
connected with the conception of philosophy, 
that is, the philosopher's understanding of 
himself. 
Remember the words of Aristotle. He asked wheth- 
er there is anything essential to human beings 
that is not reducible to the various functions 
they have in social life, anything that is 
essential to them qua human beings. And whereas 
all questions about the "good and the 'well'" of 
this or that certain function or activity belong 
to the various sciences and arts of these func- 
tions and activities, and these sciences and 
arts get their importance from the importance of 
their subjects, the question of the essence of a 
5VCf. : Teichman [19761 .  
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human being qua human being belongs to philoso- 
phy. If we know what this essence consists of, 
it seems, then we can also say which real life 
human beings should live, and what is wrong with 
their actual life, how society should be con- 
structed to fit to the real nature of human 
beings, what individuals should really do - and 
not only "this language-game is played". Philos- 
ophy gets its importance from these important 
questions and the possible results which answers 
to them might bring about." 
But now it seems as if Wittgenstein denies that 
there is such an essence, and would only accept 
forms of life, or language-games. "What has to 
be accepted ("Das Hinzunehmende" in the German 
original - R.R.), the given, is - so one could 
say - forms of life." [PI, p. 2261 But, to 
accept the existing forms of life, it seems, 
excludes the possibility of (rationally) criti- 
cizing them. The exclusion of the possibility of 
(rationally) criticizing them entails, it seems, 
the exclusion of the possibility of (rationally) 
changing them. Wittgensteinis philosophy ex- 
presses, one could says6, a pure conservatism. 
In the end philosophy loses its importance. So 
the question is: "Where does our investigation 
get its importance from, since it seems only to 
destroy everything interesting, that is, all 
that is great and important." [PI 1181 
To give an answer to this question, I want to 
point to a similar problem. Bertolt Brecht 
writes: "Me-ti taught: Master Xa-meh says that 
consciousness depends on the actual way in which 
people produce what is necessary for life. He 
Cf.: Nielsen [I9921 for a similar view on 
philosophy. 
s6 It is said, by Trigg [19911; see also my essay 
"How not . . . "  in this volume. 
denies that, in their minds, people can free 
themselves farther from the economical stand- 
point than in economy. This sounds at first 
oppressive. But the simple consideration that in 
fact all great works came about via this depen- 
dence, and that these would by no means be 
diminished by acknowledging the dependence, puts 
everything right again. 'I5' 
Two points interest me in these remarks. The 
first is: that what Ka-meh taught sounds down- 
hearted only for people who view the great works 
not as important in themselves, but rather as 
important because they are the expression of 
something else: the reason or rationality, for 
instance. 
We can register something similar in the case of 
interpreting Wittgenstein. Singing catches, 
play-acting, building - all these and many other 
activities are not taken to be philosophically 
important. They are perhaps plebeian examples 
for something higher, but not in themselves 
worthy of consideration. "Language (or thought) 
is something unique" - as Wittgenstein lets his 
interlocutor say in PI 110. But he continues: " -  
this proves to be a superstition (not a mis- 
take!), itself produced by grammatical illu- 
sions. 
And now the impressiveness retreats to these 
illusions, to the problems." Surely, language 
and thought are something important, but they 
are not something unique! If the plebeian exam- 
ples can be called thinking, then nothing is 
lost, except our delusion. "What we are destroy- 
ing is nothing but houses of cards and we are 
clearing up the ground of language on which they 
stand." [PI 1181 
The second point of Brecht's remark is this: to 
I' Brecht ( [19671, p. 4 3 4 f .  3 ,  my translation - R.R. 
take the great works for what they are in them- 
selves presupposes seeing them as something 
following their own rules, or with their own 
underlying criteria. This does not exclude that 
they are causally, or otherwise, effected by 
something not based on these criteria, not 
following these rules, the economy for instance. 
But to identify the causes presupposes to get a 
clear picture of what it is that is causally 
effected. 
Something similar, again, we can see in the case 
of Wittgenstein. What he is interested in are 
the conceptual confusions which are expressed in 
philosophy. Therefore he tries to show what it 
is to think, to feel, to order, and so on. It is 
the essence of thinking, feeling, ordering, and 
so on, he is interested in. And the "Essence is 
expressed by grammar." [PI 3711 The grammar is 
one of a family of word-uses, which is connected 
by family-resemblances. To see the family-resem- 
blances it is fruitful to conceive the (primi- 
tive) language(-games) as complete. 
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Philosophical Investigations 65ff.: 
On Family Resemblance 
Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance 
belong to the best known parts of the PI. Never- 
theless, there has so far been no general agree- 
ment on their detailed philosophical content and 
their role in the whole architecture of the PI. 
The attention Wittgenstein's remarks have drawn 
is partly due to Renford Bambrough's famous 
article [1960/61] on them. Bambrough's query is 
still one of the most interesting in the liter- 
ature. According to Bambrough in these remarks 
one can find a solution to the so-called problem 
of universals. Bambrough writes5': 
"The nominalist says that games have nothing 
in common except that they are called games. 
The realist says that games must have some- 
thing in common, and he means by this that they 
5 8  I qluote here what Bambrough calls the "bare 
bones" oE his reconstruction of Wittgenstein's solution 
(p. 199. All references with page-number only refer to 
Bambrough's essay.). There is a conceptual tension in 
the following quotation with regard to the realist's 
position. If it is possible that something must be the 
case, but is not the case, then what "the realist says" 
and "the realist's claim" cannot be identical. But in 
some occurences "something must be the case" and 
"something is the case" are interchangeable. Therefore 
I understand in the following what the realist says in 
the sense oE the realist's claim. 
5 0 
must have something in common other than that 
they are games. 
Wittgenstein says that games have nothing in 
common except that they are games. 
Wittgenstein thus denies at one and the same 
time the nominalist's claim that games have 
nothing in common except that they are called 
games and the realist's claim that games have 
something in common other than that they are 
games. " [198f. I 
Now we have two possibilities: 
either 
(i) to be a game is not the same as to be call- 
ed a game, 
or 
(ii) to be a game is the same as to be called a 
game. 
If (i) is true, then it is also true that Witt- 
genstein denies the nominalist's claim, so long 
as we take Bambrough's reformulations as appro- 
priate. And if (i) is true, then it is also true 
that Wittgenstein denies the realist's claim. 
But in this case Wittgenstein would also deny 
what both the realist and the nominalist accept: 
that games are called games. 
But if (ii) is true then it is only true that 
Wittgenstein denies the realist's claim, but it 
is not true that he denies the nominalist's 
claim. Therefore, Wittgenstein only denies at 
one and the same time the nominalist's claim and 
the realist's claim if (i) is true. 
Now, (i) is true iff 
(i. i) something can be a game without being 
called a game, 
or 
(i.ii) something can be called a game without 
being a game. 
But if (i.i) is true, then Wittgenstein's claim 
could not be a solution to the so-called problem 
of universals at all, assuming, that is, that we 
take the so-called problem of universals to 
consist in the questions whether there can be an 
objective justification for the application of a 
general term to its instances, and - if there 
can be - in what it consists [cf.: p. 1981. For 
Wittgenstein's claim is about games and not 
about what we call games. Even if games have 
nothing in common except that they are games, 
the things we call games might in fact have 
something in common other than that they are 
called games, just as a specific subset of the 
set of games may have something in common. 
If (i.ii) is true, then Wittgenstein's claim 
could only be a solution to the so-called prob- 
lem of universals, provided there were at least 
two games among the things which are called 
games. Since Wittgenstein's claim does not 
entail this proposition it is also in that case 
no solution. 
If (ii) is true, then Wittgenstein's claim is 
the same as 
- "games have nothing in common except that they 
are called games", 
and 
- "the things called games have nothing in 
common except that they are games", 
and 
- "the things called games have nothing in 
common except that they are called games." 
Therefore, if (ii) is true, then it is not only 
the case that Wittgenstein does not deny the 
nominalist's claim, but his claim is the same 
Therefore, Wittgenstein's remarks on family- 
resemblance - as they are understood by Bamb- 
rough - are either no solution to the so-called 
problem of universals at all, or they are a 
nominalistic one. 
Furthermore, for the nominalist's claim to 
contradict the realist's claim (i) cannot be 
true. For, if (i) is true, then the realist's 
claim is compatible with the claim that games 
have nothing in common except that they are 
called games. But this is exactly the nomina- 
list's claim. On the other hand the nominalist's 
claim is compatible with the claim that games 
must - "must" understood in the sense Bambrough 
understands it in the last sentence quoted above 
- have something in common other that they are 
games. But this is exactly the realist's claim. 
Therefore, if the debate about the so-called 
problem of universals is characterized by two 
proponents - the nominalist and the realist - 
whose claims contradict one another in the way 
described by Bambrough, then Wittgenstein is a 
nominalist. But if the solution of such a prob- 
lem consists in the formulation of a third 
position, which shows that the two proponents 
are both false in one respect and right in 
another one, then Wittgenstein's claim is no 
solution at all, if Bambrough's reconstruction 
is appropriate. At least it is not clear how 
something can be the solution of a problem, if 
it only repeats what one of the proponents has 
already claimed. This could only be the case, if 
the arguments were new. Therefore it would seem 
advisable to look at the flesh around the bare 
bones. 
Bambrough illustrates his interpretation with a 
simple diagramm: 
e d c b a 
A B C D  A B C E  A B D E  A C D E  B C D E  
[p. 1891. 
He writes: 
"Here we can already see how natural and how 
proper it might be to apply the same word to a 
number of objects between which there is no 
common feature." [Ibid.] 
And if we take only the subset: 
e d c a 
A B C D  A B C E  A B D E  B C D E ,  
"then although they all happen to have B  in 
common, it is clear that it is not in virtue of 
the presence of B that they are all rightly 
called by the same name. " [Ibid. I
The first group of objects can only be an illus- 
tration of Wittgenstein's position with regard 
to games if we suppose that 
- if (i) is true, then 
either 
- to be a game is not a feature of each 
game. 
or 
- to be a game is a feature of each game, 
but this feature is not represented in the 
list A ,  B ,  C ,  D, E ;  
and 
- if (ii) is true, then 
either 
- to be a game/to be called a game is not a 
feature of each game, 
or 
- the illustration is not relevant for the 
question whether the things which are called 
games have something in common. 
Furthermore, clear is that if we (rightly) apply 
the same name to the number of objects of the 
first group, then it is not in virtue of B that 
we call the number of objects of the second 
group rightly by the very same name. But this is 
only analytically true. Now, let us take the 
following group instead of Bambrough's first 
one : 
f 9 h i j 
P Q R S  P Q R T  P Q S T  P R S T  P Q R U  
If one can accept it as natural and proper to 
apply the same word to Bambrough's first group 
of objects, how natural and proper would it then 
be to apply the same word to my group? But here 
it would not be analytically true that if we 
(rightly) apply the same name to this group, 
then it is not in virtue of P that we call a 
subset of this set by the same name. This would 
only be the case, if it were clear that it is 
not in virtue of P  that we call the objects of 
my group by the same name. But whether the 
objects of my group are called by the same name 
in virtue of P nothing one can see! 
~ u t  now Bambrough writes that, even if the 
number of objects were infinite, and if all of 
them have a common feature or features, "it 
would not be in virtue of the presence of the 
common feature or features that they would all 
rightly be called by the same name, since the 
name also applies to possible instances that 
lack the features. " [189f. I 
But here it is clear that Bambrough's simple 
illustration is no longer one in favour of this 
thesis. For if all elements of an infinite set 
of objects had one or more common features, then 
his set of the five objects {a,b,c,d,e) would 
not be an example of a subset of such an infi- 
nite set. Therefore we have to make a distinc- 
tion between two independent arguments in Bambr- 
ough's analysis: 
(a) it might be natural and proper to apply the 
same name to a number of objects, which have 
no common feature; 
and 
(b) all general names apply not only to actual 
instances, but furthermore to possible ones 
which have no common feature. 
(a) is compatible with: 
(c) it might be natural and proper to apply the 
same name to a number of objects, which have 
one or more common features. 
Now the "it might beu-propositions (a) and (c) 
will be - for the sake of argument - reformu- 
lated into "there areM-propositions: 
(a') there are applications of the same name to 
a number of objects, which have no common 
feature; 
and 
(c') there are applications of the same name to 
a number of objects, which have a common 
feature . 
If we remember now the claims of the nominalist 
and the realist we see, that (a') would suffice 
to deny the realist's claim, and that (c') would 
suffice to deny the nominalist's claim, so long 
as we accept the things that the nominalist and 
the realist say with regard to games are in- 
stances of their respective general positions, 
which could be expressed in the following way: 
(N) Objects, which are called by the same name, 
have nothing in common except that they are 
all called by that name. 
( R )  Objects, which are called by the same name, 
(must) have something in common other than 
that they are all called by that name. 
That is, if we were able to show that Wittgen- 
stein hold both (a)/(ai) and (c)/(c1), then we 
could say that Wittgenstein both denied the 
nominalist's and the realist's claims. First to 
(a)/(a'). Wittgenstein writes in PI 66: 
"Consider for example the proceedings that 
we call 'games' . I mean board-games, card- 
games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. 
What is common to them all? - Don't say: 
'There must be something common, or they 
would not be called 'games" - but look and 
see whether there is anything common to them 
all. - For if you look at them you will not 
see something that is common to them all, 
but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them at that. To repeat: don't 
think, but look! - Look for example at 
board-games, with their multifarious rela- 
tionships. Now pass to card-games; here you 
find many correspondences with the first 
group, but many common features drop out, 
and others appear. When we pass next to 
ball-games, much that is common is retained, 
but much is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? 
Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or 
is there always winning and losing, or com- 
petition between players? Think of patience. 
In ball games there is winning and losing; 
but when a child throws his ball at the wall 
and catches it again, this feature has dis- 
appeared. Look at the parts played by skill 
and luck; and at the difference between 
skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think 
now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here 
is the element of amusement, but how many 
other characteristic features have disap- 
peared! And we can go through the many, many 
other groups of games in the same way; we 
can see how similarities crop up and disap- 
pear. 
And the result of this examination is: we 
see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes 
overall similarities, sometimes similarities 
of detail." 
And in PI 67 Wittgenstein writes: 
"I can think of no better expression to 
characterize these similarities than 'family 
resemblance'; for the various resemblances 
between the members of a family: build, fea- 
tures, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, 
etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the 
same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a 
family. " 
Here one can surely say that Bambrough's first 
group is a simple illustration of the former 
remarks, that is, that Wittgenstein accepts 
(a)/(al).'' This acceptance is not restricted to 
'' A more extended illustration with the example 
of "game" can be found in: Suter l 1 9 8 9 1 .  Bambrough 
elaborates this point with his example of the Churchill 
face. Bambrough writes: "The members of the family have 
no feature in common, and yet they will all unmistak- 
ably have the Churchill face in common." [p. 1901 Here 
it seems as if the Churchill face cannot be a feature. 
(There is a problem with the understanding of the word 
"feature" which in English has a peculiarly specific 
meaning when refering to the separate parts of the 
the word (or concept) "game". The description 
and comparison of games functions only as an 
example for concepts like "language" and "propo- 
sition" ("Satz") [PI 651, "number" [PI 671, and 
others. 
But how are all these remarks related to our 
objection above that Bambrough' s first group 
could only be an illustration of Wittgenstein's 
position if we suppose that 
- if (i) is true, then 
either 
- to be a game is not a feature of each 
game, 
or 
- to be a game is a feature of each game, 
but this feature is not represented in the 
list A, B, C, D, E;  
human face. Thanks to Peter Cripps for this point.) But 
I see no reason why this should be the case. I think it 
would be more correct, and less misleading, to say that 
the faces of the members of the Churchill family do not 
have a common feature, but that the members have at 
least one common feature, namely the Churchill face. 
But the Churchill faces do not have the feature 'Chur- 
chill face" in common. See also: Wennerberg [I9671 for 
an extended critique of Bambrough's account. 
There is a debate in the literatureconcerning 
which concepts are - according to Wittgenstein - family 
resemblance concepts and which are not. Some authors 
belief that all concepts are family resemblance con- 
cepts. Cf.: Kutschera [1973], p. 190 - for predicates 
with one place; Pompa [19681, p. 347; Pitcher [19641, 
p. 220. Others argue that not all concepts are family 
resemblance concepts. Cf.: Llewelyn [19681, p. 343; 
Simon [19691, p. 409; Wennerberg [19671, p. 125f.; 
Hunter [19851, p. 62; Manser [19671, p. 211; Suter 
[19891, p. 31. For Bambrough the question is irrelevant 
(p. 1941. I will try to show that not all concepts need 
be family resemblance concepts, but won't try to say in 
detail which are and which are not. 
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and 
- if (ii) is true, then 
either 
- to be a game/to be called a game is not a 
feature of each game, 
or 
- the illustration is not relevant for the 
question whether the things which are called 
games have something in common? 
For Wittgenstein also says that games have 
nothing in common. For Bambrough's reconstruc- 
tion of Wittgenstein's claim to be correct one 
has to make - as I want to call it - a "not 
literally meantN- objection. That is, Wittgen- 
stein indeed thought that games have something 
in common, but does not mention it, because it 
is, for instance, too trivial. According to 
Bambrough Wittgenstein should rather have said 
that games have nothing in common except that 
they are games.61 The "not literally meantw- 
objection is enormously widespread in the liter- 
ature.62 Other candidates for a common feature 
are : 
- that games are activities (Wennerberg [19671, 
p. 110); 
- that games have rules (Khatchadourian [19681, 
p.209; Suter [19891, p. 26; Hallett); 
- that games have the capacity to serve 
specific human needs (Khatchadourian [19681, 
. 
p. 211); 
- that games play a specific role in human life 
(Manser [19671, p. 217); 
- that games are (interwoven with) activities 
(Savigny; Campbell [19651, p. 241); 
- that games are proceedings (Savigny); 
'' A similar argument is to be found in: Kutschera 
[19731. p.191. 
" I found only one exception: Pitcher [19641, p. 
212. 
- that games are located in space and time 
(Campbell [19651, p. 241) .63 
Let us start with the last candidate. To say 
that every game is located in space is similar 
to saying that every body is located in space. 
In PI 252 Wittgenstein comments on such propo- 
sitions as follows: 
"'This body has extension.' To this we 
might reply: 'Nonsen~e!~ - but are in- 
clined to reply 'Of course!I - Why is 
this?" 
The answer to the question is given in the 
foregoing section: 
"Example: 'Every rod has a length.' That 
means something like: we call something (or 
this) 'the length of a rod' - but nothing 
'the length of a sphere.' Now can I imagine 
'every rod having a length'? Well, I simply 
imagine a rod. Only this picture, in connex- 
ion with this proposition, has a quite dif- 
ferent role from one used in connexion with 
the proposition 'This table has the same 
length as the one over there'." 
When the "not literally meantn-objections are 
founded on the supposition that Wittgenstein 
does not mention such things as the location of 
every game in space and time because of their 
triviality and self-evidence, then we also find 
a counterpart for this argument in PI 251: 
"What does it mean when we say: 'I can't 
imagine the opposite of this' or 'What would 
it be like, if it were otherwise?' . . .  
" For reference to Savigny and Hallett see foot- 
note 5 in the first essay. 
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Of course, here 'I can't imagine the oppo- 
site' doesn't mean: my powers of imagination 
are unequal to the task. These words are a 
defence against something whose form makes 
it look like an empirical proposition, but 
which is really a grammatical one." 
Now, can we imagine that a game is not located 
in space and time, is no activity, is no pro- 
ceeding? I think we can't in the sense of Witt- 
genstein's remarks. Therefore these proposals 
for candidates of common features can be an- 
swered with: "Nonsense!" 
That every game plays a specific role in human 
life resembles the following problem: 
"When we say 'Every word in language signi- 
fies something' we have so far said nothing 
whatever; unless we have explained exactly 
what distinction we wish to make. (It might 
be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish 
the words of language (8) from words 'with- 
out meaning' such as occur in Lewis Car- 
roll's poems, or words like 'Lilliburlero' 
in songs.)" [PI 131 
A situation which would make the proposition 
that every game plays a specific role in human 
life say something is for instance described in 
PI 200. 
With regard to the candidate that every game has 
the capacity to serve specific human needs one 
could answer either that this capacity is noth- 
ing one can see or - better - with PI 14: 
"Imagine someone's saying: 'All tools serve 
to modify something. Thus the hammer modi- 
fies the position of the nail, the saw the 
shape of the board, and so on. ' - And what 
is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the 
nails? - Our knowledge of a thing's length, 
the temperature of the glue, and the solidi- 
ty of the box.' - Would anything be gained 
by this assimilation of expressions?" 
The situation is different in the case of one 
candidate for a common feature - that games are 
games. This supposed common feature resembles 
the features of location in space and time and 
the like insofar as it seems to be hard to 
imagine the contrary, whereas if (i) were true, 
we could imagine that something is called a 
game, but is not really one. But if (ii) is true 
or if we understand the proposition that every 
game is a game literally, then this proposition 
seems to reduce to "Every game is identical with 
itself . " 6 4  In this case one can answer with PI 
216 : 
'' Bambrough himself proposes another line of 
argument. He writes: "In the sense in which, according 
to Wittgenstein, games have nothing in common except 
that they are games, and red things have nothing in 
common except that they are red, brothers have nothing 
in common except that they are brothers. It is true 
that brothers have in common that they are male sib- 
lings, but their having in common that they are male 
siblings is their having in common that they are 
brothers, and not their having in common something in 
addition to their being brothers." [p. 1 9 4 1  (This 
passage is directed against: Strawson [ 1 9 5 9 1 ,  p.ll.1 
Here it seems as if every proposition which describes 
something that can be in common is also analytically 
true, or a t  least is different in its truth-conditions 
from paradigmatical empirical propositions. One could 
argue against Bambrough that brothers have in common 
their being male and have in common their being sib- 
lings. But neither their being male, nor their being 
siblings is their being brothers. Only their being male 
and siblings is - perhaps - their being brothers. On 
the other hand it is perhaps true that neither their 
being male nor their being siblings is something in 
addition to their being brothers. 
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"'A thing is identical with itself.' - There 
is no finer example of a useless proposi- 
tion, which yet is connected with a certain 
play of the imagination. It is as if in 
imagination we put a thing into its own 
shape and saw that it fitted." 
With regard to one candidate for a common fea- 
ture - that games have rules - I am not sure 
whether this could also be answered in one of 
the ways above. But I have the feeling that also 
here there is something awry.65 
Now, Wittgenstein's remarks in PI 66 and else- 
where seem to give us reason to believe that 
Wittgenstein accepts (b). For Wittgenstein 
writes: 
"And we extend our concept of number as in 
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. 
And the strength of the thread does not 
reside in the fact that some one fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the over- 
lapping of many fibres." [PI 671 
"For how is the concept of a game bounded? 
What still counts as a game and what no 
longer does? Can you give the boundary? No." 
[PI 681 
"One might say that the concept 'game' is a 
65 Perhaps one could argue along the following 
lines. According to Wittgenstein a game is defined by 
its rules. [Cf.:PI 2051 That is: to follow this or that 
rules means to play this or that game. But it is not a 
part of the definition of chess that skill plays a 
specific role. Therefore the "common feature" of all 
games that they are played according to rules is 
something different from the features listed by Witt- 
genstein. 
concept with blurred edges." [PI 711 
1t is true that in cases where a / a is 
appropriate, often (b) is also. But if we look 
at the context of the quoted passages we see 
that there are no reasons to attribute (b) to 
Wittgenstein: 
" .  ..I can give the concept 'number' rigid 
limits ..., that is, use the word "number" 
for a rigidly limited concept, but I can 
also use it so that the extension of the 
concept is not closed by a frontier." [PI 
671 
This remark suffices to show that Wittgenstein 
does not accept at least that part of (b) ac- 
cording to which every word applies to possible 
objects, and not only to actual ones. But (b) 
not only expresses a position with regard to 
openness of concepts, but furthermore one with 
regard to vagueness. Here we can look at PI 69: 
"How should we explain to someone what a 
game is? I imagine that we should describe 
games to him, and we might add: "This and 
similar things are called 'games'" (This 
expresses the vagueness of the concept 
"game" - R.R.) And do we know any more about 
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom 
we cannot tell exactly what a game is? - But 
this is not ignorance. We do not know the 
boundaries because none have been drawn. To 
repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a spe- 
cial purpose. Does it take that to make the 
concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that 
special purpose. ) No more than it took the 
definition: 1 pace = 75 cm. to make the 
measure of length 'one pace' usable. And if 
you want to say "But still, before that it 
wasn't an exact measure", then I reply: very 
well, it was an inexact (a vague - R.R.) 
one. - Though you still owe me a definition 
of exactness." 
This remark suffices to show that Wittgenstein 
does not accept that part of (b) that is con- 
cerned with vagueness. On the contrary, both 
quotations give reasons to attribute (c) / ( c l )  to 
him. 
Whereas with the acceptance of (b) Wittgenstein 
would not only deny the realists claim (R), but 
furthermore support the nominalist's claim (N) - 
if we accept that "to be called by the name IT"' 
is not among the features - with the non-accep- 
tance of (b) Wittgenstein does not only not 
support the nominalist, but with the acceptance 
of (c)/(cf) he denies the nominalist's claim. 
There is a further line of argument in Bam- 
brough's account which did not find a sufficient 
echo in the literat~re.~~ For him family resem- 
blance is not only sufficient as an objective 
justification of our application of a general 
term to its instances - which is contrary to the 
realist's claim -, but is furthermore necessary 
as such a justification - which is contrary to 
the nominalist's claim. To show the necessity of 
family resemblances Bambrough describes a situa- 
tion "where a set of objects literally ( !  R.R.) 
and undeniably have nothing in common except 
that they are called by the same name." [p. 
19916' He writes: 
"If I choose to give the name 'alpha' to each of 
66 An exception is Savigny. 
" Notice that his remark and the following ones 
indicate that Bambrough does not accept iiil, but 
implicitly (il . 
a number of miscellaneous objects (the star 
Sirius, my fountain-pain, the Parthenon, the 
colour red, the number five, the letter Z) then 
I may well succeed in choosing the objects so 
arbitrarily that shall succeed in preventing 
them from having any feature in common, other 
than that I call them by the name 'alpha'." [p. 
199f. I 
The points in which this imaginary case differs 
from real ones are: 
- the arbritrariness of the selection of objects 
in the imaginary case, 
- that the class of alphas is a closed class, 
that is, "no further application can be 
given to the word 'alpha' according to the 
use that I have prescribed." [p. 2001, and 
- that "I cannot teach the use of the word 
'alpha' except by specifically attaching it 
to each of the objects in my arbritrarily 
chosen list. No observer can conclude any- 
thing from watching me attach the label to 
this, that, or the other object, or to any 
number of objects however large, about the 
nature of the objects, if any, to which I 
shall later attach it. The use of the word 
'alpha' cannot be learned or taught as the 
use of a general word can be learned or 
taught." [p. 200f ., my italics -R.R.I 
We have already seen what wittgenstein's posi- 
tion is with regard to the openness of concepts. 
Therefore it is only necessary to discuss the 
other elements of that reasoning. First, which 
use of the word 'alpha' can neither be learned 
nor taught? There was no use described in Bam- 
brough's description of the imaginary case, but 
only a giving of a name to objects. Or as Witt- 
genstein writes: 
"One thinks that learning the language con- 
sists in giving names to objects. Viz., to 
human beings, to shapes, to colours, to 
pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. To repeat 
- naming is something like attaching a label 
to a thing. One can say that this is prepa- 
ratory to the use of a word. But what is it 
a preparation for?" [PI 261 
"What is the relation between name and thing 
named? - well, what is it? Look at language- 
game (2) or at another one: there you can 
see the sort of thing this relation consists 
in." [PI 371 
"For naming and describing do not stand on 
the same level: naming is a preparation for 
description. Naming is so far not a move in 
the language-game - any more than putting a 
piece in its place on the board is a move in 
chess. We may say: nothing has so far been 
done, when a thing has been named. It has 
not even got a name except in the language- 
game.' [PI 491 
So we can conclude that Bambrough's description 
of the imaginary case is either no description 
of a name-giving procedure, or it lacks its 
essential part - the description of the use of 
the word 'alpha'. The second possibility is the 
interesting one, for it leads to the question 
whether we can imagine a use for a word which is 
applicated to such arbritarily chosen objects. 
One, not only imaginary, example is given with 
(not in) Bambrough's description itself. That 
is, the naming of the objects above can play the 
role of a (supposed) counter-example to a philo- 
sophical claim. For, it is of course the case 
that the reader of Bambrough's essay can learn, 
and can be taught, what Bambrough calls 'alpha', 
and how he uses this word. Another example seems 
to be relics in religious contexts. The objects 
called "relics" need not have more in common 
than the alphas have, yet there is still a use 
of the word which can be taught and learned by 
the members of the religious community. But the 
important point is that the use of the word 
"relic" does not consist only of saying "Relic", 
when one sees (or thinks of) a relic. The use 
includes much more than this, and that makes it 
a use. 
Therefore, I think, we can also conclude that 
family resemblance between objects which are 
called by the same name is not a necessary 
condition for an objectively justified applica- 
tion of that name. Whether or not objects called 
by the same name have something in common, stand 
in a family resemblance relation to one another, 
or are simply "arbitrarily" chosen will depend 
on the language-games in which that name is 
used. There are no abstract general sufficient 
and/or necessary conditions which must be ful- 
filled in order objectively to justify an appli- 
cation. Therefore, to ask whether family resem- 
blance is necessary and/or sufficient as a 
justification is an incomplete question since it 
lacks the (hidden) part "relative to language- 
game ' L ' "  . This situation is principally the 
same as in the case of exactness. This is ex- 
pressed in the last two sentences of PI 69: 
"And if you want to say "But still, before 
that it wasn't an exact measure", then I 
reply: very well, it was an inexact (a vague 
- R.R. one. - Though you still owe me a 
definition of exactness." 
The interlocutoris objection is correct if we 
take a specific form of exactness - for instance 
the exactness in some fields of the physical 
sciences - as our criterion. In this sense 
Wittgenstein can answer: "very well, it was an 
inexact one." The objection is wrong if it is to 
mean that the measure were useless. In this 
sense Wittgenstein can answer: "you owe me a 
definition of exactnessn. 
Now we can say, that Bambrough is right in his 
comment that Wittgenstein both denied the rea- 
list's and the nominalist's claim. But he is not 
right in what he takes to be Wittgenstein's 
argument. For the realist's claim bases on the 
universalisation of specific language-games or 
practices - namely those of the (physical) sci- 
ences. The nominalist's claim bases on the 
universalisation of (parts of) our ordinary 
discourse, which includes the application of 
word to objects between which there are only 
family resemblances or even only arbitrary rela- 
tions. What Wittgenstein denies is the univers- 
alisation of both groups of language-games. 
Finally we can have a look at the alternative 
i i i .  So far we have only discussed what 
would be true if one of the two positions were 
true. But which is true? According to Hunter 
"the final arbiter of whether something is a 
game is whether the linguistic community rou- 
tinely so describes it; in spite of there being 
nothing that all games share, we all soon learn 
to identify activities as games by their proper- 
ties." ([1985], p. 62, cf. also p. 54)" This 
will also be true for possible cases. This 
statement entails the proposition that the 
community cannot err in identifying a game as a 
game, that is: to be called a game is (an essen- 
It is clear, I hope, that with "to be called" 
was always - that is, also in Bambrough's remarks - 
meant "to be routinely called by the linguistic commu- 
nity" and not "to be called at time t and place p by 
person P". 
tial part of) being a game. I think for the 
actual instances that is true, but for the 
possible ones one also has to register that 
there may be differences in the community's 
linguistic practices. This doesn't mean that, 
with regard to possible future instances, one or 
all parts of a community may err, but only that 
it is at that moment not decided whether this or 
that activity will be called a game or not, even 
if it resembles one or more known games very 
closely. As far as features of the objects in 
question are concerned, this is true because 
there are only family resemblances between the 
actual instances and because these may vary in 
different directions. Therefore, at least with 
regard to games (the actual instances for 
"game") (ii) is true. 
But (ii) cannot be generalized. For in the case 
of the use of words according to fixed criteria 
the community can err in identifying objects as 
falling under the concept. Whether an object is 
one which falls under the explicitly defined 
concept C depends on there being defining fea- 
tures. In identifying or finding them even the 
whole community can err." But that an object 
falls under the concept C if it has the defining 
feature has now been decided." In physical 
sciences as one paradigmatic area of such cases 
the specification of defining features is nor- 
mally dependent on whole theories, which for 
instance also entail propositions about the 
relevant object's structure and behavior with 
regard to others, that is: what they - the 
structure and behavior - explain and by which 
they are explained. In these cases a version of 
6P That does not mean t h a t  there  can be e r r o r s  i n  
every case  a t  every time and p lace  by everyone. 
'O  This does not exclude t h a t  the  community may 
l a t e r  t ake  another f e a t u r e  a s  the  def in ing  c r i t e r i o n .  
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Philosophical Investigations 206 : 
The Common Behaviour of Mankind 
Imagine you came into a strange country. You did 
not understand the language of the people - if 
their verbal utterances were a language at all. 
Now: 
(Q) "In what circumstances would you say that 
the people gave orders, understood them, obeyed 
them, rebelled against them, and so on?" [PI 
2061 
This Wittgensteinian question ( Q )  is commented 
by Savigny with the thesis: 
(i) "The answer to the question in [PI 206lb 
demands a theory. "' 
(i) can be understood at least in two different 
ways : 
(it) (Q) demands as an answer a theory, that is: 
only a theory could be accepted as an answer. 
(i") The answer to (Q) - whatever it will 
consist of - demands a theory. 
(With regard to (i") one could, and perhaps 
would, tacitly add : " . . .  as a justification of 
the answer.") 
What Savigny writes a bit later is not thesis - 
for the reason that it is, in my eyes, undeba- 
ted: 
(ii) "Wittgenstein does not tell us, what his 
theory is." In short: Wittgenstein does not give 
' Cf. note 5 in the foregoing essay 
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us his the~ry.~ 
From (i') and (ii) follows in my view: 
(iii) Wittgenstein does not answer (Q). 
(And with regard to (iii) one could, and perhaps 
would, tacitly add: "... as so often in the PI." 
(i") and (ii) do not exclude that Wittgenstein 
did in fact answer (Q), but - again only tacitly 
- without a sufficient justification.) 
Undebated is, as I said above, (ii): Wittgen- 
stein really does not give us a theory. Not only 
is it lacking in the immediate context, it is 
not to be found in the entire PI. At least he 
does not give us a theory in that sense of the 
word, in which it is taken by him. With regard 
to (i) we can choose: we can take one of the two 
alternatives, both or neither of them. (i") is 
in my view relatively uninteresting for an 
interpretation, whereas it could be very inter- 
esting for a critique, or a systematically 
oriented elaboration, of the sparse Wittgenstei- 
nian remarks - assuming, that is, that Wittgen- 
stein gave an answer. But since the problem here 
is interpretation and neither critique nor 
further elaboration, (i") shall not further be 
mentioned, without justifying why (is') is 
probably false. 
(i') becomes more plausible if we smuggle a word 
or two into (Q): (Q') "In what circumstances 
would you be justified in saying . . .  ? "  
For the sake of greater clarity and precision 
(Q') could be reformulated into: 
Q "What could you give as a justification 
for saying that the people . . .  ? " ;  or complemen- 
My "short" is a bit too short for it does not 
mention a presupposition of v. Savigny's proposition: 
that Wittgentein has a theory; only he does not tell us 
what it consists of. 
tary: 
(Q') " "How would the people's behaviour have to 
be, in order for you to say with justification 
that they gave orders . . .  ? " .  
The more we reformulate (Q), the clearer, but 
also the more problematic, the results will be, 
when we compare them with Wittgenstein's text. 
I think (i) is simply inappropriate. And this 
impression becomes stronger if we pass from (Q) 
via (Q') and (Q') ' to (Q') " .' 
This impression is highly welcome, for especial- 
ly (iii) seems to me to be too ~nplausible.~ Let 
us therefore forget everything with the excep- 
tions of ( Q )  and (ii), and register as our first 
result that all the more or less extended com- 
mentaries on P I  206c - which without exception 
take P I  206c and other parts of the P I  to be in 
some way Wittgenstein's answer to (Q) - are 
basically right. Now it is time to have a look 
at this answer: 
(A) "Die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise 
ist das Bezugssystem mittels welches wir uns 
eine fremde Sprache deuten."= 
If a theory is demanded, who should then be the 
addressee of (Q)? 
' If (iii) would be true, what are then the 
commentaries on P I  206c and 207 about? For instance v. 
Savigny's? 
This is the German text and the English version 
has, as Savigny [ 1 9 8 9 1  points out, the misleading 
translation: 
"The common behaviour of mankind is the system of 
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language." 
Instead of "behaviour of mankind" I propose "human way 
of acting". But for the sake of simplicity I will use 
in the following the established translation. 
The following questions are immediately connect- 
ed with (A), if one is interested in interpreta- 
t ion : 
- What does "interpret" mean? 
- What does "system of reference" mean? 
- what does "common behaviour of mankind" mean? 
The last question has been central to the dis- 
cussion in the literature. Therefore let us take 
it as our starting point. The interpretations 
which have been proposed in the literature can 
be ordered by grouping them according to the 
domain they take to be "common": 
(1) the common behaviour is a (regular) behavi- 
our that is common to the members of the ob- 
served group - this is Savigny's interpretation; 
(2) the common behaviour is not only common to 
the members of the observed group, but further- 
more common to the group the observer stems from 
- this more or less sums up Schulte [1990]; 
(3) the behaviour is common to all human beings, 
to mankind -in this is the standpoint adopted by 
Baker/Hacker and Haller [1979;1984;198816. 
(3) is the strongest interpretation in the sense 
that, with (3), it is presupposed that there is 
(at least) one (kind of) behaviour that is 
common to all human beings, whereas this domain 
can not be so wide in the case of (2) and must 
be even smaller in the case of (1). From an 
extensional point of view (3) entails ( 2 )  and 
(2) entails (1). Hence (1) is the extensionally 
weakest position. With regard to (I), (2) and 
13) stand in need of justification. Anyone who 
Haller means that PI 206c leads us to attribute 
a 'praxeological fundamentalism" to Wittgenstein. His 
interpretation is probably not supported by the English 
translation, but by accentuating the "menschlich" 
("human") in the German text. 
tries to defend (only 1)' shows that he is 
interested in exactly that behaviour in regard 
of which (1) is distinct from (2) and/or ( 3 ) .  
Here the point is an intensional one. Anyone who 
tries to defend (only 1) would thereby defend 
the position that, whatever may be subsumed 
under (2) and/or ( 3 ) ,  is not sufficient, perhaps 
even not necessary. In this sense (only 1) is 
the intensionally strongest position. In his 
interpretations of PI 206,207 Savigny tries to 
justify this position. In his essay [I9891 this 
position is further elaborated. I will refer to 
both, but primarily to the commentary. 
With regard to (Q) Baker and Hacker give an 
interpretation which is similar to Savigny's: 
"What justifies the judgement that alien people 
are giving orders, understand them, obey of 
flout them?" The difference with regard to 
Savigny is that Baker and Hacker (not only at 
this place) do not talk about (the need of) 
theories. But the more important difference for 
our topic is their interpretation of (A): "The 
common behaviour of mankind provides an essen- 
tial leverage for interpreting an unknown lan- 
guage." This common behaviour of mankind is 
characterized as "not merely that behaviour 
which manifests our animal nature, our natural 
needs for food, drink, warmth, our sexual 
drives, our physical vulnerability. etc. It also 
includes the diverse species-specific forms 
which such behaviour may naturally take for 
human beings.It is part of the natural history 
of mankind that we are impressed by fundamental 
features of our lives (birth, death and procre- 
ation), by elemental features of our natural 
- 
' Since (1) does not exclude that there is a 
behaviour common to all human beings, I introduce 
"(only 11" for that position which is characterized by 
the exclusion of everything which goes farther than the 
necessary minimum. 
world (the sun and moon, the cycle of seasons, 
the fecundity of nature, its fury and tranquil- 
ity), by the basic patterns of human relation- 
ship arising out of sexual differentiation, 
parenthood, the overlapping of generations." 
Savigny is right in mentioning that Baker and 
Hacker do not found their interpretation on the 
text of the PI, especially PI 206 and its con- 
text. Instead of this they refer to two passages 
from the manuscripts. And also Haller does not 
refer to the context of the passage in question. 
Therefore (3) must be taken not to be justified 
by its proponents according to the principles of 
"textimmanent interpretation" as put forward by 
Sa~igny.~ But (3) is taken by Savigny not only 
to be not justified enough by the context of 
(A), it furthermore obstructs Baker and Hacker 
from giving an appropriate interpretation of PI 
207a. 1,2.' This means: even if (3) cannot be 
justified in terms of PI 206c - although it 
might be in terms of other passages of the PI - 
it is an obstruction for the interpretation of 
at least one passage from the PI. If one does 
not want to attribute inconsistency to Wittgen- 
stein's text, one could be forced to say that 
(2), (1) or (only 1) are the only appropriate 
interpretations. 
PI 207a, 1,2 go as follows: 
"Let us imagine that the people in that country 
carried on the usual human activities and in the 
course of them employed, apparently, an articu- 
See his "Introduction". This judgement does not 
say that ( 3 )  is false or uninteresting with regard to 
the whole PI. 
' With references of this kind is meant: PI, number 
section, part of the section, number of sentence of the 
part. This is the system of reference Savigny uses. 
Savigny's remark belongs to his comment on PI 206. 
late language. If we watch their behaviour we 
find it intelligible, it seems 'logical'." 
Baker and Hacker comment the passage "carried on 
the usual human activities": " . . .  puzzling, 
since if it turns out that the noises they emit 
are not speech, then can they carry on the usual 
human activities at all? Without a language they 
would just be hairless apes." In this comment 
Savigny views "an interpretation interesting for 
the feuilleton", namely the supposition Wittgen- 
stein would have argued for an "anthropocentric 
language-imperialism".1o 
Wittgenstein continues: 
" . .  . But when we try to learn their language we 
find it impossible to do so. For there is no 
regular connexion between what they say, the 
sounds they make, and their actions; but still 
these sounds are not superfluous, for if we gag 
one of the people, it has the same consequences 
as with us; without the sounds their actions 
fall into confusion-as I feel like putting it. 
Are we to say that these people have a lan- 
guage: orders, reports, and the rest? 
There is not enough regularity for us to call 
it 'language'." 
Savigny points out that "their language" in the 
first sentence is used attributively and not 
referentially. The people do not have a lan- 
guage. "Their language" is that, which seems to 
us to be their language. But then they are - if 
Baker and Hacker are right - hairless apes. Of 
course it is clear that they are people. Here, 
like at many places in the PI, Wittgenstein 
introduces a fictitious community of people to 
contrast particular sides of our psychological 
concepts and thereby to make them visible. But 
the question of Baker and Hacker can be given 
l o  Cf. also: Savigny ( [ 1 9 8 9 1 ,  p.  2 3 2 ) .  
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sense by considering that it is not a priori 
clear where we would like to give, or to accept, 
limits for the property "being a human being". 
If to carry on the usual human activities and to 
use in the course of this a language belongs to 
that property, then Baker's and Hackers's ques- 
tion is correct. Savigny does not see any prob- 
lem here, for he writes: " . . . contrary: the 
behaviour is described as 'usual human activiti- 
es', their behaviour as 'seems 'logical" ... So 
we find a human way of acting ("Handlungsweise" 
in German, see above - R . R . )  ...". Here, I think, 
one has to look closer at the text. 
Firstly, it is surely clear that with PI 207a 
not only orders are meant - which are the osten- 
sible topic of ( Q 1  - but language as discussed 
in PI 206c and 207b. It is also clear that it is 
a fictitious situation ("Let us imagine"). Now, 
Wittgenstein uses the phrases "wie es scheint" 
(in the English translation: "apparently") and 
"it seems" (in the German original: "erscheint 
uns"). What we are to imagine is, that it seems 
the people use an articulate language and that 
their behaviour seems 'logical'. So far there is 
no difference between this and Savigny. But now 
the question arises, whether "usual human activ- 
ities" is also used attributively and not refe- 
rentially, as it is, according to Savigny, in 
the case of "language". Exactly this problem is 
touched by Baker and Hacker with their question. 
Savigny seems to suppose that this is not the 
case." At least his whole argumentation against 
" Savigny's remarks are insofar unclear as he says 
on the one hand that the people's behaviour is signi- 
fied ("bezeichnet") by Wittgenstein as usual human 
activities, but on the other and at the same time he 
puts "usual human activities" in quotation-marks. So it 
is not clear whether he means "signified asu ("bezeich- 
net als") or 'signified with" ("bezeichnet mit"). 
Therefore my "seems". In ( 1 1 9 8 9 1 .  p. 2 3 4 )  the thing is 
( 3 )  bases on this assumption. But if this as- 
sumption should be true, then the situation 
would be strange. For what we are to imagine 
then are usual human activities, which - as we 
are to imagine at the same time - only seem to 
be connected with an articulated language. This 
double demand only makes sense if the things 
demanded are different. Usual human activities 
do not only seem to be connected with an articu- 
lated language. Normally they are. At least the 
games of ordering, of reporting, etc. - as we 
play them - are connected with an articulated 
language. And they are connected with it in such 
a way that, to say they seem connected with an 
articulated language has no clear sense. On the 
contrary, they are paradigmatic examples of what 
we call "activities connected with an articulat- 
ed language", paradigmatic of - to say it with 
Austin - how to do things with words. Something 
can seem to be a usual human activity which is 
connected with an articulated language (can seem 
to be ordering, to be reporting, etc. ) - which 
we are to imagine according to Wittgenstein - 
and here we can err. That is: it may be that 
what seemed to be such an activity connected 
with language is not really one. But it cannot 
happen that we imagined a usual human activity 
which seemed to be connected with an articulated 
language, but this only seemed so. What could 
happen - and what therefore could be demanded by 
Wittgenstein - is that something seemed to be a 
usual human activity which is connected with an 
articulated language, but that we register while 
trying to learn it, that it is not connected 
with an articulated language, but only something 
that appears to us as such. But then it is not 
the imagined usual human activity, if an articu- 
clear - my "seems" would there be superfluous. But - 
according to the principles of immanent interpretation 
- only for this work. 
lated language essentially belongs to it, as it 
is the case with ordering, reporting, etc. In 
our imagination the articulated language need 
not be regularly connected with the activity. 
This is one of the important point of Wittgen- 
stein's philosophy of language. 
Here one could refer to PI 207a, 4, where Witt- 
genstein says that the sounds the people utter 
are not superfluous. Savigny writes with regard 
to this remark: "If there is no regular connec- 
tion between sounds and actions, then the gag- 
ging doesn't have exactly the same consequences 
as it does for us. (For us there is a regular 
connection.)" But, if there is no regular con- 
nection between sounds and actions, how can it 
be then a usual human activity? 
If we interpret PI 207a, 1,2 in the way proposed 
above then also the "aber"12 in the next sen- 
tence becomes clear. For there are two things we 
are to imagine: 
- an explorer who only watches, and 
- an explorer who furthermore tries to learn the 
language. Now it should be clear why at the 
beginning I made such a trouble about (Q). This 
question is not concerned with the problem in 
what circumstance we would be (theoretically) 
justified in saying that the people give orders, 
obey them, etc., but with the circumstances. The 
circumstances are also different with regard to 
the explorer. What he wants to say while watch- 
ing may be different from what he wants to say 
while learning. 
That for an observer it may only seem that the 
people are engaged in usual human activities 
' It is not translated into English. The German 
text is: 'Versuchen wir aber ihre Sprache zu erlernen, 
so finden wir, dass es unmdglich ist." 
which are connected with an articulated lan- 
guage, bases on the fact that knowledge of the 
rules which characterize our use of language is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for following them. l3 That the explorer regis- 
ters that there is something wrong with the 
"language" of the people, must not be connected 
with his insight into the rules we follow. Here 
it is sufficient if he registers that he cannot 
- while trying to learn the language - take part 
in the games in the usual way. Then he can 
perhaps come to the result that the people do 
not have a language, that it only seemed so. 
That he cannot learn the language is neither the 
cause nor the reason for the unknown people's 
not having a language. On the contrary, for they 
have no language, there is nothing he can learn. 
But that he cannot learn it is the cause or the 
reason for his judging that they do not have a 
language. This point is similarly accentuated by 
Savigny: "Wittgenstein describes realistically 
in which way we find out that they do not have a 
language. (Before a philologist can get to grips 
with describing a living language he must first 
learn it.) But it has to be emphasized that the 
language fails as such because there is a lack 
of regularity, not because we cannot learn it. on14 
l3  This is the point of Savigny's interpretation of 
the passages on rule-following in the PI. Cf. also: 
Savigny [19911 . 
'' The difference between Savigny's and my position 
in this point follows from our difference with regard 
to ( Q l .  The difference is: for Savigny the "explorer" 
is the philologist, for me the "explorer" is the reader 
(Wittgenstein writes "you" in PI 206b). My point is 
that one should expect as little as possible from the 
explorer with regard to knowledge about the essence of 
language in Wittgenstein's sense. Cf. also: TS 213, p. 
157. 
Before I try to give an answer to the other two 
questions from the beginning, those concerning 
"interpret" and "system of reference", I want to 
draw attention to a section close to PI 206/207 
that is in more than one respect similar to 
them. If the following emphasis of the resem- 
blance is correct, then at least it is not true 
of (2) that "nowhere in the preceding text can 
even the vaguest hint" (Savigny) of (2) be 
found . 
In PI 200 Wittgenstein writes: 
"It is, of course, imaginable that two people 
belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games 
should sit at a chess-board and go through the 
moves of a game of chess; and even with all the 
appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we 
were to see it we should say they were playing 
chess. " 
The "tribe" here corresponds to "the people" in 
the "unknown country" of PI 206. The games of 
the former correspond to the language of the 
latter; the game of chess corresponds to the 
giving, obeying, of orders etc. That games are 
unknown in the one corresponds to the fact that 
the people do not have a language in the other. 
"The common human way of a~ting"'~ is then that 
the two people - as we do - sit - as we do - at 
a chessboard - as we do - go through the moves 
of a game of chess - as we do - and show the 
appropriate mental accompaniments - as we do. 
(That there is so much correspondence is, of 
course, not a surprising result, so that one 
could say: Look, here wittgenstein created an 
example which resembles our life enormously. The 
correspondence is constructed.) In these circum- 
stances, where there is for us as the observers 
("if we were to see it" - my underlining) every- 
'= Remember that this is the translation of *'die 
gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise" which I prefer. 
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thing is as we are used to, we would of course 
say that the two people were playing chess.16 
But what if we tried to play a game of chess 
with one of the two people? 
Wittgenstein continues with PI 200: 
"But now imagine a game of chess translated 
according to certain rules into a series of 
actions which we do not associate with a game- 
say into yells and stamping of feet. And now 
suppose those two people to yell and stamp 
instead of playing the form of chess that we are 
used to; and this in such a way that their 
procedure is translatable by suitable rules into 
a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to 
say they were playing a game? What right would 
one have to say so?" 
There are at least two possibilities to inter- 
pret this passage. The first bases on the suppo- 
sition that "those two people" are the "two 
people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with 
games" (my italics). Then, of course, they do 
not play in the second case." The second inter- 
pretation which seems possible, takes the "in- 
stead" literally: "those two people' play real- 
ly, only not a form of chess we are used to. 
"Those two people" can then, of course, no 
longer belong to a "tribe unacquainted with 
games". The point of this interpretation is that 
we should not exclude that something really is a 
game even if it is far from resembling one. On 
the other hand something might not be a game 
Perhaps the correspondences are so strong that 
one could not say that we interpret in such a case, if 
interpreting requires uncertainty. 
" This is Savigny's interpretation. 
even if it looks exactly like one.'' 
Whichever interpretation one chooses influences 
the interpretation of the question at the end of 
the whole section. But independent of both is an 
interpretation of the answer Wittgenstein sug- 
gests to the preceding question: we would not be 
inclined to say they were playing a game. The 
visible differences, the superficial differenc- 
es, are too strong. In this sense there is also 
no common human way of acting, no system of 
reference, no interpreting.'' 
But there are not only resemblances between PI 
200 and PI 206/207. One important difference is 
that the examples given in PI 200 concern one 
token of behaviour, whereas it seems clear that 
in PI 206/207 types are meant. If Wittgenstein 
doesn't explicitly say at the beginning of PI 
200 that in the tribe games are unknown, then 
the question whether what the two people are 
doing is playing or not would hardly be answer- 
able at all. The cases would be "temporally 
IB Baker/Hacker point out something in this direc- 
tion, but without being very explicit. But the passage 
from MS 124,  p. 206 which they quote shows the point 
very well. 
" With regard to the question at the end of PI 
200:  this question as distinct from the other only 
makes sense if the remark in the second sentence and 
the other question are not to be interpreted in the 
sense of "being justified to say that/whether they play 
chess". That is: only if "being justified to say" and 
"being inclined to say' are conceptually distinct. This 
is the difference I emphasized with regard to (Q). This 
difference is obscured by Savigny when he interprets 
the last question as: "Could one, and if so with what 
right, say . . . " .  
under-determined".2o In this view PI 2 0 6 / 2 0 7  are 
further elaborations of PI 200; here the answer 
is not impossible because there is not enough 
time for the "explorer". If observation is 
sufficient, then the observer has enough time to 
observe. The new element is: learning is empha- 
sized, instead of observing. 
But now to the questions: What does "system of 
reference" mean, and what does "interpret" mean? 
In which way could "system of reference" be used 
if (1) is correct? Here is a suggestion: We 
observe how the people carry on different activ- 
ities and how, in the course of these activi- 
ties, they utter different sounds. Or, we ob- 
serve how they utter different sounds without 
carrying on any activities. We want to know 
whether at least some of the sounds they utter 
are orders, questions, etc. But we only observe 
tokens of activities and sound utterances. These 
are not enough for us. What we need are types, 
or schemata, namely types, or schemata, of sound 
utterances which are regularly connected with 
the people's other behaviour, that is with 
lo Baker and Hacker point in their exegesis to a 
passage from the "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe- 
matics", where Wittgenstein describes the case that God 
creates in a desert for two minutes a country resem- 
bling England in all details. Now the question whether 
what two people of this country are doing at one moment 
would be the same as what (at the same time, with the 
same behavior, etc.) two mathematicians in England are 
doing is, in principle, answered by Wittgenstein as 
follows: We could not say it, two minutes are too 
short; we would have to know what happened before 
and/or what will happen afterwards. This resembles the 
section before PI 200: "It is not possible that there 
should have been only one occasion on which somebody 
obeyed a rule." (PI 199) Similar problems are the topic 
of PI 581-587. In PI 583 one finds a connection to the 
position of Baker/Hacker and Haller. 
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types, or schemata, of their behaviour. What we 
need is - a system of reference. 
This interpretation is, of course, guided by the 
content of (1) and it does not show more than 
that one can give associations for "system of 
reference" which are in accordance with, or at 
least not contrary to, (1). Therefore the inter- 
pretation of "system of reference" is no experi- 
mentum crucis which could help us to justify a 
decision between (I), (2) and ( 3 )  . 2 1  But at 
least one difficulty connected with the given 
interpretation of "system of reference" should 
be seen. In this picture there seems to be no 
good place for the distinction between observing 
and learning, that is for the importance of this 
distinction with regard to the problem in ques- 
tion. This difference seems only to be one of 
the psychology of the explorer. What sounds more 
natural therefore is an interpretation of "sys- 
tem of reference" on the basis of (2). Our 
interaction with the people of an unknown coun- 
try is that system, that is: that way of acting 
which is common both to them and to us. 
To justify that (1) is correct and that (2) is 
not, that is to justify that (only 1) is cor- 
rect, it is not enough to show that (1) is an 
appropriate interpretation, but furthermore that 
(2) is not. According to Savigny (2) is compati- 
ble with the text, because "interpret" in PI 
206c has not to be interpreted as "tran~late".~~ 
This position presupposes that "to interpretn is 
not the same as "to translate". But in the 
commentary on PI 207 one can read: . . : trans- 
2 1  "System of reference" does not seem to be an 
important problem of interpretation for the commentar- 
ies. 
'' Savigny does not give reasons for this judge- 
ment. 
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lating is, according to (or after ? - R . R . )  PI 
201 nothing other than interpreting." So, we are 
saying that, according to PI 201, "to translate" 
is to be read as "to interpret", and if we ask 
now how "to interpret" is to be read, we hear 
that it is to be read as "to translate". That 
doesn't sound good. 
In one sense of "translate" this cannot be taken 
to be the correct interpretation of "interpret" 
in PI 206c. even if it seems that this is exact- 
ly the point. In PI 23 one example of a lan- 
guage-game is: "translating from one language 
into another". But % language quite strange to 
you" in PI 206b makes sufficiently clear that 
with "interpret" in PI 206c is not meant "trans- 
late" in the sense of PI 23. To play the game of 
translating from one language into another we 
have dictionaries, grammars, classical examples, 
specialists for special fragments, etc. But in 
this sense we simply cannot - ex hypothesi - 
(try to) translate the sounds of the people. But 
in this sense of "translate" "interpret" in PI 
201 is also not to be interpreted as "trans- 
late". As far as "interpret" in PI 201 is to be 
interpreted as "translate", "interpret" in PI 
2D6c is also to be interpreted as "translate". 
There is no conceptual change between these 
neighboring sections. According to PI 201 "in- 
terpret" is not that "which is exhibited in what 
we call 'obeying a rule' and 'going against it' 
in actual cases." In the situation described in 
PI 206b there is nothing we could call "obeying 
a rule" or "going against it", for the language 
is "quite strange to us". Here one can only 
interpret, based on the common human way of 
acting, as it is described in PI 200. A good 
translator, on the other hand, only chooses 
sometimes, but normally he follows the rule 
blindly. [Cf.: PI 2191 That makes him a good 
translator. Before one becomes a good transla- 
tor, one has to learn the language. 
Let us summarize. (3) is too strong for inter- 
preting PI 206c, for it is not made compatible 
with the whole section and its context. Whether 
(3) is fruitful for the interpretation of other 
passages was not discussed here. 
Neither (1) nor (2) is excluded by the text. But 
the text itself is sufficiently unclear to make 
a decision between (1) and (2) difficult. But it 
was shown that (only 1) is too weak, and that 
the arguments against (2), which are given by 
Savigny, are not strong enough. 
To come to a decision it seems appropriate to 
widen the c~ntext.'~ For instance PI 54, a sec- 
tion not mentioned in any of the commentaries, 
seems to bring (2) into trouble and to support 
(1) and (3). 
Finally, no independent and systematic argument 
was given here. Both - the widening of the 
context and the systematic argumentation - go 
beyond my aim in this essay.'" 
Baker and Hacker see already in PI 1,a connec- 
tion with PI 206. But the other passages they quote or 
point to are not useful for their position. 
'' An outline of a systematic argumentation along 
the lines of ( 2 ) ,  which seems to me to be fruitful, is 
given in Melme (19861. 
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Philosophical Investigations 293: 
Private versus Public ~eetles' 
Some years ago when I read Merrill and Jaakko 
Hintikka's book Investigating Wi ttgenstein I 
found their "most surprising, and . . .  most 
controversial, thesis", the thesis of "Wittgen- 
stein's metaphysical Cartesianism, that is to 
say, the claim that for Wittgenstein there 
really were private event-like experiences, in- 
cluding pains and other such sensations" [p. 
2 6 5 1 .  At first I simply considered this to be an 
original but absolutely wrong interpretation of 
the Philosophical Investigations. It seemed to 
be not just a courageous but daredevil interpre- 
tation - as E. v. Savigny said in his Wittgen- 
steins "Philosophische Untersuchungen" [Vol . I, 
p. 3441. But meanwhile I have observed - perhaps 
my attentiveness for these things has grown - 
that this thesis meets with approval by quite 
some people. Among these people there are some 
philosophers I highly estimate. Hence the matter 
seems to me worth dealing with in a serious man- 
ner. 
I'm not surprised by the fact that some people 
accept this thesis ascribed to Wittgenstein, but 
by the fact that this thesis is ascribed to 
Wittgenstein. Therefore in the following it is 
not my main goal to argue against anybody's 
conviction that there are - in a philosophical 
or psychological sense - private sensations but 
' A shorter German version of this essay appeares 
in the Proceedings of th Conference ANALYOMEN, 
Saarbrncken 1998. 
to argue against the thesis that this is the 
opinion of Wittgenstein inasmuch as his meta- 
physical positions are involved. However, I will 
strengthen my argument in such a way that it 
also attacks the weaker thesis that Wittgen- 
stein's texts and especially PI 293, are compat- 
ible with the opinion ascribed to Wittgenstein 
by the Hintikkas. 
As we know, our problem is first and foremost 
connected with the Private Language Argument, 
and meanwhile it is a widespread opinion - and 
in this I am in accordance with the Hintikkas - 
that the PLA has no selfi-contained standing in 
Wittgenstein's philosophy but, primarily, is a 
consequence, an application, of the argument on 
Rule-Following, developed in sections 143-242. 
Therefore, the Hintikkas say, we have to answer 
the question: "what are the language-games that 
connect our talk of private experiences to their 
subject matter and hence lend this talk its 
meaning?" [p. 2461 Well, this question asks for 
a special kind of language-games but, at the 
same time, it makes a nice presupposition: to 
assume that there are private experiences! Again 
I agree with the Hintikkas - and I think, we all 
do so - that, following Wittgenstein, private 
languages are impossible. The point of disagree- 
ment is: I am a disciple of the "received view" 
- as the Hintikkas call it [cf. p. 2461 - ac- 
cording to which Wittgenstein has simultaneously 
shown that there are no private languages and no 
private experiences, whereas the Hintikkas think 
that there are private experiences, solely the 
language about them cannot be private, has to be 
public (and they think that this is Wittgen- 
stein's opinion, too). Thus, their slogan is: 
Wittgenstein does not criticize the Cartesian 
metaphysics but the Cartesian semantics [cf . 
p.2501. 
We also agree that Wittgenstein does not deny 
that we are able to speak about our own sensa- 
tions, e.g., our own pains - and we do it in our 
normal, common language. But Wittgenstein states 
no ontological thesis about the existence or 
non-existence of sensations but shares with all 
of us and outside of all philosophy the opinion 
that there are sensations. Then, we could refor- 
mulate the disputed point: I think that there 
are sensations but they are not private, whereas 
the Hintikkas believe that our sensations are 
private. 
Now, it may appear as if our discrepancy solely 
consisted in my usage of the words 'my sensa- 
tions' (or 'our sensations') and the Hintikkas' 
usage of 'private sensations' or 'my private 
sensations'. I will argue that these different 
ways of using 'private' generate an important 
discrepancy in the understanding of language- 
games, and I will start with Wittgenstein's 
introduction of the problem of private languages 
in PI 243: "But could we also imagine a language 
in which a person could write down or give vocal 
expression to his inner experiences - his feel- 
ings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? 
- Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? 
- But that is not what I mean. The individual 
words of this language are to refer to what can 
only be known to the .person speaking; to his 
immediate private sensations. So another person 
cannot understand the language." Here, Wittgen- 
stein construes a certain situation connected 
with a lot of assumptions; since we already have 
read the whole PI we know that this situation is 
construed for the sake of argument and later on 
will be shown as impossible, but let us look 
more cautiously at these assumptions: (1) There 
are inner experiences, sensations; this may be 
regarded as an ontological thesis (however, the 
word inner is connected with our concept of a 
man, an individual, a person and, therefore, at 
least in some philosophical conceptions the 
thesis is not purely ontological). (2) Everyone 
can know his own sensations, but (3) another 
person cannot know the sensations of this person 
- these are psychological or epistemological 
assumptions - in our traditional understanding. 
(4) Everyone can refer with words to his own 
sensations - this belongs to the philosophy of 
language. And also (5) : another person cannot 
understand this language for she does not know 
the reference of these sensation words. 
I have already accepted khe first assumption - 
on inner sensations - , but now, in connection 
with the other assumptions these inner sensa- 
tions are also immediate, hidden, private sensa- 
tions. It seems to me that there is a big muddle 
around the words inner, hidden, private; in some 
arguments one of these words may be substituted 
by the others, in other arguments this cannot be 
done; sometimes one word is used to define the 
others, sometimes the reverse is the case, but 
without declaring the terms as synonymous. 
Therefore, I regard it as useful to follow 
Anthony Kenny in distinguishing two ways of 
using 'privacy': one meaning is inalienable, 
belonging to me solely ("Another person can't 
have my pains. " , PI 2531, the other use is not 
communicable (not expressible) , verifiable by me 
solely ("only I can know whether I am really in 
pain", PI 246). 
"Another person can't have my toothache. " - In 
this sense my toothache is private; but for 
everyday psychology it is also a hidden and 
inner state or event. Another person also cannot 
have my blood circulation or my foot though both 
are not psychological entities and my foot is 
not even internal and, at least sometimes, is 
not hidden. Wittgenstein construes fictitious 
situations in order to imagine how, even so, it 
could be that another person has my pains, my 
blood circulation, my foot. But these construc- 
tions require another language-game; in this new 
language-game we could not characterize these 
events or states as private, neither, however 
could we characterize them as my pains etc. Now, 
when we realize that these are grammatical 
declarations we need not get more upset about 
the privacy of my toothache than about the 
privacy of my foot. 
My blood circulation is hidden, especially: my 
blood circulation is hidden to me. But let us 
assume: "I discover that whenever I have a 
particular sensation a manometer shews that my 
blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say 
that my blood-pressure is rising without using 
any apparatus. This is a useful result." [PI 
2701 Neither the privacy (the concealment) of 
the blood circulation is a philosophical problem 
for us, nor is the assumed ability to perceive 
its increase by means of certain perceptions (at 
least not in this context). 
Another person, however, needs the manometer to 
determine changes in my blood circulation for my 
blood-pressure as well as my sensations are 
hidden to him. But also my foot and other parts 
of my body are hidden to him. And: that I cannot 
reveal the blood circulation in the same way as 
the foot, again, is not the philosophical prob- 
lem we are worried about. It is another thing 
with the sensations; now this hiddeness is not 
the same as the one of the inner organs and of 
their changes of state in contrast to the exter- 
nal ones. Here, concealment and internality 
means something else: while my blood circulation 
is also hidden to me, this is not the case with 
my toothache. If we really want to maintain this 
divergent use of concealment and internality 
which has to guarantee that my toothache is not 
hidden to me but to you, then there exists - I 
think - only one possible solution: My sensa- 
tions are not hidden to me because I'm myself 
inside my body. 
I am sure that this is not Wittgenstein's solu- 
tion. And, therefore, there cannot be a solution 
in the sense of Wittgenstein which resorts to 
language-games and at the same time asserts the 
privacy, internality, concealment of sensations. 
- With respect to the concept of language-games 
we can now give a more precise account of the 
divergence to the Hintikkas; as I can see, there 
are two possible lines of argument against the 
existence of a private language: 
(1) It is wrong that a person and only this 
person knows the sensations of this person 
and is able to refer to these sensations by 
means of language. 
Therefore: 
(1.1) It is wrong that a person knows his/her 
own sensations and is able to refer to them 
by means of language. 
or 
(1.2) It is wrong that one person cannot know 
the sensations of another person (or cannot 
refer to these sensations by means of lan- 
guage) . 
(2) ~lthough it is true that every person 
knows just his/her own sensations another 
person is able to understand thelanguage 
this person uses to spe ak about those 
sensations. 
And following Wittgenstein's description of this 
language of sensations in PI 243, we can split 
this into: 
(2.1) Although it is true that every person 
knows just his/her own sensations another 
person is able to establish the referential 
relation between the expressions this person 
uses and the sensations of this person and, 
therefore, to understand this language. 
or 
(2.2) Although it is true that every person 
knows just his/her own sensations and also 
that another personcannot establish the 
referential relation between the expressions 
this person uses and the sensations of this 
person, another person can understand this 
language. 
To put the position of the Hintikkas in its 
proper place we have to remember our agreement 
on the thesis of the impossibility of a private 
language. - By the way, the Hintikkas say: 
Wittgenstein "is not in reality arguing against 
the possibility of private languages in general, 
but against their necessity in the particular 
area of the language people use of their inner 
sensations and feelings". [p. 245, my italics] 
This would remarkably weaken their goal of 
argumentation. But at other places they speak 
clearly enough of the impossibility of a private 
language about sensations. [Cf. p. 242, 2451 The 
main difference to the "received view" is the 
assumption that according to Wittgenstein "there 
really are private experiences, and there really 
are expressions naming them and referring to 
them" [p. 2471. But, to speak intersubjectively 
of these private experiences we need - as the 
Hintikkas say - a publicly available framework: 
the language about private experiences has to be 
a public language. 
Thus, in our classification the position of the 
Hintikkas should be assigned to type (2): There 
are private experiences but another person can 
understand the language a person uses to speak 
of them. - The further assignment to type (2.1) 
or (2.2) depends on the question of whether or 
not another person is able to relate the private 
experience of a person to the expressions used 
by that person to speak of his/her private 
experiences. For the Hintikkas again and again 
refer to PI 293, and since this passage is so 
beautiful let me quote it in its full length: 
"I£ I say of myself that it is only from my 
own case that I know what the word 'pain' 
means - must I not say the same of other 
people too? And how can 1 generalize the one 
case so irresponsibly? 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain 
is only from his own case! - Suppose every- 
one had a box with something in it: we call 
it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone 
else's box, end everyone says he knows what 
a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - 
Here it would be quite possible for everyone 
to have something different in his box. One 
might even imagine such a thing constantly 
changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' 
had a use in these people's language? - If 
so it would not be used as the name of a 
thing. The thing in the box has no place in 
the language-game at all; not even as a 
something: for the box might even be empty. 
- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing 
in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar 
of the expression of sensation on the model 
of 'object and designation' the object drops 
out of consideration as irrelevant." [PI 
2931 
In addition to this passage the Hintikkas de- 
clare that Wittgenstein criticizes the wrong 
semantical paradigm, the "model of >object and 
designation<", for this model "results in rele- 
gating the putative representative relationships 
between sensation-language and sensations en- 
tirely to the realm of the private and thus in 
rendering these relationships otiose. It is the 
privacy of these semantical relations, not the 
privacy of what is represented by their means, 
that wittgenstein is criticizing." (p. 2501 
Thus, since these relations between the sensa- 
tions and the expressions of sensations are not 
private we can assign the position of the Hin- 
tikkas to type (2.2). (They argue that there is 
a special kind of public language-game which 
fulfills the task of correlating sensations and 
their expressions - the physiognomic language- 
games. 
The Hintikkas have a strategy of argumentation 
which makes attacks against them more difficult 
in two respects: on the one hand they state that 
Wittgenstein still holds the Tractatus thesis of 
the ineffability of semantics but is never 
willing to utter - a la Tractatus - nonsensical 
sentences about semantical matters. Thus - they 
say - we have to add Wittgenstein's "unspoken 
assumptions" [p. 2521 in order to realize that 
Wittgenstein if he were willing to speak in a 
realistic mode on private experiences and their 
properties, could say, "there is an actual 
beetle in each person's box visible only to that 
person" (p. 2481 "Of . course we cannot say in 
language that sensations and their ilk are 
private, according to Wittgenstein. But this is 
not the problem. It is only one of the conse- 
quences of the ineffability of semantics. The 
real question is: Are those philosophers right 
who say that there are no private experiences 
according to Wittgenstein?" [p. 2651 Here, to 
get involved in a dispute would mean to make 
Cf. Richard Raatzsch's essay on PI 244 in this 
volume. 
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ontological derivations from Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of language instead of rejecting the 
question: not because of the ineffability of 
semantics but because of the irrelevance of the 
question to this kind of philosophy of language. 
(And, by the way, if there were nothing else to 
criticize, then it would be enough to qualify 
this argument about the "unspoken assumptions" 
and the counterfactual speech about what Witt- 
genstein would do if he could do what he cannot 
do as highly un-Wittgensteinian - the Hintikkas 
may be right or wrong in their thesis on private 
experiences but this has nothing to do with the 
late Wittgenstein.) 
The other difficulty - connected with this one - 
is that the ~intikkas criticize the "received 
view" because there "private experiences disap- 
pear from the picture" [p .  2461, solely public 
behavior remains, whereas Wittgenstein's problem 
according to them is to say in what way it is 
possible to speak intersubjectively on private 
experiences within a public language-game. [Cf. 
p. 246, 247f.l Naturally, this would shift the 
topic of our discussion: the privacy of the 
experiences is assumed already, therefore, an 
attack on private psychological experiences 
challenges the existence of the psychological 
experiences. Thus, we have to be careful not to 
slip from the level of philosophy of language 
into making psychological, epistemological, 
ontological statements about the existence of 
experiences etc., and at the same time we have 
to be careful not to challenge the existence of 
psychological experiences together with the 
privacy of these experiences. (The reproach of 
behaviorism is not new: "The impression that we 
wanted to deny something arises from our setting 
our faces against the picture of the 'inner 
process'. What we deny is that the picture of 
the inner process gives us the correct idea of 
the use of the word >to remember<. We say that 
this picture with its ramifications stands in 
the way of our seeing the use of the word as it 
is." [ P I  3051 "'Are you not really a behaviorist 
in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying 
that everything except human behaviour is a 
fiction? - If I do speak of a fiction, then it 
is of a grammatical fiction." [PI 3071 ) 
Now, our argument against the Hintikka interpre- 
tation has to contain two things: on the one 
hand we have to attack the thesis that according 
to Wittgenstein there are private psychological 
experiences. And, when this is done and we are 
content with it, we cannot confine ourselves to 
it: We also have to challenge that our public 
language functions in the way the Hintikkas 
describe, for our result, after all, ought to be 
that the Wittgensteinian concept of a language- 
game is not neutral with respect to the question 
whether or not there are private psychological 
experiences. 
Provided that we agree in the position that the 
question of the privacy of experiences is not to 
be put and to be answered as an epistemological 
or ontological question but as a question of 
philosophy of language - and this is what I will 
do in the following - we can start with PI 246: 
"In what sense are my sensations private? - 
Well, only I can know whether I am really in 
pain; another person can only surmise it. - In 
one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. 
If we are using the word 'to know' as it is 
normally used (and how else are we to use it?), 
then other people very often know when I am in 
pain. - . . . It can't be said of me at all (ex- 
cept perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in 
Pain. What is it supposed to mean - except 
perhaps that I am in pain?" [ P I  2461 
This could be the place, now, to show how Witt- 
genstein in the following passages argues 
against the privacy of sensations [cf., e.g., 
sections 247 - 252, 272 - 2801 but I will con- 
centrate on what the Hintikkas of fer as evidence 
of the privacy of sensations. They quote PI 272: 
"The essential thing about private experience is 
really not that each person possesses his own 
exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other 
people also have this or something else. The 
assumption would thus be possible - though 
unverifiable - that one section of mankind had 
one sensation of red and another section anoth- 
er." [PI 21 I am sure this is not direct evi- 
dence for private sensations as the Hintikkas 
believe [cf. p. 265f.l but just the opposite: if 
there are private sensations of red and if they 
differ, then this does not play any role in our 
use of the word red. And this is not so because 
of our adherence to a certain conception in the 
philosophy of language but because in our lan- 
guage-game this distinction does not appear! 
And: if anyone believes that, e.g., red-green 
color-blindness plays a role in special lan- 
guage-games, he surely is right but should be 
reminded that this phenomenon can play a role 
just because it is not private. 
And the ~intikkas also misinterpret PI 271, 
which is about the case suggested by Wittgen- 
stein's fictitious opponent of someone who 
cannot keep in mind what the word pain means and 
therefore again and again calls different things 
pain. They believe that Wittgenstein wants to 
indicate "that comparisons between my own expe- 
riences at different times are also problematic" 
[p. 2481. But to take part in the language-game 
I neither need the ability to compare my recol- 
lections of private experiences nor methods to 
increase the accuracy of the comparison; Witt- 
genstein finishes 271 with: "a wheel that can 
be turned though nothing else moves with it, is 
not part of the mechanism'' [PI 2711. 
I could present also other misunderstandings: 
assumed examples of private experiences or of 
the naming of private experiences [cf. PI 257, 
261, 265, 270, 3841 are misinterpreted by re- 
garding the speech of the fictitious opponent as 
Wittgenstein's own position; often Wittgenstein 
uses words or phrases belonging to the oppo- 
nent's usage for the sake of argument - and the 
Hintikkas regard this as acceptance of this 
usage; they regard Wittgenstein's willingness to 
speak of inner experiences as an admission of 
the existence of private experiences etc. [cf. 
pp. 249f., 259, 260f.l. 
And now, let us make - together with Wittgen- 
stein - a concession to the opponent: there are 
private psychological experiences. What could be 
the public framework that gives the language 
community the possibility to speak of these 
experiences? The Hintikkas refer to PI 244: "How 
do words refer to sensations? - There doesn't 
seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about 
sensations every day, and give them names? But 
how is the connexion between the name and the 
thing named set up? This question is the same 
as: how does a human being learn the meaning of 
the names of sensations? - of the word 'pain' 
for example. Here is one possibility: words are 
connected with the primitive, the natural, 
expressions of the sensations and used in their 
place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; 
and then adults talk to him and teach him excla- 
mations and, later, sentences. They teach the 
child new pain-behaviour." [PI 2441 The Hintikk- 
as think that such language-games "can lend our 
talk of pains and other sensations its meaning" 
[p. 2571 and say: "This is an apt example of one 
kind of public framework which . . .  enables 
different persons to compare their respective 
sensations". [Ibid.] The last sentence which the 
Hintikkas quote from PI 244 - "They teach the 
child new pain-behaviour." - was strictly speak- 
ing too much; it goes together with the next 
sentence which they, for good reasons, did not 
quote: "'So you are saying that the word >pain< 
really means crying?' - On the contrary: the 
verbal expression of pain replaces crying and 
does not describe it." [PI 2441 Inasmuch as the 
linguistic pain behavior solely is a substitute 
for the natural, spontaneous, pain behavior, it 
is not a report on pains, has not the state of a 
description. Wittgensteingives us an example of 
drilling linguistic pain behavior, not of the 
comparison of private pains. If the original 
pain behavior of the child (and also that of the 
animal) can give us information about its pain 
then also the new one (which the animal cannot 
learn) can do it; but inasmuch as the new, 
linguistic pain behavior solely substitutes the 
old one, it cannot teach us more about the state 
of the child than the old. Therefore, if we 
liked to speak on the concealment of pains we 
should do this already with reference to the 
child's original pain behavior. And, if we here 
cannot find any philosophical problem we should 
not look for it in the case where the new behav- 
ior solely substitutes the old one. 
We will not deny the existence of pains, nor do 
we in the case when the child has not yet mas- 
tered linguistic pain behavior. After all: If 
the child cannot say it, "but at least it could 
point to the place where it has the pains; if a 
child is able to cry so much then just as well 
it can point" - says Karl Valentin [p. 32 - my 
transl.]. Or is he wrong? He is wrong, if indis- 
putably the child has pains but does not know 
them, and if the new pain behavior cannot teach 
us more about the state of the child but can 
teach the child something, namely, to speak 
about its pains. ("William James, in order to 
shew that thought is possible without speech, 
quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr. 
Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even 
before he could speak, he had thoughts about God 
and the world. - What can he have meant? - 
Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful 
rides, some two or three years before my initia- 
tion into the rudiments of written language, 
that I began to ask myself the question: how 
came the world into being?' - Are you sure - one 
would like to ask - that this is the correct 
translation of your wordless thought into 
words?" PI 3421 
When the child has learned this linguistic pain 
behavior then the possibility arises of conceal- 
ing or pretending pains by using forms of natu- 
ral or linguistic pain behavior as signs, symp- 
toms of pain. This is the child's socio-cultural 
learning (which the animal cannot acquire: for 
such behavior it lacks the proper surroundings). 
[Cf. PI 2501 If privacy, concealment could play 
a role at all, then here. To learn to conceal or 
pretend sensations cannot change the onto1 ogical 
state of these pains but, perhaps, the grammar 
of the word pain. If someone thinks that this 
case could support the thesis of the privacy of 
sensations he is in disagreement with Wittgen- 
stein, also in the case of pretence: "from a 
person's behaviour you can draw conclusions not 
only about his pain but also about his pre- 
tence." [LW, 1, 9011 
We agree with the Hintikkas: the grammar of the 
word pain is "constituted by a language-game 
which essentially includes, over and above 
having certain sensations, also their normal 
spontaneous expressions" [p. 2641 Nevertheless, 
here "having certain sensations" cannot indicate 
a comparison whether or not the same (private) 
experience is given. 
It is correct, also, that Wittgenstein in PI 270 
(and elsewhere, too) rejects the question wheth- 
er I have properly recognized my experience [cf. 
p. 2 6 4 1 .  The Hintikkas go on with the following: 
"Before the correlation (between my sensations 
and the correlated public expression, Ph.) has 
been established, there is nothing to know or to 
make a mistake about. After it has been estab- 
lished, the connection between the public corre- 
late and the sensation is not subject to episte- 
mic mistakes, because it is a conceptual connec- 
tion." [Ibid.] However, where error is impossi- 
ble there truth and knowledge also are impossi- 
ble! "It can't be said of me at all ... that I 
know I am in pain. " [PI 2 4 6 1  I am in pain. - 
That I cannot be wrong in identifying my sensa- 
tions, that is because I do not identify them! 
Therefore, from here you cannot clear the path 
to the comparison of sensations of different 
persons assumed as private and you cannot clear 
the way to the comparison of these sensations 
with public behavior. 
Now, we can come back to the famous beetle 
example of PI 293. The Hintikkas argue: "Our 
opponents could try to defend their position by 
saying that by a rejected private object they 
mean something that is logically impossible for 
others to witness. But suppose it were logically 
impossible for others to see my beetle in my 
box, but that I could compare it with public 
beetles outside the box. Why could I not then 
speak of my beetle and also of yours? ... it is 
compatible with Wittgenstein's ideas to imagine 
... a situation in which each person has access 
only to his or her own beetle, but that beetle- 
owners can nevertheless happily converse with 
each other about their pets by relating their 
own beetle to suitable public objects of compar- 
ison. " [p. 2661 And as an answer to the objec- 
tion that in this case it would be impossible 
for the other to verify my comparisons of my 
private beetle and the public beetles they de- 
clare: "There are public ways of checking my 
skill and veracity in making such comparisons, 
such as testing my eyesight, calling character 
witnesses, administering lie detector tests, 
etc." [Ibid.] Well, these public control proce- 
dures exist just there where I am comparing 
public beetles with each other, and not in the 
case of comparing them with my private beetle. 
And: with one exception the examples of control 
procedures are procedures of testing my veraci- 
ty; I am sure, there are many everyday situa- 
tioris in which it is useful to know whether or 
not somebody is sincere, but this is not the way 
to solve philosophical problems. Isn't it a 
quite ridiculous proposal to test my eyesight? 
As if I, perhaps, could see the public beetles 
blurred solely and as if because of this all the 
philosophical trouble occurred - or do they 
really want to test my aptitude to see sharply 
my inner, private beetles?! 
However, more important is another thing: there 
are no public beetles! The Hintikkas still have 
the aim of upholding the distinction between my 
private sensation of .pain and my public pain 
behavior. No doubt, both are conceptually con- 
nected, but if there were no difference the 
private sensations of pain would get lost. This 
must be true for another person too, so that I 
can compare my private pain sensations with his 
public pain behavior, solely, and not with his 
public pain sensations. Let me remind you, 
Wittgenstein's construction is: "Suppose every- 
one had a box with something in it: we call it a 
'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's 
box, end everyone says he knows what a beetle is 
only by looking at his beetle." [PI 2931 Let us 
not be seduced by the fact that we indeed know 
various public beetles, may-bugs, lady-birds, 
stag-beetles, etc.; and if someone comes back 
from the forest and tells us about a beetle 
never seen before, then there really is a frame- 
work which allows us to put the right questions. 
But in Wittgenstein's example it has to be no 
lie, naturally, when everybody says, he knows 
what a beetle is, only by looking at his beetle. 
Therefore, the following interpretation is 
misleading at least: Eike von Savigny who gives 
an interpretation of PI 293, with which I agree 
on all other points, argues on the section 293- 
sentences "Here it would be quite possible for 
everyone to have something different in his box. 
One might even imagine such a thing constantly 
changing." [PI 2931 with the following words: " A  
continually changing thing cannot be distin- 
guished from a series of different things, and 
the box - sometimes or always - could be empty, 
for what the argument can set forth for any 
series 'beetle - fly - bee - louse - . . . '  it can 
also set forth for the series 'contains a beetle 
- contains a fly - contains nothing - contains a 
louse - . . . I  etc." [Savigny, p. 342 - my trans- 
1.1 It is correct that a changing thing, differ- 
ent things and nothing in the box may play the 
same role - and here, together with Wittgenstein 
and for the sake of argument, we speak in a 
realistic manner - but then if I were looking 
into my inside I could not distinguish the 
changing thing from different things and, there- 
fore, if I have no reasons to exchange the names 
for the changing thing, I also have no reasons 
to name the different things by different names 
beetle, fly, bee, etc. These different names 
used by Savigny indicate the possibility of a 
comparison with outer things. Just this, howev- 
er, cannot be done. 
To avoid such misunderstandings let us call what 
we are talking about not beetle but teeble. 
Another person tells me: "My teeble is sharp." 
(Compare, at least in German: "Ein spitzer 
Schmerz" - " A sharp pain".) And I ask him: 
"Sharp like what? Like a needle? At one end or 
at both?' Here something goes wrong! The correct 
answer would be: "Sharp in the mode as teebles 
sometimes are." But in our example this answer 
is not permitted for I have to compare my pri- 
vate teeble with outer beetles or other outer 
things. Therefore, it is also not permitted to 
answer "Sharp like your teeble the other day." 
for I cannot compare my private teeble with your 
private teeble. - Nevertheless, I like these 
answers and, therefore, let us turn the whole 
matter upside down: these answers are permitted, 
for we know many teebles, especially, I know 
yours. The pains are not private, are not hid- 
den, but, naturally, they exist! And often we 
know the pains of another person, though he 
sometimes hides them, for: what he cannot do is 
to hide his pains systematically! - This is a 
grammatical declaration. 
Now, let me sum up my argument: I assigned the 
position of the Hintikkas to type ( 2 . 1 )  "Al- 
though it is true that. every person knows just 
his/her own sensations another person is able to 
establish the referential relation between the 
expressions this person uses and the sensations 
of this person and, therefore, understands this 
language". I argue that this position is wrong; 
I will not argue against type (2.2) "Although it 
is true that every person knows just his/her own 
sensations and also another person cannot estab- 
lish the referential relation between the ex- 
pressions this person uses and the sensations of 
this person, another person can understand this 
language". I had logical reasons, solely, to 
present this mysterious position. Thus, I plead 
for type (1). especially ' I sustain position 
(1.2) "It is wrong that another person cannot 
know the sensations of a person"; then - togeth- 
er with other premisses - it can be concluded 
that (1.1) " ~ t  is wrong that a person knows 
his/her own sensations and is able to refer to 
them by means of language" itself is wrong - I 
am able to refer to my sensations because other 
persons according to (1.2) can do it. But, this 
discussion needs another paper. 
Finally, if my interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of language is correct, then Wittgen- 
stein's position in the following sense is not 
neutral with respect to the thesis that there 
are private psychological events or states: 
There is no argumentation about the formation 
and the functioning of language-games which uses 
this thesis and is compatible with Wittgen- 
stein's philosophy of language. - Certainly, one 
could keep up the "thesis on Wittgenstein's 
metaphysical Cartesianism" if he were to add 
that this is one of Wittgenstein's private, 
hidden attitudes. 
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"Physiognomic language-games?' 
In chapter 10, "Wittgenstein on Private Experi- 
ence" [pp. 241ff.1, of their book Investigating 
Wittgenstein Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka try to 
elaborate a view according to which the late 
Wittgenstein adopts a Cartesian point of view 
with respect to metaphysics. The remarks on 
"physiognomic language-games", which are also in 
some respect a topic of chapter 11, "Differences 
and Interrelations among Language-games in 
Wittgenstein" [pp. 272f. I ,  play an important 
constructive part in the argumentation in favour 
of this thesis. In this paper I shall discuss 
these remarks on "physiognomic language-games" 
and attempt both an internal (I) and an external 
critique (11) . 
In order to demonstrate the fallacies of the 
"received interpretation", the object of the 
Hintikkasr critique, it is useful to remind 
' Earlier versions of this paper were discussed at 
colloquia in Bielefeld and Konstanz (both Germany). I 
must thank the participants for their helpful comments. 
Mr. Peter Philipp (Halle, Germany) helped not only with 
critique but especially with his essays Schmerzen, 
physiognomische Sprachspiele und das Privatsprachenpro- 
blem (Halle 1990) and PU 293: Private vs. dffentliche 
Kafer (Halle 1991, forthcoming in the Proceedings of 
the ANALYOMEN-Conference held in Saarbrilcken 1991. See 
also his essay in this volume). In the text I will 
refer to Hintikka 119861 with number of pages only. 
ourselves of section 293. It goes as follows: 
"293. If I say of myself that it is only from 
my own case that I know what the word "pain" 
means -- must I not say the same of other people 
too? And how can I generalize the one case so 
irresponsibly? 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain 
is only from his own case!-----Suppose everyone 
had a box with something in it: we call it a 
"beetle". No one can look into anyone else's 
box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is 
only by looking at his beetle.---Here it would 
be quite possible for everyone to have something 
different in his box. One might even imagine 
such a thing constantly changing.---But suppose 
the word "beetle" had a use in the people's 
language?---If so it would not be used as the 
name of a thing. The thing in the box has no 
place in the language-game at all; not even as a 
something: for the box might even be emp- 
ty.---No, one can 'divide through' by the thing 
in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of 
the expression of sensation on the model of 
'object and designation' the object drops out of 
consideration as irrelevant." 
The Hintikkas quote next the two last passages 
(b, c) of this section and write "that the 
private object (the beetle, the sensation) drops 
out of semantical consideration according to 
Wittgenstein only when the semantics of sensati- 
on-talk is construed on an incorrect model. . . .  
It is the privacy of these semantical relations, 
not the privacy of what is represented by their 
means, that Wittgenstein is critizing. (Sensa- 
tions are private; sensation-language cannot 
be.)" [p. 250.12 
With the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" the 
Hintikkas mean "the model of reference unmediat- 
ed by any language-game." [p. 2541 Now, the 
physiognomic language-games are - by definition 
- language-games and not an aspect of the "model 
of 'object and Bezeichnung' " . Therefore, the 
object belongs as relevant to the discussion. 
The beetle-game's need for some "foundation" 
other than that of the "model of 'object and 
Bezeichnung"' is at the same time a demand for 
the self-sufficiency of this "foundation", that 
is, a demand for the independence of the situa- 
tion described in section 293. [Cf. also pp. 
273ff and 278f..] If one could find such a 
"foundation", it seems, one could also compare 
private beetles in a public way. 
The most important textual evidence upon which 
the Hintikkas base their argument for a con- 
structive aspect, is section 244. Wittgenstein 
writes: 
"244. How do words refer to sensa- 
tions?---there doesn't seem to be any prob- 
lem here; don't we talk about sensations 
every day, and give them names? But how is 
the connexion between the name and the thing 
named set up? This question is the same as: 
how does a human being learn the meaning of 
the names of sensations?--of the word "pain" 
for example. Here is one possibility: words 
' A remark in passing: the Hintikkas interpret the 
functional relationship given by Wittgenstein by 
assuming that, if Wittgenstein accepts other models 
than that of "object and Bezeichnung" this would de 
facto be enough to ascribe to him the acceptance of the 
object as relevant and belonging to the discussion, 
which opens the way to an ascription of a Cartesian 
position. 
are connected with the primitive, the natu- 
ral, expression of the sensation and used in 
their place. A child has hurt himself and he 
cries; and then the adults talk to him and 
teach him exclamations and, later, sentenc- 
es. They teach the child new pain-behavior. 
"So you are saying that the word 'pain' 
really means crying?"---On the contrary: the 
verbal expression of pain replaces crying 
and does not describe it." 
Here the Hintikkas only quote the first passage 
(a), where they find "Wittgenstein's first and 
foremost example of 'how words refer to (more 
accurately: 'are related to', in German beziehen 
sich auf) sensations'" [p. 2571 . It is decisive 
for the Hintikkas that here we deal with a 
conceptual or "grammatical" relation and not 
with a contingent one between the sensation and 
the spontaneous pain-behavior, such as the 
sensation's "natural physiognomic correlate" (p. 
258) . "Such a framework of spontaneous expres- 
sive behavior (including facial expressions, 
gestures, and other bodily movements), will be 
called physiognomic framework and a psychologi- 
cal language (or language fragment) based on it 
will be called a physiognomic language. " [Ibid. I 
Now we can look at the characterization of pain 
the Hintikkas find in .section 244a. (I take it 
as a definition and call it "DEF-H".) 
DEF-H 
". . . ,  a sensation is an instance of pain, if 
it is of the kind that typically goes to- 
gether with what is normally taken to be, 
and is responded to, as pain-behavior.' [p. 
257) 
To say that x typically goes together with y, 
which is normally taken to be, and is responded 
to, as z ,  presupposes - as the words "typically" 
and "normally" typically and normally are used - 
that there can be atypical and abnormal cases. 
If we exclude that x cannot go together with y 
and/or with non-y, and/or if we exclude that y 
cannot be taken to be, . . . ,  z and/or non-z, then 
we would typically and normally have no reason 
to use the words "typically" and "normally". But 
how does this fit with the so-called logical, 
conceptual, or "grammatical" relation between x 
and y/z that the Hintikkas are speaking about? 
Would it not be more prudent and advisable to 
speak only about something like a statistical 
relation? 
Since we want to be a bit more exact here, let 
us transfer the parameters explicit in section 
244 onto DEF-H (and call the result, as a varia- 
tion of DEF-H, "Vm-1"). 
vm-1: 
" .  . ., a child's sensation is an instance of 
pain, if it is of the kind that typically 
goes together with what adults normally take 
to be, and what adults normally respond to, 
as a child's pain-behavior." 
But here it seems as if that which is taken by 
the adults to be a child's pain-behavior might 
not really be pain-behavior. Of course, we know 
such things from adults: for example the pre- 
tence of pain. But it could also be that real 
pain occurs whithout there being any pain-behav- 
ior. Of course, we are also familiar with this: 
the concealment of pain. Finally it could happen 
that there are both pain and pain-behavior, yet 
the adults do not take them as such. And neither 
is this strange to us: sometimes we err in 
identifying the behavior of others. However, if 
only one of these things is possible we cannot 
say that the physiognomic language-games connect 
our psychological vocabulary with our private 
sensations, but only that they typically and 
normally do so. With respect to certainty there 
is no longer any conceptual difference (only, 
perhaps, a statistical one) between the physiog- 
nomic language-games and those language-games 
for which the physiognomic ones should function 
as a foundation. One question arises here: What, 
then is the criterion according to which we can 
distinguish between the normal and typical cases 
on the one hand and the abnormal and atypical 
cases on the other? It is clear that the physi- 
ognomic language-games cannot function as such a 
criterion if we take DEF-H or VAP-1 as in any 
relevant sense defining or characterizing them. 
Shouldn't we, then, better take 
VAI-2: 
". ., a child's sensation is an instance of 
pain, if it is of the kind that goes togeth- 
er with what adults take to be, and what 
adults respond to, as a childis pain-behavi- 
or."? 
Here it seems that none of the above doubts can 
arise. Indeed, this characterization fits much 
better with the Hintikkas' thesis about "the 
incorrigibility of primary language-games" [p. 
279f.l. Can we then generalize VAP-2 into 
VAI-3 : 
".., a sensation is an instance of pain, if 
it is of the kind that goes together with 
what is taken to be, and responded to, as 
pain-behavior."? 
But also this formula cannot be valid, because 
it seems now that all pain-behavior - including 
that of the adults, who we know to be capable of 
pretending pain - forces us to accept a pain-- 
sensation. Whatever nice results VAR-3 may 
possibly bring us, the costs incurred should not 
be so high as to require that we forget nearly 
all we know and nearly all we are certain about, 
when it was just these things which forced us to 
look for a "foundation" in the first place. Why 
do the remarks in section 293a,b seem to be so 
powerful? Simply because we do encounter things 
like the adults' simulation and concealment of 
pain-sensations, and because we know that adults 
can err while identifying the mental processes 
and events of other adults. We cannot check the 
adult's utterance "I am in pain!" as we can 
check his utterance "The cat is on the mat! ". 
There is at least an epistemic difference be- 
tween an adult's toothache and cats on mats. Of 
course, not everything that looks and sounds 
like a cat on a mat is really such. But there 
are at least some well-known and generally 
accepted procedures to find out whether some- 
thing that looks and sounds like a cat on a mat 
is what it seems to be. Both cats and mats are 
visible things which we can take in our hands. 
Are pains visible entities? Of course not. We 
can have pain in our hands, but cannot take pain 
in our hands. And this is why it is so easy to 
simulate or to hide pain, if we want or are 
forced to do so. As candidates for simulation 
and concealment cats on mats are not very suit- 
able. Much better are beetles in boxes. Both 
however, are more suited for these purposes than 
a child's pain! 
The absence of the parameters explicit in sec- 
tion 244 in the Hintikkas' characterization of 
pain allows us to bring two different cases 
under one definition; but we have to pay the 
price of losing the differences which allowed us 
to take the one case as the "foundation" of the 
other. 
If we cannot make the step from VAR-2 to VAR-3, 
does this mean that we have indeed two concepts 
of pain, one for children and another for 
adults? Don't we also talk about the child's 
milk teeth and the adult's (mature) teeth? Also 
the Hintikkas say that Wittgenstein on the one 
hand favors physiognomic language-games but, on 
the other, does not exclude other public frame- 
works for our talk about private sensations. In 
particular he does not exclude the possibility 
of physiological correlates of different sensa- 
tions as a public semantical system of coordi- 
nates [cf. pp. 273ff.l. If different sensations 
can have different physiological correlates - 
and for them to be useful as a public system of 
coordinates they must be different, otherwise 
different sensations could not be publicly 
identified as such - shouldn't we then also say 
that physiologically different teeth are corre- 
lated with different sensations, a milk tooth 
with a milk tooth-pain and a (mature) tooth with 
a (mature) tooth-pain? Suppose that such a state 
of affairs were possible. Which concept of pain 
would the adults teach the child, or at least 
try teach it? Isn't it just a happy chance that 
the child learns from the adults' teaching 
precisely the concept which is most fitting for 
both its private sensation and the physiological 
correlate thereof. And isn't this just such a 
happy chance as the one whereby we find openings 
in the cat's skin precisely where the cat has 
eyes and ears? 
No, I believe the physiological correlates 
cannot help us out of the difficulties which the 
physiognomic correlates led us into. They only 
create new ones. It is not only that the whole 
story sounds strange - the question arises 
whether we have any good pictures available in 
the cases of pain in the head, in the foot, in 
the neck, etc. Of course, one could say now that 
no such physiological correlates were meant but 
instead something in the brain. That may be so, 
but one thing is clear: this is not very public, 
at least not in the situation described in 
section 244. And finally: before we can use 
physiological correlates as a public system of 
coordinates we have to clarify whether sensation 
x belongs to the physiological state s (and/or 
process p) or not. This has to be done in a 
public way, otherwise we would have what the 
Hintikkas do not want: a private relation be- 
tween the public sensation-vocabulary and the 
private sensation. 
Let us then put the physiological correlates 
aside and try to find the place where our prob- 
lem arose. This place has to be found between 
section 244,  section 293, and the Hintikkas' 
characterization of pain.. 
Remember what made the situation described in 
section 244  so interesting for the Hintikkas 
that they gave it an own name. It was the search 
for something that could play the role which the 
"model of 'object and Bezeichnung"' played in 
their eyes in section 293.  The problem with the 
"model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" was its 
character as a "model of reference unmediated 
by any language-game. " Was it then Wittgen- 
stein's mistake in section 293 to speak about 
the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" instead 
of the "model of the private (making of the) 
relation between 'object and Bezeichnung"'? Of 
course, for the Hintikkas pain is still a (pri- 
vate) entity and "pain" a (public) Bezeichnung, 
a (public) name for these "private innards" (v. 
Savigny). Section 244 gives us a public lan- 
guage-game, which can, as it seems to the Hin- 
tikkas, function as a foundation for preventing 
the objects from dropping out of consideration 
as they do in section 293. In the words of the 
beetle-game the Hintikkas can say that we can 
talk about, describe, and compare the (private) 
beetles in our boxes because we have learnt in 
another public game how to describe, how to talk 
about, how to compare public beetles. Also we 
can now behave as if there weren't really a 
beetle in the box and can, if there really were 
none in it, behave as if there were. a d  we can 
behave as if we behave as if there were not 
really a beetle in the box, etc.. 
Suppose now that Wittgenstein's expression in 
section 293c is correct, that is, he means what 
he says when he speaks about the "model of 
'object and Bezeichnungl'. The first consequence 
is that "the object drops out of consideration 
as irrelevant." Whatever "pain" means, it does 
not stand for a private object. That means that 
pain-behavior can no longer be a physiognomic 
correlate of a private object. Does that mean 
that there is only pain-behavior left? Do the 
differences we were certain about - the differ- 
ences between honest and dishonest pain-- 
behavior, between spontaneous and reflected 
pain-behavior, between the child's and the 
adult's pain-behavior - disappear, drop out of 
consideration? 
We do not doubt whether a child is in pain when 
it has hurt himself and is crying. But do we 
doubt in each case in which an adult has hurt 
himself and is crying?.If reflection is possible 
and/or necessary in such situations, then this 
is normally and typically' no reflection of 
whether the adult is really in pain, but it is 
reflection on our possibilities to help or to 
express our sympathy in an effective way. 
' "Typically and normally" in the sense above, for 
there are circumstances in which we primarily reflect 
whether the adult is really in pain or not. 
123 
When do we doubt? We doubt, for example, when 
the adult is crying like someone who has hurt 
himself, without having visibly hurt himself. We 
doubt only in special situations, not in gener- 
al. In these special situations we interpret the 
behavior that closely resembles pain-behavior; 
and in this interpretation we sometimes err. In 
other situations we do not doubt, we do not 
interpret, we simply react, help, or express our 
sympathy. Sometimes we don't even know what it 
would be to doubt whether the other is in pain 
or not. Whoever doubts in these situations must 
have other concepts of pain than the ones we 
have, or must be in confusion. 
The child's spontaneous pain-behavior and our 
reaction to it play indeed a special role in the 
variety of our uses of our pain-vocabulaxy. It 
is just one of the situations in which children 
are learning these uses. It is not the only 
situation to have this character. There are 
others in which children learn what it means to 
simulate or hide pain. There are lots of such 
situations, changing from time to time and place 
to place. But it is in no, or only a few, cases 
primarily the description of pain which the 
children are learning here. Much more important 
is to learn how to behave in the case of one's 
own pain and, in the case of another's pain, how 
to help, how to express sympathy, etc. That is 
the way people are. That is the point of section 
244. To repeat the quotation of that passage 
from section 244 which is not quoted by the 
Hintikkas: 
"'So you are saying that the word 'pain' 
really means crying?'---On the contrary: the 
verbal expression of pain replaces crying 
and does not describe it." (My emphasis - 
R.R.) 
As far as knowing that another is in pain and as 
far as descriptions play a role, we often know 
whether the other is in pain or not and what 
pain it is. As far as knowledge plays a role at 
all in connection with being in pain it is the 
pain of the other we (can) have knowledge about. 
With respect to my being in pain it is false and 
senseless to say "it is only from my own case 
that I know what the word 'pain' means" [section 
2931. In this sense - the sense in question here 
- pain is not private. 
The Hintikkas are right, I believe, in criticiz- 
ing a tendency in the literature according to 
which there is a wide gap between the Wittgen- 
stein of the TLP and the Wittgenstein of the PI. 
I also agree with the Hintikkas when they write 
that what they call vertical relations between 
language and world do not drop out of Wittgen- 
stein's interest. But in the Hintikkas' specific 
interpretation of the Tractatus and it's rela- 
tion to the later philosophy it seems to be 
necessary to find an analog for what allowed in 
the early philosophy the analysis of the propo- 
sition's real logical form. If we take the 
picture of the vertical relations between lan- 
guage and world seriously, we could say that, 
according to the Hintikkas, the pain, the pri- 
vate sensation, is at the bottom. Superimposed 
upon it comes the physiognomic language-game, 
while at the top are the secondary language-- 
games. Following this picture, the physiognomic 
language-game has to play the role of the Trac- 
tatus' Elementarsatz. 
But if we take pain to be not a private, that is 
an inner and for the others hidden, entity, the 
physiological language-game can no longer play 
the role of a mediating language-game. It was my 
aim to show that they cannot play this role even 
if we let the question about the nature, or the 
essence, of pain remain open. At least they 
cannot play this role in the way the Hintikkas 
handle the problem. But if we take pain to be 
not a private entity then there is also no 
longer any reason, nor any attractiveness in my 
view, to take the situation described in section 
244 to be a (self-sufficient) language-game. 
Then the view is open to see that this situation 
is no language-game at all, but belongs to the 
one game with the word "pain". 
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How not to speak on Wittgenstein and Social 
Science 
In an article entitled "Wittgenstein and Social 
Science", Roger Trigg writes: "Our ability to 
reason about reality lies at the root of our 
intellectual endeavor. Yet it is an ability put 
in grave doubt by the later Wittgenstein. In 
rooting our reason in society, he made it impos- 
sible to reason about society'' (Trigg [1991], p. 
222, in the following quoted with number of page 
only.). Despite the "vast influence in the field 
of social science" [p. 2091, of the work of the 
later Wittgenstein, it "adds up to a direct 
onslaught on the very possibility of rationali- 
ty" [p. 2191. This is strong criticism. If it is 
correct, it should at least help social scien- 
tists to get rid of that philosophy they have 
mistakenly taken to be important for their 
field. But is this criticism correct? 
Trigg's argument, as I.take it, runs as follows: 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is incompatible 
with the possibility of a proper social science; 
there is or at least should and could be a 
proper social science; therefore this philosophy 
must be abandoned. (Notice that the "proper" is 
important insofar as there is a social science 
vastly influenced by the late Wittgenstein. This 
science is, of course, not made impossible by 
Wittgenstein's philosophy). 
The argument rests on a view of a proper social 
science on the one hand and on a view of Witt- 
genstein's so-called later philosophy on the 
other hand. The latter must be abandoned because 
it does not fit the former, not because it is 
false in itself. In this article I will first 
take a closer look at Trigg's views of a proper 
social science (section 11). Secondly, I will 
look at how he views the later Wittgenstein 
(section III), in order finally to discuss 
whether Trigg's criticism meets Wittgenstein 
(section V). However, before I do that I will 
briefly examine Trigg's own views, asking wheth- 
er he presents an attractive alternative at all 
(section IV). The final section of the article 
will investigate whether there are any points in 
Trigg's critique of ~ittgenstein which may help 
to elucidate the importance of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy for the social sciences, even 
if Trigg's criticism is not acceptable. In 
sections I1 and I11 I will quote Trigg exten- 
sively, because his remarks are themselves good 
examples of propositions which Wittgenstein 
criticized. 
For a clearer presentation of Trigg's account, I 
shall group his remarks into three sections. In 
his article they are not divided in this way. 
(i) The first condition for the possibility of 
knowledge and science in general is, according 
to Trigg, that there is a difference between 
subject and object. "There is a difference 
between knowledge and reality. The latter is the 
proper object of knowledge, but the subject of 
knowledge, the person who knows, must remain 
distinct" [p. 2201.  Without this difference 
there is no possibility of an objective truth. 
Trigg speaks about "the natural picture of the 
situation . . .  according to which we can each 
think clearly and have determinate experiences 
apart from our ability to use language" [p. 
2091. Our concepts are "based on individual 
private experience" [p. 2101 . Our thoughts and 
feelings are then independent of language, which 
may be a social institution. ~eality is self- 
subsistent and "in no sense dependent for its 
existence on our interaction with it. We can 
discover it, but do not create it. . . .  If I see a 
lion, I can assume that it has an independent 
existence, and is not the product in some pecu- 
liar way of my conceptual scheme" [p. 209f. I. On 
the other hand the subject is itself indepen- 
dent. "Similarly I myself have a real existence, 
and do not need to have been inducted into the 
practices of a society to see the lion for what 
it is and react accordingly'' [p. 2101. 
(ii) Also for "knowledge to be possible in the 
field of social science, the nature of a soci- 
ety, or social reality, has to be regarded as 
distinct from the investigator." [p. 2201 In a 
similar way this is also valid for the physical 
sciences, as the case of quantum mechanics 
shows. The general problem is that "an observer 
who is continually interacting with a system 
cannot observe it in the detached way necessary 
for the acquisition of knowledge" [Trigg, p 
2201. So, for the sake of human rationality and 
knowledge there must be "the possibility of 
unprejudiced reason" [p. 2181 . But now we must 
accept that all investigators are themselves 
members of a society. The problem of the neces- 
sary distinction between object and subject thus 
becomes a "perpetual problem in social science" 
[p. 2201. "No one, even in the name of science, 
can step outside every society and abandon every 
presupposition" [p. 2201. Yet, for the sake of 
human rationality in the field of social sci- 
ence, "we will no longer take its ( i.e. socie- 
ty's - R . R . )  assumptions for granted, or uncrit- 
ically apply its conceptsn [p. 2201. We have "to 
grasp the concepts of a society and simulta- 
neously to distance ourselves from them" [p. 
2201. 
According to Trigg, the "unprejudiced reason" 
which is not constrained by any language-game 
allows us to understand both our own society and 
other ones, and so to avoid ethnocentricity. In 
the first case the possibility of "unprejudiced 
reason" is necessary because there is, for 
instance, the possibility that "the real work- 
ings of a society may not be properly perceived 
by its members" [p. 2211 . There may be 'false 
consciousness' and unforeseen consequences of 
people's actions. Social reality is more than 
just the individuals' thoughts and feelings. 
"Otherwise everything would be apparent at the 
surface of society and there would be little 
need for social science" (Trigg, p. 2221. Where- 
as this is also valid for other societies, in 
whose case the "unprejudiced reason" is further- 
more necessary simply because we cannot assume 
that the members of another society under inves- 
tigation share concepts which are identical to 
ours. They often do not, as we know. Investigat- 
ing our own and other societies with an "unprej- 
udiced reason" enables the social scientist to 
criticize rationally the investigated societies, 
to direct the attention of their members to the 
discovered unintended consequences of their 
actions, and perhaps "to strengthen the institu- 
tions of a community, assuming there are good 
grounds for their existence" [p. 2201. 
(iii) Where could social scientists find founda- 
tions for such an important "unconstrained and 
unprejudiced reason"? It is metaphysics which 
provides them with it. It seems that Trigg takes 
empiricist philosophy to be the appropriate 
metaphysics. 
These are the basic insights we must accept, 
according to Trigg, to explain how a proper 
social science is possible. And all these in- 
sights are denied or questioned by the later 
Wittgenstein. 
[il The "natural picture" did not find favour 
with Wittgenstein. As Trigg says, instead "of 
the private he emphasizes the public, and in- 
stead of the individual he stresses the social. 
Concepts are not based on individual private 
experience, but are rooted in our social life 
which of its nature is shared publicly" [p.210]. 
"Both the nature of private experience, and of 
an objective world, was deemed to depend on 
concepts all could share" [p. 2091. The source 
of our concepts is society. "Nothing I think or 
say about myself and the world is determinate 
until it has been mediated by the rule-governed 
practice of our shared life" [p. 2101 . "There is 
no possibility of conceding that one person may 
be right and everyone else wrong" [p. 2161. 
Therefore, Trigg concludes, there is no place in 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy for a distinc- 
tion between subject and object, for the notion 
of an objective truth, or for the necessary 
distinction between the observer and the object 
under observation. 
[iil There is also no place for an "uncon- 
strained and unprejudiced reason" in Wittgen- 
stein's later philosophy, because "we can never 
get outside all language-games and talk ratio- 
nally, just as it is never possible to reason 
properly beyond the limits of language" [p. 
2181. We can reason whether a player is playing 
a game, following its rules correctly or not, 
but we can never reason about the game and the 
rules themselves, because that would mean to 
leave the game itself. This "attack on reason is 
devastating, ... . We cannot abstract ourselves 
from (society) in order to reason about it" [p. 
2121. 
Since we are bound to the language-games, Witt- 
genstein cannot distinguish between the intended 
and the unintended consequences of our actions - 
in fact, he cannot even pose that question. 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein's philosophy does not 
allow us to understand a society with other 
games than ours, except through a process where 
the investigator becomes himself a member of 
that society, thus losing his status as an 
investigator. This philosophy, says Trigg, 
"implies that the only way to understand a 
cannibal society is to be a cannibal" [p. 2201 . 
Furthermore, "whether or not forms of life are 
derived from anything beyond themselves, they 
cannot be explained or justified. They are just 
there even if they are an expression of human 
nature. One cannot reason about them, because 
reasoning can only take place within a particu- 
lar context" [p. 2121. "Wittgenstein's stress on 
the fact that we must accept language-games as 
given involves a repudiation of any idea ... of 
providing a rational foundation for activities 
and practices. Philosophy has to leave every- 
thing as it is" [p. 2151. 
"On this view genuine social science cannot get 
behind people's understanding of what they are 
doing, but can only lay bare the conceptual 
rules they follow" [p. 2151. 
[iiil "The view of philosophy as the mere clas- 
sification of concepts not only emasculates it 
as a discipline. It also removes the possibility 
of giving proper ( sic!, see above under I - 
R . R . )  foundations to other parts of human intel- 
lectual endeavor. The role of human reason 
itself is downgraded when metaphysics is dis- 
missed" [p. 2161. Sociology and philosophy "seem 
to merge". "The search for meaning forces soci- 
ology away from the scientific ground" [p. 2151. 
Before looking into whether Trigg's critique 
meets Wittgenstein, it seems appropriate to 
examine Trigg's own philosophy of science, or 
metaphysics. This examination will be restricted 
to the first two points of section 11. Para- 
graphs (iii) and [iii] will be discussed in 
section V. 
(i') In which sense is reality "in no sense 
dependent for its existence on our interaction 
with it"? Let's take some plebeian examples. A 
book about Wittgenstein is surely in many ways 
dependent for its existence on our interaction 
with some parts of reality. And so are ships, 
houses, music-boxes, and many other things. We 
can discover them, but we also create them. In 
this sense many things are dependent as well as 
created by us. 
But that is not the sense which Trigg has in 
mind. He is perhaps speaking about reality in 
itself, or reality in general, or reality as a 
whole. Whatever that may be, and in whatever way 
it is not dependent and not created by us, 
social scientists simply do not investigate 
reality in itself, or reality in general, or 
realitv as a whole. Social scientist investiaate 
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the wa;s people build and observe houses, biild 
ships, and use music-boxes. What should be 
explained, then, is at least how these plebeian 
parts of ordinary reality are linked to reality 
in itself. Because in most cases scientists are 
not in doubt in which sense something is (in)de- 
pendent, and (not) created. And where they are 
in doubt, they normally try to develop scientif- 
ic methods and criteria for deciding the ques- 
tion. 
What about the lion: it is of course not reality 
in itself, but perhaps, as a member of a natural 
kind, it is somewhat closer to reality than our 
examples of artificial products? What I can 
assume when I see a lion (as well as when I see 
a house) may be debatable. But what is it to 
"react accordingly without being inducted into 
the practices of a society"? If somebody sees a 
lion in the zoo and runs away, crying for help - 
is that person then seeing the lion for what it 
is and reacting accordingly? 
If the example of the lion is supposed to be an 
example of the philosophy favored by Trigg, it 
is a bad one. If it is a good example at all, 
then it is an example in favour of Wittgenstein. 
This becomes more obvious, even for the case of 
seeing, when one substitutes "a solemn ceremony 
in Westminster AbbeyN for "a lion" in Trigg's 
proposition. 
(ii') Is the proposition "x is in no sense 
dependent for its existence on y" (necessarily) 
the same as "x is distinct from y"? I am in at 
least one sense dependent for my existence on my 
father, but I am distinct from him. Yet my 
father and I belong still, so to say, to the 
same ontological realm. One can compare my 
father and me, whether there is, for instance, 
any resemblance in our appearances. One can also 
ask whether the fact that I am a mechanic is 
dependent on the fact that my father is a watch- 
maker. Maybe, and maybe not. And again, my 
father as a watchmaker and I as a mechanic 
belong to the same ontological realm. But what 
if one would say: Music is in its existence both 
independent of and distinct from sugar beets? 
Here one could answer that music and sugar beets 
do not belong to the same ontological realm. And 
that would mean: one cannot compare it like one 
can compare fathers and sons, mechanics and 
watchmakers. There is no possibility for a 
relevant and meaningful comparison between music 
and sugar beets. (Here one could perhaps say 
that music is in no sense dependent for its 
existence on sugar beets. But then "in no sense 
dependent" is the same as "in no sense not 
dependent", and not the same as "independent", 
as this concept is normally used.) The moral: In 
order to be able to say that x is (not) depen- 
dent on/ (not) distinct from y we must relate 
entities that belong to the same ontological 
realm, that is, there must be a possibility for 
meaningful and relevant comparison between x and 
y. Otherwise the result is nonsense, or some- 
thing like a grammatical proposition. 
Now, do societies (the nature of societies, 
social realities) and investigators belong to 
the same ontological realm? If "society" is 
taken in the sense of "community" one can try to 
become a member of a society, but one cannot try 
to become a member of an investigator. That is 
not impossible, because it would be very hard 
for people to become members of an investigator. 
Hence, in "x is a member of y' there is no 
meaningful and relevant substitution for "xu 
with "y" representing "investigator" - as op- 
posed to "society". Similar considerations can 
be made for "x is born in y", "x is happy in y", 
and others. (If we take "society" in the sense 
of "complex of social relations", instead of 
"community", the problem is much easier to 
solve.) The moral: a society (or the nature of a 
society, or social reality) does not belong to 
the same ontological realm as an investigator. 
Therefore, to say that for knowledge to be 
possible in the field of social science, the 
nature of a society has to be regarded as dis- 
tinct from the investigator is like comparing 
music and sugar beets. 
Trigg speaks about observing a system in a 
detached way, because continually interacting 
with it would make the acquisition of knowledge 
impossible. But is this true? Is a watchmaker 
interacting with a clock when he turns it 
around, trying to see how it works? Or is this 
no interaction? Is he then interacting with the 
clock when he takes it apart? If this is inter- 
action, it is by no means clear why he should 
not be able to observe the mechanism of the 
clock. On the contrary, to turn the clock around 
in your hands, or taking it apart, may well be 
necessary conditions for observing the clock 
with the aim of finding out how its mechanism 
works. Those who now feel like saying that a 
clock is not a system, should remember that 
biologists and chemists are interacting in many 
more ways with things that are paradigms for 
systems. And surely they acquire knowledge, even 
if it may be difficult to separate the influence 
of the scientist. But there are many different 
ways of interacting, some leaving this aspect of 
the system as it naturally is, some other as- 
pects. In this sense, Trigg's remarks are simply 
false, and one does not have to be a philosopher 
of science to see that. 
But things like these are surely not what Trigg 
has in mind. What he wants to stress are con- 
cepts of interaction and system, according to 
which a system would behave differently if we 
interact with it. And the interaction would 
render the system's normal behavior inexplica- 
ble. But taken in this way Trigg's proposition 
is like a part of an explaining theory with 
concepts defined within the context of the 
theory. But then it is not clear how the theory 
could explain e.g. the example with the watch- 
maker given above. Alternatively, the proposi- 
tion is a definition of a word. Such definitions 
cannot be judged as true or false, but as fruit- 
ful or not fruitful. For some cases at least, 
Trigg's definition is not fruitful, as we have 
seen. 
What does it mean to say that we no longer take 
society's assumptions for granted? Which assump- 
tions? All, or only some of them? If only some 
of them, one wants to know which of them, and 
why not the others. What could be the criterion? 
If all of them, we arrive at the Cartesian 
doubt. But what then about the "natural pic- 
ture"? Can each individual think clearly, or 
only I? Do I have different determinate experi- 
ences, or only the experience that I know clear- 
ly that I am in doubt? 
But again, that is surely not what Trigg means. 
Yet, instead of using ordinary words in a meta- 
physical manner, he now uses ordinary words in 
an ordinary manner, coupled with the "dialecti- 
cal" phrase of "simultaneously grasping and 
distancing" . 
Even if Trigg's metaphysics can be criticized as 
in the above section, he could well be right in 
his critique of Wittgenstein. So, let us take a 
closer look at it. 
[if] Trigg's remark that, according to Wittgen- 
stein, concepts are not based on individual 
private experience, but rather on our social 
life, suggests that two different positions are 
possible. It sounds as if there are two theses, 
and the social scientist, looking for proper 
foundations for his actions, could choose. But 
this picture is wrong. Neither are the two 
claims "on the same level", nor are both claims 
theses. Wittgenstein writes: "In what sense are 
my sensations private? - Well, only I can know 
whether I am really in pain; another person can 
only surmise it. - In one way this is wrong, and 
in another nonsense" [PI 2461 . In which sense is 
this false, and in which sense is this nonsense? 
The second part of the proposition beginning 
with "Well" is false. "If we are using the word 
'to know' as it is norma.11~ used (and how else 
are we to use it?), then other people very often 
know when I am in pain" [PI, 2461.  The first 
part of the same proposition is nonsense: "It 
can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a 
joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it 
supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in 
pain" [PI 2461.  
So one must make a distinction within Trigg's 
phrase of the "individual private experience" : 
experiences are something that individuals have, 
but they are not private in the sense of the 
first part of Wittgenstein's proposition above. 
And this sense is the philosophically important 
sense for the "natural picture". One could well 
say that individual experiences are the basis 
for our concepts -- if that means that without 
individuals having experiences there would be no 
concepts. "..., of what object does one say 
that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for example. 
And that is the correct answer" [PI 5731. But 
being able to have experiences and opinions 
means that an individual is able to master a 
social practice. Therefore I have just not 
thought or said even something indeterminate 
about myself and the world "until it has been 
mediated by the rule governed practice of our 
shared life", as Trigg says. In this sense there 
is no stress on the social instead of the indi- 
vidual. But there is also no stress on the 
public instead of the private, when taken in the 
way we normally use "instead of". The concept of 
the mind as something private is nonsensical, 
not false. And therefore the remarks on the 
public character of mental states and processes 
are not a thesis which one could choose instead 
of the thesis that mental states and processes 
are private. 
Is there a possibility in ~ittgenstein's later 
philosophy to concede that "one may be right and 
everyone else wrong" Notice first that this 
remark is imprecise. Who is "everyone else"? Is 
the question whether of three, four, or one 
hundred people with an opinion on question Q, 
one is or may be right and the other two, three, 
or ninetynine are or may be wrong? Or is the 
question whether in a community one may be right 
and everyone else in that community may be 
wrong, whatever may be the question? Trigg 
himself points to PI 241 where Wittgenstein 
says: "So you are saying that human agreement 
decides what is true and what is false?' - It is 
what human beings say that is true and false; 
and they agree in the language they use. That is 
not agreement in opinions but in form of life." 
In this sense there is.no ground to surmise that 
it could not be the case that one is right in 
what he says and the other two, three, or nine- 
tynine are wrong. Rather more important for 
Trigg's position is the next section: "If lan- 
guage is to be a means of communication there 
must be agreement not only in definitions but 
also (queer as this may sound) in judgments" [PI 
2 4 2 1 .  If some people were to measure the length 
of a table, and one said that it is 2 meters 
long, whereas the others said it is 3 meters 
long, it could well be the case that only the 
one is right. But if there were no agreement at 
all whenever anybody would measured the length 
of the table, the procedure of measuring would 
lose its point. "...what we call 'measuring' is 
partly determined by a certain constancy in 
results of measurement" [PI p. 2421 . There is, 
then, surely the possibility in Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy that one may be right and 
everyone else may be wrong; but not in each case 
at every time in each question. 
[ii'l Trigg's remark that we can never, accord- 
ing to the late Wittgenstein, get outside of all 
language-games and talk rationally, raises some 
questions. First, it seems to presuppose that we 
can never stay inside all language-games and 
talk rationally. That may well be. In other 
words, it could be the case that the predicate 
"rational" is not meaningfully applicable to all 
language-games and activities. For instance the 
language-games of singing catches, cursing, and 
praying, listed by Wittgenstein in P I  23, may 
belong to the group of such language-games. 
However a person prays, we will hardly say that 
he prays rationally or not rationally, but 
rather e.g. that he prays (not) intensely. 
But Trigg's remark, to make a point at all, must 
presuppose the stronger claim that we cannot 
stay in any language-game and talk rationally. 
For, if we could at the same time be in a lan- 
guage-game and talk rationally, the metaphysical 
foundation of an "unconstrained and unprejudiced 
reason" would lose half of its attraction. So, 
does Trigg's argument mean, for instance, that 
we cannot talk rationally while playing the 
games of describing the appearances of an ob- 
ject, or that of reporting an event, or specu- 
lating about an event, listed by Wittgenstein P I  
23? Is Trigg saying that whatever a social 
scientist is doing when he describes the appear- 
ance of an object, reports an event, or specu- 
lates about an event, he is not engaged in the 
language-games of describing, reporting, or 
speculating, because what he is doing may be 
rational? Do we then have two concepts of de- 
scribing, reporting, and speculating? Or are the 
things done by the social scientist not real (or 
proper) describing, reporting, and speculating? 
Or, was it Wittgenstein's mistake to list re- 
porting, describing, and speculating among the 
examples of language-games? 
Is there a possibility for a distinction between 
an observer and the object observed in Wittgen- 
stein's later philosophy? There is surely a 
distinction between a person describing an 
object's appearance and the object's appearance 
itself. And there are surely similar distinc- 
tions between a person giving a report of an 
event and the event itself; between a person 
speculating about an event and the event itself. 
If observing the appearance of an object, or of 
an event, is at least in some cases a condition 
for, or a part of, describing the appearance of 
an object, or of reporting an event, or of 
speculating about an event, then there is surely 
the possibility for a distinction between an 
observer and the object observed. 
Trigg's criticism that, according to Wittgen- 
stein, we can only reason about whether a person 
is playing a game (correctly) or not, but not 
reason about the game itself, rests on the 
distinction between, to put it this way, reason- 
ing-in-games and reasoning-about-games. This 
distinction is important and it is correct to 
make it. But it is not a distinction that Witt- 
genstein could not accept. On the contrary, his 
philosophy is based on that distinction. He 
describes language-games, and their rules, he 
describes fictitious communities and their games 
(How could only this be possible in Trigg's 
eyes?), he compares the language-games to games 
like chess, etc. 
All these things are possible just because there 
is a difference between playing chess and de- 
scribing chess or comparing it with giving 
orders, and they are necessary because "we do 
not command a clear view of the use of our 
words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspicuityu [ P I  1221. 
In this sense there is without question the 
possibility of reasoning-about-games. But per- 
haps Trigg has another sense in mind. First, he 
might mean reasoning-about-causes-of-games. But 
even this is not excluded by Wittgenstein: "The 
procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a 
balance and fixing the price by the turn of the 
scale would lose its point if it frequently 
happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or 
shrink for no obvious reason" [PI 1421. And even 
a reasoning-about-the-rationality-of-games is 
not excluded by Wittgenstein: "But, after all, 
the game is supposed to be defined by the rules! 
So, if a rule of the game prescribes that the 
kings are to be used for drawing lots before a 
game of chess, than that is an essential part of 
the game. What objection might one make to this? 
That one does not see the point of this pre- 
scription" [ P I  5671.  "The game, one would like 
to say, has not only rules but also a point" [ P I  
5641.  
The next thing one should accept is that Witt- 
genstein, as seen by Trigg, is at least self- 
contradictory. However one interprets the re- 
marks in Culture and Value (CV)- as conservative 
or not - one thing should be clear: at least 
some of them are by no means uncritical, or 
apologetic. One can distinguish between two 
forms of conservatism. One form is that every- 
thing should stay as it is: no changes, no 
experiments!, could be the motto of this form. 
The other form of conservatism consists precise- 
ly of a demand for changes, not experiments of 
course, but a return to the way things used to 
be. The latter is critical with regard to the 
actual social reality, whereas the former is not 
necessarily critical. (It may be critical in the 
same sense as Churchill's slogan about democracy 
being the worst of all political forms, except 
for all the known ones.) If the remarks in 
Culture and Value (CV) express in any way a 
conservatism, then it is the latter kind, not 
the former. But this form of conservatism would 
not be compatible with the conservatism Trigg 
speaks about with reference to the concepts of 
language-game, form of life, etc. 
In a similar way one could argue with respect to 
the compatibility between the later Wittgenstein 
and Marxism. It is by no means made clear by 
Trigg how that compatibility could be brought in 
accordance with the assumption of late Wittgen- 
stein's apologetic for the language-games actu- 
ally played, of the impossibility of criticizing 
these language-games. 
Is Wittgenstein able to distinguish between 
intended and unintended consequences of our 
actions? Consider what he says: "The fundamental 
fact here is that we lay down rules, a tech- 
nique, for a game, and that then when we follow 
the rules, things do not turn out as we had 
assumed. That we are therefore as it were entan- 
gled in our own rules. 
This entanglement in our rules is what we want 
to understand (i.e. get a clear view of)." In 
these cases "things turn out otherwise than we 
had meant, foreseen." [PI 1251 In this sense 
Wittgenstein is not only able to make the dis- 
tinction, it is in his eyes in some respect a 
"fundamental fact". 
But one could answer that ~ittgenstein is con- 
cerned here with cases where the players them- 
selves feel that "things do not turn out as 
we/they had assumed." Does that mean that we can 
only register that there is something wrong with 
our rules in retrospect? That depends. In many 
cases, especially those of explicitly making 
explicit rules, we surely look whether things 
will turn out as planned when we follow them. 
Our ability to look forward may be restricted in 
this or that way, but nothing in Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy gives rise to a general skepti- 
cism in this respect. The point of interest to 
Wittgenstein is only whether we had played a 
game, when it turns out,. for instance, that a 
game is no longer a game with a winner and a 
loser, because we found, after playing it over a 
long time, or after some deep investigations, 
that there is a way for the beginner to win each 
game. 
Now, what about Trigg's statement that under- 
standing a cannibal is, according to Wittgen- 
stein, only possible by being a cannibal? Trig- 
gfs phrase is as nice as it is imprecise. "Un- 
derstanding a cannibal society" may mean a 
number of things. The social scientist may try 
to find out where a cannibal society came from, 
what history it had, where it settled, what its 
members eat when they are not eating people, 
whether they eat people every day or only on 
special occasions, which family relations they 
have, how they build houses, whether they sing 
songs, pray, and curse, etc. None of these 
questions can be meant by Trigg, for otherwise 
his statement would lose its point as a critique 
of Wittgenstein. One must read "to understand a 
cannibal society" in the sense of "to understand 
how it feels to be a cannibal", "to understand 
how freshly cooked people taste", "to understand 
how it is to slaughter a fat old man", and the 
like. It is correct that it is hard to see how 
one could understand such things just with the 
help of Wittgenstein's philosophy. But it is 
also hard to see why just these questions and 
not the former ones should be of the highest 
interest to social scientists. Perhaps poets are 
in a better position here. However, nothing in 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy forces us to 
doubt that the first questions could be answered 
seriously. Some statements in Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy do lead us to doubt that we can 
understand everything in the same manner as we 
understand the games we are engaged in. But 
again, the fact that we are unable to understand 
games in which we are uninitiated in the same 
way as we can understand games in which we are 
initiated, is not a philosophical thesis, but 
simply an observation which can be made by 
anybody who goes to an alien society. The point 
cannot be to accept this fact or not, but to 
give it the right weight. 
But there is another aspect too. Read in Trigg's 
way, Wittgenstein's philosophy not only implies 
a strong intercultural relativism, but also a 
strong intracultural relativism. For describing 
a game of chess is not the same as playing 
chess. But if we are "bound to the language-game 
we actually play", then it is not clear how 
describing (a game of) chess could be describing 
(a game of) chess. To be consistent, Trigg 
should not only look at Wittgenstein as a cul- 
tural relativist, but as a cultural solipsist. 
But looking at Wittgenstein as a cultural solip- 
sist excludes the possibility of looking at him 
as a cultural relativist, for even relativism is 
not expressible then. 
[iii'] To say that the view of philosophy as the 
mere classification of concepts removes the 
possibility of giving proper foundations to 
other parts of human intellectual endeavor, 
presupposes, to be a critique at all, that the 
other parts of human intellectual endeavor stand 
in need of foundations given by philosophy. For, 
one could answer Trigg by saying that Wittgen- 
stein's philosophy surely removes this possibil- 
ity - and helps in this way to lay bare the real 
(or "proper") foundations, if there are founda- 
tions at all. Trigg himself quotes PI 124: 
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the 
actual use of language; it can in the end only 
describe it. For it cannot give any foundation 
either." Philosophy cannot give any foundation 
for the actual use of language, especially no 
rational one. Whether philosophy can give any 
(rational) foundations of social institutions 
like war, trade, stock-exchanges, etc. is not 
said here. But these are some of the main ob- 
jects of social sciences. Even if philosophy 
could not give (rational) foundations for them, 
or criticize them, people can! Why should criti- 
cizing usual practices and social institutions 
as irrational be a domain of philosophy alone, 
and not of political parties, poets, journal- 
ists, scientists, in short: citizens? They 
simply do it, even if they do not have the 
slightest idea about philosophy! Why should they 
need metaphysics in order to criticize the rule 
"that the kings are to be used for drawing 
before a game of chess"? What people do when 
they criticize such phenomena are examples of 
what we call "giving foundations for a social 
institution or practice". But again, this is 
surely not what Trigg has in mind when he speaks 
about "foundations". He means something like 
"ultimate (or proper) foundations", and not 
foundations for wars, trades, and stock-exchang- 
es, but for social reality in itself, ..., - see 
above. This is what philosophers call "giving 
foundations". 
But is it not true then that, "according to 
Wittgenstein, ... a prophet calling society to 
a proper vision of things . . . is like someone 
wrecking a cricket match by refusing to play by 
the rules" [Trigg, p. 2161? Clearly, cricket 
would disappear if everyone refused to play by 
the rules. And if the effect of what the prophet 
says is that all people refuse to play by the 
rules, then he has been successful. But that is 
not Trigg's question. The question is, whether a 
prophet is able to give good reasons for refus- 
ing to play by the rules, whether he can con- 
vince people to refuse to play by the rules. 
Notice first that it may not just be good rea- 
sons that make people refuse to play by the 
rules. It may well be the authority of prophets, 
politicians or others. But the question still 
remains. Here one must make a distinction be- 
tween two things: it is one thing to ask what it 
means to play cricket, what cricket consists of; 
and it is another thing to ask why people play 
cricket. Insofar as people have reasons to play 
cricket, there may be the possibility of con- 
vincing them not to play. This is of course not 
excluded by Wittgenstein, who is mainly inter- 
ested in the first question. His philosophical 
interest in chess is not an interest in people's 
reasons for playing chess, but in what it means 
to play chess. His aim is not to understand why 
people play chess, but to understand what it is 
they do when they are playing chess. It is the 
essence of a thing he. wants to understand. And 
the "Essence is expressed in grammar" [PI 3711 . 
We saw that 
- Trigg's view of a proper social science rests 
on conceptual confusions and false assertions, 
and therefore cannot be a view of a proper 
social science at all; 
- Trigg's view of the later Wittgenstein's 
philosophy is at least a misinterpretation, and 
that nothing of what Wittgenstein's philosophy 
was supposed to exclude is really excluded by 
I L ~  I L ;  
- therefore Trigg's argument is not acceptable. 
It is not the case that Wittgenstein puts our 
ability to reason in grave doubt. Wittgenstein 
clarified what our ability to reason consists 
of, insofar as this ability is connected with 
our abilities to think, feel, measure, under- 
stand, calculate, observe, speculate, report, 
describe, speak, etc. And what else could our 
ability to reason consist of? 
But if Trigg's critique fails to meet Wittgen- 
stein, could there nevertheless be this or that 
point which can help us to get a better picture 
of the relevance of Wittgenstein's later philos- 
ophy for the social sciences? 
The first thing one should see is that there are 
many different approaches in the social scienc- 
es, approaches which sometimes exclude one 
another. Hence, one cannot expect that any 
philosophy could be brought to accord with all 
of them, without contradictions. The question 
then is not only whether a philosophy could give 
foundations to the social sciences, whatever 
that may be, but also whether it might help to 
evaluate the different approaches. In this sense 
Winch is right when he stresses the philosophi- 
cal side of sociology, for also sociology makes 
use of concepts. Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
cannot be compatible with all sociological 
concepts, and it is especially not compatible 
with those that take the private self as its 
basic concept. It is not compatible with method- 
ological individualism and interactionism, 
showing that these concepts rest on a misuse of 
language, based on conceptual confusions. But 
Wittgenstein not only shows that there are 
confusions, he also shows that the answer to the 
question: "Is this an appropriate description or 
not?" often is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but 
only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not 
for the whole of what you were claiming to 
describe." [Cf.: PI 31 The reason for conceptual 
confusions is a misunderstanding of the use of 
our language, not stupidity. And the other way 
around: the "problems arising through a misin- 
terpretation of our forms of language have the 
character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; 
their roots are as deep in us as the forms of 
our language and their significance is as great 
as the importance of our language" [PI 1111. 
If one takes a social science only for science 
if it is close to physics and its methods, then 
a social science searching for meaning in a 
Wittgensteinian manner is no science. But why 
should social science be close to physics? 
Philosophers often give the answer "because all 
sciences search for truth". But is the search 
for truth really the only important aim for 
physics? Does physics not also play an important 
role for the technical sciences? And do the 
technical sciences - in the same sense - search 
primarily for truth? And must "search for truth" 
always mean the same, whether we speak about 
physics, technology, .psychology, or anything 
else? But even if we were to accept that the 
social sciences search for truth in the sense 
that physics does, one of Wittgenstein's in- 
sights would still be valid: that there is a 
"misleading parallel: psychology treats of 
processes in the psychical sphere, as does 
physics in the physical" [PI 5711. Following 
Trigg's view, "perhaps one thinks that it can 
make no great difference which concepts we 
employ. As, after all, it is possible to do 
physics in feet and inches as well as in meters 
and centimeters; the difference is merely one of 
convenience" [PI 5691 . Whereas even this is 
false. It is much more misleading if we compare 
physical and psychological concepts. "Seeing, 
hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not the 
subject of psychology in the same sense as that 
in which the movements of bodies, the phenomena 
of electricity etc., are the subject of physics. 
You can see this from the fact that the physi- 
cist sees, hears, thinks about, and informs us 
of these phenomena, and the psychologist ob- 
serves the external reactions (German: "die 
Ausserungen" - R.R.) (the behaviour) of the 
subject" [PI 5711. To repeat: seeing, hearing, 
..., are the objects of psychology, which is as 
different from them as physics is from the 
movements of bodies. The point is not that there 
is a difference between subject and object, but 
that there are important differences between the 
social and physical sciences which are not based 
on a difference between subject and object, but 
on differences within objects and subjects. 
Wittgenstein is not interested in searching for 
causes of our language-games. This is connected 
to his concept of philosophy according to which 
there should be no explanations, no hypotheses, 
no theories [PI 1091, and the like. Everything 
one wants to say in philosophy must be said 
without looking for new discoveries. Wittgen- 
stein only wants to give descriptions. His only 
interest is in arguments that show that what 
philosophers utter is nonsense, not in the 
possible causes of these utterances, neither 
psychological nor social ones. The insistence on 
description, instead of explanation, may in some 
respects be fruitful even for a social scien- 
tist. As Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer (RoF) 
show, it is sometimes the search for an explana- 
tion that gives rise to a "constrained and 
prejudiced reason". In order to reason in an 
unconstrained and unprejudiced manner it is 
necessary to get a clear view of our own lan- 
guage-games. But, "the aspects of things that 
are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable 
to notice something - because it is always 
before ones eyes). The real foundations of his 
enquiry do not strike a man at alln [PI 1291. 
The absence of any interest in explanations is 
visible especially in Wittgenstein's remarks on 
our entanglement in our own rules. "The civil 
status of a contradiction, or its status in 
civil life: there is the philosophical problem.' 
[PI 1251 In the PI there is not much more to be 
found on this point than this basically cryptic 
remark. But there is also nothing to be found 
that excludes a scientific explanation of "the 
civil status of a contradiction". Nevertheless, 
grammatical confusions must be described, before 
they can be explained. "Our mistake is to look 
for an explanation where we ought to look at 
what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon' . That is, 
where we ought to have said: this language-game 
is played" [PI 6541. To repeat: "where we ought 
to have said", not everywhere! It is philosophy, 
or the search for meaning, where we ought to 
have said: this language-game is played; for 
philosophy must be "possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions" [PI 1261. Philosophy 
becomes then a form of skilled remembering, 
because in order to follow a rule in general it 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi- 
tion to be able to express explicitly the rules 
we follow. Even if "nothing is hidden" [PI 4351, 
and everything necessary lies open to view [PI 
921, we do not see it. 
As far as a social scientist is interested in 
aspects which are "hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity", Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy may be of high interest for 
him, providing him with lots of insights. If he 
disregards these aspects he is in danger of 
overlooking "the real foundations of his enqui- 
ry". 
To give at least one example: in PI 200 Witt- 
genstein describes a situation in which in an 
alien tribe two people "sit at a chess-board and 
go through the moves of a game of chess; and 
even with all the appropriate mental accompani- 
ments. And if we were to see it we should say 
they were playing chess." Now a scientist could 
continue and ask for the causes, or reasons, the 
two people have to play a game of chess, in that 
way trying to explain the observed behaviour. 
But what if we were to find that the two people 
belong "to a tribe unacquainted with games" [PI 
200]? Would we, and also the scientist, still 
continue to say that the two people were playing 
a game of chess? And if not, would that not mean 
that the assumed causes and reasons should not 
only be abandoned, but that the primary question 
should now be, what are these two people doing? 
Sociology and philosophy do not seem to merge, 
as Trigg (and also Winch) think, but rather they 
stand in a close relation to such a degree that 
Wittgenstein's philosophy can help to clarify 
the conceptual foundations of sociology. "Con- 
cepts lead us to make investigations; are the 
expression of our interest, and direct our 
interest" [PI 5701. To get a clear overview of 
our concepts means then also to get a clearer 
overview of our interests. Trigg speaks about 
ethnocentricity as if it were precisely the 
outcome of a Wittgensteinian philosophy. But 
ethnocentricity in anthropological research is 
an historical, scientific fact. With Wittgen- 
stein's philosophy one becomes better able to 
see how it arises, on what confusions it is 
based, and thereby to avoid it. 
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The ghilosoghical background of some tendencies 
in egistemic logic 
To treat logic not only as syntax and formal 
semantics but with the aim of investigating some 
properties and some portions of natural languag- 
es, of reconstructing logical structures of 
these languages, requires - as a means of these 
investigations - some abstractions and idealiza- 
tions which are, at least partially, philosophi- 
cally and methodologically motivated. This is a 
feature of logical work which is nearly invisi- 
ble as long as we do not leave the frame of 
classical logic: We have all learned our lesson 
of the last 100 years and we have no trouble 
with the philosophical presuppositions of clas- 
sical logic because, normally, we do not recog- 
nize them. But this feature becomes more impor- 
tant when we are working in field of non-classi- 
cal logic. 
Thus, if we are looking at classical logic as 
competing with other logics, especially with 
intuitionistic and many-valued logics, and if we 
are ready to look at it from a liberal point of 
view, we realize that the truth predicate of 
classical logic is only one of various different 
truth predicates. And looking at alethic (clas- 
sical) modal logic, we note the same about the 
concept 'necessarily true'. Now, it is easier to 
recognize the different philosophical presuppo- 
sitions and consequences of different non-clas- 
sical logics (and, therefore, also of classical 
logic), but we could say that we do not leave 
the field of philosophy of logic since the 
philosophically relevant concepts are those of 
logical syntax and semantics. 
My first thesis is: We cannot preserve this view 
if we change over to those logics which are 
usually called 'non-classical modal logics': 
epistemic logic, deontic logic, logic of action, 
causal logic and so on. - But the origin and the 
development of these logics in the middle of our 
century disguised this new feature because this 
development had a peculiarity. It seemed to be 
very natural to construe systems of non-classi- 
cal modal logic in the following way: Let us 
take an appropriate system of alethic modal 
logic and re-interpret its modal concepts, e.g., 
substitute the concept 'necessary' by 'is known' 
or 'is obliged' and the symbol by K or 0 .  As 
long as, in the new system, we do not want to 
use a concept of necessity besides 'is known' or 
'is obliged', at a syntactical level there is no 
need to exchange the symbols. The formal seman- 
tics, e.g. of the system D, also do not alter 
when we speak of 'is obliged' instead of 'is 
necessary'. 
I do not deny the correctness of this approach 
so far our aim is only to do logic, but I main- 
tain that our task is, at least in some cases, 
to do applied logic - and this task is covered 
by this approach. 
The concepts we are investigating - 'believe', 
'know', 'doubt' or 'allowed', 'obliged', 'for- 
bidden', etc. - are not logical concepts. It is 
possible to give a logical analysis of these 
concepts since they have formal properties but 
they are descriptive concepts, they have a 
descriptive content in the sense of logic. (In 
this context it is not my problem whether these 
concepts have formal properties - so to speak - 
"a priori" or as a result of our logical analy- 
sis.) At least some of these descriptive con- 
cepts we are investigating by formal means are 
philosophically relevant and, therefore, in 
construing logical theories of norms, of propo- 
sitional attitudes, of actions, etc. we import 
into these theories (or: infiltrate these theo- 
ries by) philosophical assumptions and presuppo- 
sitions which do not belong to the field I 
called 'philosophy of logic'. 
Then we are in a situation where disputes may 
arise, e.g., whether we have to construe a logic 
of rational epistemic concepts or of descriptive 
epistemic concepts; whether or not some or all 
rational epistemic concepts are empirically 
empty - and what consequences this has; whether 
or not a logic of descriptive epistemic concepts 
is possible at all, etc. 
Now, my second thesis is: We can eliminate many 
of the problems which are related to these 
philosophical assumptions we - mainly uninten- 
tionally - imported into our logical theories. 
To do this we have to find a neutralization of 
our theory relative to certain, perhaps not all, 
philosophical positions. 
I think, not everybody would regard it as desir- 
able to acquire philosophical neutrality, for 
one I do not want it; therefore, let me add my 
third thesis, straight away: When this philo- 
sophical neutralization of our formal theory is 
done we can again import philosophical assump- 
tions into our theory, but now we are able to do 
this explicitly and with the methodological con- 
sciousness of accepting postulates which have a 
non-logical, descriptive state in the sense of 
logic. 
In the following I want to illustrate (1) the 
philosophical burden of some systems of episte- 
mic logic and (2) the way to reduce this burden, 
at least partially. In the main, I will consider 
the epistemic logic of Werner Stelzner [19841; 
but the philosophical problems arising there are 
not typical for Stelzner's position only. There- 
fore, I will contrast his views to those of 
Kutschera [I9761 and Lenzen [19801 - both stand- 
ing in the tradition of Hintikka's epistemic 
logic whereas some of Stelzner's ideas belong to 
the tradition of Alexander Sinoviev's work. Then 
I discuss some philosophical positions behind 
this formal analysis of epistemic concepts, and 
I contrast them to the views of the late Witt- 
genstein. Finally, since I sympathize with most 
of Stelzner's ideas on the methods of the logi- 
cal analysis of epistemic concepts, I will try 
to find a suitable reconstruction of his episte- 
mic logic to reach my second goal. 
* * *  
Kutschera [I9761 starts 'his construction of an 
epistemic logic with the distinction between a 
descriptive and a rational concept of belief and 
with the decision for the logical analysis of 
the rational concept of belief. He finds the 
motivations for this decision in the fact that 
for the totality of everything people really 
believe we cannot hold principles like 
and 
(2,) B ( a . g )  2 - B ( a . - R ) .  
He says that it is hardly possible to state 
principles about the inner logical structure of 
people's systems of contents of real beliefs 
since there are no limits to the lack of logical 
intelligence. (Cf. Kutschera 113761, p. 80) 
In the following way Kutschera introduces a 
rational concept of belief: Let B, be a suitable 
descriptive concept of belief; then, with 
A. is the set of belief contents of the person a, 
in the sense of this descriptive concept. Now, 
with restriction to consistent sets of sentences 
A., we can define: 
D.2 B(a,p) := A. c p. 
Now, B satisfies not only (1) and ( 2 ) ,  but also 
(3,) B(a,T), for a l l  logical ly true sentences T .  
It would be absurd to accept ( 3 )  for B. instead 
of B, but in the case of B it is highly trivial. 
(However, we should demand that the set A. is not 
empty to avoid that tables and chairs are out- 
standing instances of rational epistemic sub- 
jects! ) 
I think we cannot find any formal objections 
against this rational concept of belief, and we 
also cannot do it against Kutschera's further 
construction. However, it is interesting to look 
at what Kutschera says about the basic idea of 
epistemic logic: There is a normal language 
usage of 'believe' which for many purposes is 
sufficiently unambiguous. Epistemic logic deals 
with this predicate by formulating precise and 
systematically fruitful criteria of its usage 
for certain philosophical aims. (Cf. Kutschera 
L19761, p.79) - Let us assume now that there is 
someone who also deals with a logic of rational 
belief and who wants to attack Kutschera's 
system or, at least, wants to defend an alterna- 
tive system. What could he bring forward as an 
argument against Kutschera's system? He could 
attack the theses of the system, e.g., thesis 
11,): Thus, he could state that with B ( a , g  3 g )  
and B ( a . 9 )  as premisses the sentence - B ( a , q )  is 
satisfiable. In which way could he support his 
thesis? He cannot formulate arguments referring 
to real belief contents because these do not 
belong to what we are concerned with. The ques- 
tion is what someone believes rationally or does 
not believe rationally (or: ought to believe 
rationally or ought not to believe rationally). 
This means: he has to speak about his under- 
standing of 'rationality', and now we realize: 
Kutschera's meaning postulates do not regulate 
the usage of the concept of belief but of the 
concept of rationality. - Instead of saying: "If 
someone rationally believes this, then he also 
rationally believes that" we could say: "If 
someone is rational, then, if he believes this, 
he also believes that." And in this case we use 
a concept of belief which is not already fixed 
as a rational concept (but, perhaps, our concept 
of rationality is restricted to belief con- 
texts) : 
This separation of the demand for rationality 
R ( a )  has two advantages: 11) Since we now have 
exposed the concept of rationality we may go on 
with distinctions between different demands for 
rationality - this is an idea developed in 
Stelzner's system. (2) Thesis (4;) shows that 
until now we have not performed the main part of 
our task: Since thesis (4;) belongs to the 
meaning postulates about R, of course it cannot 
belong to the meaning postulates about our 
concept of belief G! We have said nothing about 
our concept of belief! 
Before turning to the positions of Stelzner, who 
also fulfills this second task, I will make some 
remarks on Lenzen [I9801 : Like Kutschera, Lenzen 
starts with a rational belief concept but with- 
out reducing it to the descriptive belief con- 
cept in the mode of DK1 and D,2. It seems to be 
as if this would pressure him to motivate the 
adequacy of his usage of epistemic concepts - 
although he states meaning postulates and gives 
axiomatic characterizations, and this, surely, 
is a correct practice. Lenzen says: It is the 
nature of epistemic attitudes that they are 
subjective. This does not mean that there are no 
objective or intersubjective criteria for them. 
This is not even meant as a thesis of "privi- 
leged access" in the sense that in knowing the 
belief contents of a person, nobody is as cer- 
tain as this person herself. It merely means 
that everybody always has an immediate access - 
privileged or not - to his own epistemic atti- 
tudes. If he assumes or believes something he is 
always indubitably conscious of this fact by 
means of introspection. (Cf. Lenzen [19801, p. 
2 7 )  
Kutschera could not accept such a thesis because 
in the case of his rational concept of belief B, 
we could at best state that the elements of the 
set A. are known indubitably but not the logical 
consequences of this set. Lenzen, however, needs 
this thesis because giving up intersubjective 
controllability is not so painful if we pro- 
claim: "We are all immediately conscious of our 
own epistemic attitudes, aren't we?" - I will 
return to this problem after I have sketched 
Stelzner's positions. 
The basic epistemic concept of Stelzner [I9841 
is that of explicit internal acceptance: 
A 1 ( x , g , t )  - During the interval t the subject x 
explicitly accepts p internally. 
Stelzner says that the introduction of this 
concept would immediately guarantee that the 
subject may decide indubitably whether or not it 
explicitly accepts a certain sentence p inter- 
nally. This concept has to mean that before t, 
the subject x performs the act of explicitly 
accepting p internally and that during t, x 
maintains up this acceptance. (Cf. Stelzner 
[19841, p. 41) 
In the case of expressions like A 1 ( x , g , t ) ,  we 
have to decide what the reference of p is: If p 
were a variable for truth values, we would get 
an extensional epistemic logic, with the conse- 
quence that the epistemic subject has to be an 
ideal knower of the world (or ideal "mis-knower" 
of the world) because sentences with the same 
truth value could substitute for one another. - 
We can avoid this embarrassing consequence if we 
use p as a variable for propositions (intensions 
of sentences), but then logically equivalent 
sentences are still substitutable; therefore, 
epistemic subjects have to be ideal logicians. 
Usually, this way is chosen in the construction 
of epistemic logics (examples are Kutschera 
[I9761 and Lenzen [1980]) with the result that 
the correlated epistemic concepts have a theo- 
retical state (mood) and are not directly appli- 
cable to epistemic attitudes. - Thus, Stelzner 
decides to take g as a variable for sentences 
(as elements of language), and now the transi- 
tions the subject performs from certain sentenc- 
es to others depend on its usage of language and 
its logical abilities. (Therefore, the predicate 
A' is never intensional but hyper-intensional.) 
Consequently, Stelzner has to introduce another 
basic predicate, the concept of understanding, 
to refer in the language of analysis to what 
epistemic subjects accept in their language: 
U ( x , a , t , b )  - the subject x understands in the 
interval t the expression a in the sense 
that x identifies by a the same as is iden- 
tified by b in the language of analysis. 
With the definition 
he introduces the concept of adequate under- 
standing and with 
he postulates that the subject understands the 
sentences it accepts - it understands the sen- 
tences in some sense, not necessarily in the 
sense of our language of analysis. And: the 
subject understands the sentences in a way we 
can express in our language. 
By definitions we get concepts of implicit 
internal acceptance: Propositional hermeneutic 
implicit internal acceptance with 
and derived imp1 ici t internal acceptance with 
D.4 A 1 ' ( x , p , t )  := (3q *... c&r ,... r a ) ( U ( x , q l , t , r l )  A 
. . . A U ( x , c & , t , r m )  A A 1 ( x , u , , t )  A 
... A A ' ( ~ . & r t ) ) ,  w h e r e  
TI, . . . , r .+p .  
In D,3 we ascribe to the epistemic subject the 
acceptance of g, whereas the subject really 
accepts a sentence of which p is a translation, 
and in D,4 we ascribe to the subject the accep- 
tance of a sentence p that is a consequence of 
sentences which are translations of sentences 
the subject really accepts. 
But also both these concepts are not yet the 
same as those of Kutschera [I9761 and Lenzen 
[19801 since we are still bound to the subject's 
usage of language. We get these concepts in the 
next step: We define propositional formal im- 
plicit internal acceptance with 
D.5 g ( x , p , t )  := (3g)A1(x,g,t), where I- p=g 
and derived formal implici t internal acceptance 
with 
0.6 A!(x,p,t) := (3q ,... &) ( ~ ' ( x , g ~ , t )  A ... 
. . - A t  where g,, . . . ,& kg. 
Now we ascribe to the subject implicit attitudes 
without looking at its usage of language. Kut- 
schera's concept of belief is that of D,5, 
Lenzen's comprises D,5 and D,6. 
Stelzner says that his basic predicate of ex- 
plicit internal acceptance is effective relative 
to the subject itself, because the subject could 
always decide whether or not it explicitly 
accepts a certain sentence internally (cf. 
Stelzner [19841, p. 41), but he knows that this 
is not valid for the concepts we introduced with 
D,3 - D,6 and, hence, it is not valid for the 
concepts of Kutschera and Lenzen, as well. 
Moreover, he knows that all the concepts he has 
introduced exclude the possibility of an inter- 
subjective verification. He obtains such con- 
cepts which are intersubjectively verifiable by 
altering the basic approach and defining a 
predicate of explicit external acceptance: 
A'(x,g,t,y) - in the interval t ,  the subject x  
performs the act of explicit external 
acceptance (act of assertion) of the 
sentence g  vis-a-vis the audience y .  
The explicit external acceptance is performed by 
acts (in most cases: speech acts) observable by 
other persons. 
In the following I will leave aside Stelzner's 
very interesting analysis of this concept of 
external acceptance, and in particular the 
differentiated demands for rationality I men- 
tioned above. I will sketch only one point I 
need for my further criticism. 
In combining his concepts of internal and exter- 
nal acceptance, Stelzner is now in a position to 
present very beautiful. analyses of sincere 
assertions and of lies. With 
he defines sincere assertion. (Please note that 
to make a sincere assertion the speaker has to 
accept internally the asserted sentence but he 
may understand this sentence in another way than 
we do in our language of analysis.) We get the 
general form of lies with 
a special case is, e.g., 
Now I can start my criticism: Stelzner fights 
intensely against all attempts to find action- 
theoretical foundations for the concepts of 
internal acceptance: since there would be no 
compelling way from external acts of acceptance 
to internal acceptance, we could only get behav- 
ioristic reductions of internal attitudes. He, 
too, rejects Searle's speech act-theoretical 
foundations of the concept of assertion because, 
as he says, referring to internal attitudes 
(especially in the rule of sincerity) makes the 
concept of assertion ineffective. Stelzner 
thinks that only the independent introduction of 
predicates of internal and external acceptance 
could guarantee a correct explication of the 
predicates of sincere and insincere assertions. 
Thus, we get the deep, unbridgeable gap between 
the concepts of internal and of external atti- 
tudes with which we are highly familiar from our 
traditional philosophical thinking. I think that 
this gap is the result of the following: first 
we construed concepts of internal acceptance, 
belief, understanding, etc. as concepts of 
private mental events or states because we 
wanted to secure the indubitable application of 
these concepts to ourselves. But now we want to 
apply these concepts to the - as we assumed - 
hidden attitudes of other people - and we do not 
know how to do this. Therefore, we introduce new 
concepts: concepts for external acts of accep- 
tance, belief, etc. Since these acts are per- 
formed publicly we may be sure about whether or 
not such an act is performed, but the proposi- 
tional and intentional attitudes are still hid- 
den. Thus these external acts may give us a hint 
that there are some internal acts, states or 
events, but we cannot know which. And, conse- 
quently, we can neither define concepts of inner 
states or acts by means of concepts of outer 
states or acts nor can we do the reverse. 
Stelzner is right when he says that his concept 
of internal acceptance in application to other 
people is not effective, but this is a v e w  weak 
formulation: we call a concept 'effective' if 
and only if there exists a procedure to decide 
definitely, in a finite number of steps, for 
every n-tupel of individuals whether or not it 
falls under that concept. This concept of inter- 
nal acceptation is then not only non-effective 
but in no case (always leaving aside the case of 
our own attitudes) are we able to decide whether 
or not a subject internally accepts a particular 
sentence. And the cause of this is not that we 
could not decide definitely because there is an 
empirical uncertainty in the applied methods, 
but we are not able to decide at all for con- 
ceptual reasons: the external behavior of the 
subject does not provide us with any criteria 
for the internal attitudes. (This was the reason 
for the criticism of concepts of internal atti- 
tudes grounded act-theoretically.) 
Thus we are concerned with a rather strange 
concept: Whereas everyone in his own case knows 
whether he accepts a certain sentence, we not 
even know how to apply the concept in the case 
of other people. On the other hand in everyday 
usage we obviously have no difficulties applying 
concepts of internal attitudes to other people. 
Is the usage of these concepts in the applica- 
tion to other people then just the same as in 
one's own case? - It is a question we are farnil- 
iar with from the writings of the later Wittgen- 
stein; therefore, let us try to find an answer 
with Wittgenstein's help. 
Stelzner declares that the concept of internal 
acceptation intends a definite state of con- 
sciousness of the epistemic subject (cf. Stelz- 
ner [ 1 9 8 8 1 ) ,  and now it seems to be as if our 
problem results from the factual difficulties 
determining this state. But what is the state of 
consciousness of internal acceptance? "The 
essential thing about private experience is 
really not that each person possesses his own 
exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other 
people also have this or something else." (PI 
272) I have a clear picture of what it means 
that I accept a definite sentence, namely: I 
have a definite attitude to this sentence. Well, 
and he has the same attitude if he accepts the 
sentence. "That gets us no further. It is as if 
I were to say: 'You surely know what >It's 5 
o'clock here< means; so you also know what >It's 
5 o'clock on the sun< means. It means simply 
that it is just the same time there as it is 
here when it is 5 o'clock.' - The explanation by 
means of identity does not work here. For I know 
well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 
5 o'clock there 'the same time', but what I do 
not know is in what cases one is to speak of its 
being the same time here and there.. . For that 
part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that 
is, that one will say that the stove has the 
same experience as I, if one says: it is in pain 
and I am in pain." (PI 350) "Perhaps a logician 
will think: The same is the same - how identity 
is established is a psychological question. 
(High is high - it is a matter of psychology 
that one sometimes sees, and sometimes hears 
it.)" (PI 377) But, of course, our talk about 
internal attitudes is not one which is based, e. 
g., on the newest results of psychology or 
neurophysiology, and our uncertainty in applying 
these concepts is not an empirical one. "When I 
say the ABC to myself, what is the criterion of 
my doing the same as someone else who silently 
repeats it to himself? It might be found that 
the same thing took place in my larynx and in 
his. (And similarly when we both think of the 
same thing, wish the same, and so on.) But then 
did we learn the use of the words: 'to say such- 
and-such to oneself' by some-one's pointing to a 
process in the larynx or the brain?" (PI 376) 
Starting with concepts of our own internal 
attitudes, we cannot find a path to the internal 
attitudes of other people; and as long as we do 
not leave this starting point, but nevertheless 
declare that we can know the experiences, atti- 
tudes, etc. of other people, we are subject to 
the reproach of behavioristic reductions of our 
concepts of internal attitudes and experiences. 
"'Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? 
Aren't you at bottom really saying that every- 
thing except human behavior is a fiction?"' [PI 
3071 In fact, if the mind-body-dualism is estab- 
lished, Wittgenstein's position is to be under- 
stood as a variation of psychological behavior- 
ism. In this case Wittgenstein's reply to the 
reproach of denying mental processes may appear 
merely as a rearguard action: "Why should I deny 
that there is a mental process? But 'There has 
just taken place in me the mental process of 
remembering . . . . ' means nothing more than: 'I 
have just remembered . . . . ' . To deny the mental 
process would mean to deny the remembering; to 
deny that anyone ever remembers anything." [PI 
3061 
But Wittgenstein says in PI 305 which positions 
he is arguing against: "The impression that we 
wanted to deny something arises from our setting 
our faces against the picture of the inner 
process gives us the correct idea of the use of 
the word 'to remember'. We say that this picture 
with its ramifications stands in the way of our 
seeing the use of the word as it is." Behav- 
iorism is no way out of the mind-body-dualism 
but only the other pole of Cartesianism. "How 
does the philosophical problem about mental 
processes and states and about behaviorism 
arise? - The first step is the one that alto- 
gether escapes notice. We talk of processes and 
states and leave their nature undecided. Some- 
times perhaps we shall know more about them - we 
think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the matter. For we 
have a definite concept of what it means to 
learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, 
and it was the very one that we thought quite 
innocent.)" [PI 3081 But an argument directed 
against our philosophical tradition is subject 
to misinterpretations, especially when we ask 
our questions where everything seems to be 
clear. "So we have to deny the yet uncomprehend- 
ed process in the yet unexplored medium. And now 
it looks as if we had denied mental processes. 
And naturally we don't want to deny them." [PI 
3081 
We have to destroy the picture of the 'ghost in 
the machine', without however denying the exis- 
tence of mental processes and states. And, of 
course, it can happen that such mental processes 
of other people remain hidden. The usual philo- 
sophical usages makes it difficult for us to be 
serious about the materialistic thesis that 
mental processes and states are specific materi- 
al processes and states. "Thinking is not an 
incorporeal process which lends life and sense 
to speaking, and which it would be possible to 
detach from speaking, rather as the Devil took 
the shadow of Schlemiehl from the ground. - But 
how 'not an incorporeal process'? Am I acquaint- 
ed with incorporeal processes, then, only think- 
ing is not one of them? No; I called the expres- 
sion 'an incorporeal process' to my aid in my 
embarrassment when I was trying to explain the 
meaning of the word 'thinking' in a primitive 
way." [PI 339; cf. also Z 605, 6061 If we use 
the phrase 'the mental process is hidden' in its 
ordinary sense then to be hidden is no peculiar- 
ity of mental processes: "'What is internal is 
hidden from us. ' - The future is hidden from us. 
But does the astronomer think like this when he 
calculates an eclipse of the sun?" [PI 11, ch. 
It is interesting to observe that Stelzner, who 
is much more cautious than others in introducing 
and distinguishing his concepts of inner and 
outer assertions and much more conscious than 
others of the formal consequences of this intro- 
duction of epistemic concepts, nevertheless did 
not pay attention to some consequences in using 
these concepts - if we assume that these con- 
cepts, at least in some features, correspond to 
ordinary language usage. As an example: Stelzner 
analyzes sincere and insincere assertions by 
means of concepts of internal and external 
acceptance. We then have a nice analysis - but 
why do we still say that someone is sincere (or 
insincere) instead of saying: "Presumably he is 
sincere.' This, after all, should be the conse- 
quence of our analysis since we do not know his 
internal attitudes! That we are not inclined to 
alter our usage as a result of this analysis may 
serve as a hint that there something has gone 
wrong. Is it our ordinary language usage which 
is wrong? In ordinary language our speech about 
epistemic attitudes of others in normal cases 
makes no use of the thesis of the essential 
privacy of these attitudes! 
However: if there are no criteria for the cor- 
rect use of 'sincere' then there are also no 
criteria for the correct use of 'presumably 
sincere' . "Imagine that a child was quite spe- 
cially clever, so clever that he could at once 
be taught the doubtfulness of the existence of 
all things. So he learns from the beginning: 
'That is probably a chair.' 
And now how does he learn the question: 'Is it 
also really a chair?'-" [ Z  411; cf. also OC 4761 
The language-game in which we have learned to 
say "That is a chair" is fundamental to the 
language-game in which we say "That is probably 
a chair", "Is it also really a chair?". This has 
to be learned first, and then the other. At the 
bottom of our language-game is not doubt but 
certainty; and the kind of language-game deter- 
mines the kind of certainty as well as the kinds 
of possible doubts. 
If we now say of someone that his assertion is 
insincere, and later on correct our opinion - is 
the cause of this that at first we have been 
deceived by his body and then his mind has been 
revealed to us? His attitude has been hidden 
from us, and now we know it, but it has been his 
attitude and not that of his mind. "To have an 
opinion is a state. - A state of what? Of the 
soul? Of the mind? Well, of what object does one 
say that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for 
example. And that is the correct answer. " [PI 
5731 Our concept of a human being, of a person, 
as we use it in everyday life, is not that of a 
body plus a mind which is concealed in it and of 
which we have no knowledge. Rather we ascribe to 
the practical actions of a person, in particular 
her linguistic utterances, that they are delib- 
erate or not, intentional or not, sincere or 
not, etc. (Cf. Cook [ 1 9 6 9 1 . )  Wittgenstein con- 
tinues with: "One should not expect to be en- 
lightened by the answer to that question. Others 
go deeper: What, in particular cases, do we 
regard as criteria for.someonefs being of such- 
and-such an opinion? When do we say: he reached 
this opinion at that time? When: he has altered 
his opinion? And so on. The picture which the 
answers to these questions give us shews what 
gets treated grammatically as a state here." [PI 
5731 None of the answers we could give to these 
questions refers to a hidden mind; by this, 
however, we do not deny that we are speaking 
about mental states or processes but about their 
hiddeness. 
Our mistake was: we were not satisfied with the 
practical certainty, determined by our language- 
game, in applying the concepts 'sincere state- 
ment' and 'insincere statement'. We looked for 
something like logical certainty and hoped to 
find there at least a kind of neurophysiological 
certainty - but, of course, in application to 
mental states this kind of certainty too would 
not be the right one. The solution to the prob- 
lem is not to restrict ourselves to bodily 
processes and to guess which mental processes 
are behind them; and the solution is not to 
reconstrue concepts of mental states and pro- 
cesses by means of concepts of bodily states and 
processes. We refer to human actions which are 
embedded in a social practice. In our language- 
game we comprehend these processes as human 
actions, and it is the same social practice 
which is at the bottom of our language-game. 
[Cf. OC 204. ] 
Let us return now to epistemic logic and to our 
final task, the reconstruction of Stelzner's 
main ideas in epistemic logic but without those 
philosophical assumptions we criticized. - What 
consequences do our philosophical considerations 
have for the logical analysis of epistemic 
attitudes? There is at least one: We have to 
give up the distinction between internal and 
external acceptance; it is enough to speak about 
acceptance. But, were there any results of our 
philosophical analysis which could be used as 
new, better means to determine the state of 
acceptance? No - and this is alright! We did not 
aim at providing new scientific discoveries or 
theories about the mind. "Philosophy simply puts 
everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything . . .  One might also give the name 
'philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." [PI 1261 Philosophy 
leaves everything as it is. This should be a 
reason for stopping all our attempts at logical 
analysis, logical explanation of mental states, 
but it is no reason for stopping logical work 
altogether: Our task is not to explicate by 
logical means what belief, internal acceptance, 
etc. are, but to explicate how we speak about 
belief, acceptance, etc. (And this is no new 
philosophical or methodological view about the 
tasks of logical analysis but perhaps we have 
forgotten this in doing non-classical modal 
logic). 
Let us now consider which means we need to speak 
(in the third person) about epistemic attitudes. 
First of all, we have to be able to describe 
actions someone performs toward others to assert 
or reject the truth or falsehood of sentences: 
HX(x,v(p)=n,t,,t,) - In the interval limited by t, 
and t ,  x  performs an act of assertion 
with regard to the truth value n of 
the sentence g .  
Ha(x,v(g)=n,t,,t.) - In the interval limited by t ,  
and t, x performs an act of rejection 
with regard.to the truth value n of 
the sentence g .  
(The subject x may refer to the sentence g by an 
explicit performative speech act, but could also 
perform other acts we can identify in an appro- 
priate way. x may also make an explicit assign- 
ment of the truth value to the sentence but we 
would also accept other forms of assignment. 
Furthermore, for my purposes it is enough to 
restrict the truth value n to True and False; 
finally, although in the following I will not 
work with the predicate H', I do not think it is 
a trivial task to reduce Ha to Ha, especially 
when we permit non-verbal acts as acts of asser- 
tion and rejection.) 
Let us assume that HA(x,v(p)=lr t , , tp)  is true; 
then - in normal cases - we are inclined to say: 
'x  believes that p' is true: 
A(x,v(p)=n,t , , t , )  - In the interval limited by t, 
and t, x believes that the sen- 
tence p has the truth value n .  
However, there are not. always normal cases. 
Sometimes, in some circumstances, we distrust 
the sincerity of these acts of assertion or 
rejection. So, to conclude acceptance from the 
performance of the act of acceptance we need 
something more. What is it we need? Is it the 
knowledge of the hidden mental state of sinceri- 
ty? Then we would be at the same point where 
Stelzner did not find a solution! Let me remind 
you: I have proposed that we should not try to 
analyze the mental states of assertion, sinceri- 
ty, etc. but to analyze our usage of the related 
expressions. Therefore, the question is not, in 
which cases of acts of acceptance the mental 
state of acceptance really exists. The question 
is rather: If we say 'He performs the act of 
acceptance of p ' ,  in which circumstances do we 
also say 'He accepts p'?  I think: What we need 
is a certain attitude towards this person, that 
is, we regard him as sincere: 
S ( x , t , , t , )  - In the interval limited by t ,  and t ,  
x  is sincere in its acts of assertion and 
rejection. 
A remark on the formal structure of this predi- 
cate: for the purposes of this paper I have 
chosen a very simple, perhaps too simple predi- 
cate. Perhaps we should have an argument for the 
audience in S, and perhaps it would be better to 
have an argument for the act of assertion or 
rejection in S. In this case perhaps in this 
place there should be an event term, and we 
would need some enlargement of our logical 
means. But I think we can go on with this simple 
predicate. 
And a more important remark: Please do not 
forget that we do not ascribe S to x because of 
x's mental state of sincerity but because of our 
attitude toward x. Perhaps we have this attitude 
to x solely because of x's state of sincerity, 
however, this is not our concern here. 
Thus, we accept 
We can adopt Stelzner's concept of understanding 
in its formal structure: 
U ( x , a , t , , t , , b )  - In the interval limited by t, and 
t, the subject x understands the 
expression a in the sense that x 
identifies by a the same thing iden- 
tified by b in the language of analy- 
sis. 
But now we have to note that this concept is 
applied on the basis of the subject's externally 
controllable usage and of the construction of 
translation rules. 
Further, we define a concept of acts of proposi- 
tional acceptance: 
and a concept of propositional acceptance: 
Thus, as basic concepts we have: H, A, S and n. 
With the exception of A all these concepts refer 
to externally observable conduct of the subject, 
but not in a behavioristic sense: my goal is not 
to reduce internal states to external conduct 
but to formalize concepts with which we speak 
about other persons. 
An interesting question is whether we can stren- 
gthen (PJ) to get an equivalence; then we could 
eliminate A from the set of basic concepts and 
define : 
I would not like this definition because then we 
would ascribe to x the related belief of p only 
for the duration of performing the act of asser- 
tion. Therefore, I propose as concept of active- 
dispositional -proposi tional belief: 
D.3 E ( x , p , t , , t , )  := ( 3 t , t . ) ( P ( x , p , t , , t , ) ~  
A S ( ~ , t , , t , )  A ( t ,  < t , ) ~ ( t ,  < t l ) ~  
( t ,  < t , )  A ( t .  &,)A 
A ( Q u t , t , )  (H'(x,v ( u )  = o , t , , t . ) ~  
A S ( x , t s , t ' )  A U ( X , U , t s r  t s r p ) 3  
3 ( ( t ,  < t,) A ( t '  < t , ) ) V  
v (('2, <t . )  A  ( t ,  < t . ) ) ~  
v ( ( t ,  > t , )  A (t, > t , )  ) V  
v ( ( t '  > t , )  A ( t ,  > t , ) ) ) .  
The definition is a little bit complicated. It 
says: x believes p in an interval if before that 
interval he performed a sincere assertion-act 
concerning g and, if he performed a sincere 
rejection-act concerning p, the rejection-act 
ends either before or after this interval. (We 
may strengthen the concept by substitution of A 
for the last v : then, any rejection-acts con- 
cerning p either end before the interval or 
begin after that interval.) 
The concept A? is the counterpart to Stelzner's 
concept A", but without reference to hidden 
mental states. Thus, using our own concepts we 
can continue Stelzner's analysis, and we will 
also get all the nice results Stelzner achieved. 
Finally, let me ask for the ontological corre- 
late to the belief concept we introduced with 
D,3. There are at least three different answers: 
(1) There exist internal mental states to which 
the concept A? is applicable. 
(2) Such a behavioristic reduction is not possi- 
ble; in some cases it may be that A?(x,p,t,,t,) 
and AiD(x,p,t), where t=ct,, t,>, are true simulta- 
neously, but this would be by chance. (We may 
say the same about the concepts of Lenzen and 
Kutschera.) 
(3) A? is a terminus technicus, a mode of speech 
only; the concept means nothing more than what 
it says on the basis of the definition. If it 
has an ontological correlate than it has it 
solely because the concepts in the definiens do 
have an ontological correlate. 
My answer is the third; I think the first is 
wrong; the second and the third, indeed, do not 
exclude one another, but with the third answer I 
give up ontological assumptions I do not need. 
You may say that my position is merely cautious 
- but that is exactly what it is supposed to be! 
Whoever is courageous enough to construe an 
ontology may do it as a supplement to this 
analysis. However, I expect - and this expresses 
my own philosophical opinion - that there is no 
situation interesting for epistemology or phi- 
losophy of language where a use of the concept 
nip - independent of kP - could have any advantage 
for describing persons. And if I am wrong in 
this point I will only have to withdraw my basic 
idea if there are no useful applications of my 
concept kP. 
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